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ABSTRACT 
The purpose of this thesis is to provide the Marine Corps with an analytical 
review of its primary military occupational specialty (PMOS) bonuses, specific to 
aviation maintenance occupations, that have been available to Marines from 2008 to 
2018, as well as the aviation maintenance specific skills bonus implemented during the 
fiscal year (FY) 2018 selective retention bonus (SRB) program. The thesis includes a 
literature review on the importance of aviation maintenance-specific skills and the 
economic theory related to pay incentives in the Department of Defense; a summarization 
of requirements to obtain an aviation maintenance certification; a review of the SRB 
program; and a data analysis on take-up rates and factors affecting re-enlistment odds. An 
understanding of the requirements needed to produce an aviation maintenance Marine 
with certifications and take-up rates for those specific PMOS bonuses during this period 
can assist the Marine Corps in updating policies targeting the intended population for 
retention and hard-to-fill assignments respective to specific MOSs. Review of the SRB 
program explains how the program has changed over time, details what MOSs and level 
of experience are targeted, and longitudinal information. The analysis in this thesis 
identifies that changes in SRB amounts are not statistically significant correlated to 
affecting the odds of aviation maintenance Marines re-enlisting but increases to SRB cap 
amounts increase the odds of re-enlistment. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
CRITICAL TASK: Exploit the Competence of the Individual Marine. We 
have highly trained maintenance experts working in the hangars…These 
young men and women keep our aircraft flying. In turn, those aircraft keep 
the Marine Corps moving. We are maximizing the competence of these 
Marines, capitalizing on their expertise and their experience, and we are 
determined to keep our best Marines in our Corps. It is incumbent upon us 
to show them a path to senior leadership, a clear progression through the 
ranks to both capture their knowledge and reward their good work. (United 
States Marine Corps [USMC], 2018) 
A. OVERVIEW 
Retaining the most knowledgeable and experienced Marines is top priority for 
today’s Marine Corps, for current and future success. A small pool of this larger population 
is aviation maintenance Marines, specifically those holding collateral duty inspector (CDI), 
collateral duty quality assurance representative (CDQAR), and quality assurance 
representative (QAR) certifications. As end-strength numbers fluctuated over the past 
decade, with a plus-up beginning in 2006 and a drawdown at the conclusion of the Global 
War on Terror, the Marine Corps felt the effects of the exodus of experienced aviation 
maintenance Marines. Losing this pool of experience is detrimental to the Marine Corps 
due to the time a Marine need to earn one of the previously mentioned qualifications. Given 
the high level of responsibility, Marines typically holding these certifications range from 
high-performing corporals to gunnery sergeants, with rare cases of outstanding junior 
Marines. The pool of specific skill qualified maintainers is small and if those Marines are 
not re-enlisting, the pool takes longer to replenish. The period of time needed to obtain one 
of these qualifications is typically three to four years. This happens to align with a 
significant decision point in a young Marine’s life—to retain or separate. If the Marine re-
enlists, the Marine Corps benefits from her knowledge for an additional four years, but if 
the Marine separates, the Marine Corps has to wait another enlistment for a new Marine to 
take her place.  
Leadership in the aviation community strive to keep those Marines serving as long 
as possible, because they understand the time it takes to create one certified maintainer.  
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To get the most out of not only the Marine but the skills that they acquire 
through the schooling, we feel it necessary to establish a longer career 
trajectory for them.… The aviation Marines with these qualifications are 
“homegrown,” so it takes a while to develop those maintainers within each 
unit…. The intent is to keep them—to the maximum extent possible—
within each unit that they’re already in. It’s a greater return on investment 
for the time that the commander puts in to training these individuals to have 
these qualifications. (Schogol, 2017b) 
In part to maximize its training investment, the Marine Corps offers the selective 
retention bonus (SRB) program to incentivize these Marines to continue serving after four 
years. Since 2000, the Marine Corps has been using this program mainly to focus on 
specific occupations, at specific grades and years of service, to re-enlist through the 
primary military occupational specialty (PMOS) bonus. Additional kicker bonus programs 
have been introduced, the most recent focusing on aviation maintenance Marines holding 
a certification and/or re-enlisting to continue serving at a designated unit via the Aviation 
Maintenance kicker.  
B. PROBLEM AND HYPOTHESIS 
There is a growing concern with the lack of experienced aviation maintenance 
Marine retention. Constant turnover of these individuals undermines aircraft readiness 
because at least four years of maintenance experience leaves operational and intermediate 
maintenance departments every time a CDI, CDQAR, QAR certified Marine decides to 
separate. “Maintainers are just as important as spare parts and pilots…And it takes time for 
maintainers to gain enough experience to become certified … ‘surgeons in the maintenance 
department’” (Schogol, 2017a). Marines holding one of the certifications is equivalent to 
a surgeon because they are specialists or subject matter experts in their respective work 
centers. A CDI Marine working in the hydraulics work center of a maintenance department 
has been working in that department for at least three years and holding the CDI 
qualification identifies her as the expert to ensure those on her team are following proper 
maintenance procedures. These Marines are also responsible for signing off on all 
maintenance action forms (MAF), ultimately certifying the repaired parts are safe for flight.  
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In the 2018 Aviation Plan, the Deputy Commandant, Aviation (DC, A) expresses 
that retaining these personnel is crucial to the Marine Corps’ overall mission (USMC, 
2018). As with any firm, the Marine Corps likes to measure its achievements, but how it 
assesses aviation success is through readiness. In the aviation community, aircraft readiness 
is the metric depicting a squadron’s success. The overall operational readiness of Marine 
Corps aircraft is the metric to how successful the Aviation Combat Element (ACE) is or 
will be. Obtaining high levels of readiness is where aviation maintenance and CDI/
CDQAR/QAR Marines become crucial. Without their hard work and knowledge, the 
aircraft would not get repaired efficiently or effectively. This is the current problem facing 
the Marine Corps. “A key factor underlying the Marine Corps’ aviation crisis stems from 
the recent draw down of forces when droves of highly trained maintainers left the force.… 
Some of … [the] most experienced maintainers were allowed to take early retirement when 
the service shrank from 202,000 to 184,000” (Schogol, 2017b). The exit of a large 
cumulative level of experience through these departures has caused aircraft readiness to 
decline. “More than half of the … fleet of about 1,000 fixed-wing and rotary-wing were 
unable to fly at the end of 2016” (Schogol, 2017b).  
How the Marine Corps incentivizes these individuals to re-enlist is important when 
competing with equivalent civilian job market opportunities that may be more enticing to 
enlisted aviation maintenance Marines than continued service. Currently, a Marine’s re-
enlistment depends on the recommendation of her commanding officer (CO). The CO 
determines whether or not a Marine is eligible for re-enlistment based off pre-requisites, 
including: “conduct, performance, and future potential as it relates to rank, age, experience, 
and maturity level” (United States Marine Corps, 2010). Nowhere in this order does a re-
enlistment recommendation consider the technical skills a Marine develops during her first 
enlistments of active duty service. Complementing this order, to fill any technical expertise 
gaps that may be overlooked in the previous order, is Marine Corps Order (MCO) 
7220.24P. This order details SRB and broken service selective retention bonus (BSSRB) 
programs, particularly identifying that “SRB/BSSRBs are monetary incentives paid to 
enlisted members at the time of reenlistment to assist in attaining and sustaining the 
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requisite number of career enlisted personnel in designated … (PMOSs)” USMC, 2016. 
The primary requisites for SRB eligibility, that tie to this study, are  
2. Be eligible and recommended for reenlistment. 3. Be serving in the grade 
of Lance Corporal or above. 4. Be assigned a PMOS designated in the 
annually published reference (f) and serve within that PMOS for the 
duration of the reenlistment unless authorized by HQMC … 6. Meet skill 
qualification prior to payment of the SRB for a member transferring into a 
PMOS. (USMC, 2016) 
Through these orders, one observes the Marine Corps strives to retain those highly 
trained, experienced, and knowledgeable individuals. Even in the Marine administrative 
messages (MARADMINs) pertaining to fiscal year SRB/BSSRB programs, the first 
paragraph of each message explains it the responsibility of a Marine’s leadership to retain 
the highest qualified for continued success of the Marine Corps. The program message 
from fiscal year (FY) 2018 states “Retaining our experienced and qualified Marines 
remains one of the Commandant’s highest priorities. Achieving retention goals is vital for 
shaping and sustaining the Marine Corps’ enlisted force” (Steele, 2017). The outlook of 
the aviation community leadership and the bonus programs demonstrate attitudes and 
measures the Marine Corps is willing to make to retain its human capital.  
This study aims to provide insight into the aviation maintenance community, 
highlighting the skills and time needed to earn a CDI, CDQAR, or QAR certification; 
analysis of the bonus programs that have been and are currently available to aviation 
maintenance Marines; analysis of the bonuses on retention of this population; and an 
analysis of the quality of Marines taking advantage of SRB program opportunities.  
In this research, I hypothesize aviation maintenance Marines are less likely to take-
up incentives as bonus pay amounts decrease, each year; those Marines re-enlisting later 
in the year are more likely to be “lower quality” than those who re-enlist early; aviation 
maintenance Marines and those aviation maintenance Marines holding CDI, CDQAR, or 
QAR certifications are less likely to retain due to civilian opportunities.  
The study’s main research question is to empirically test how bonus elasticities 
affect re-enlistment rates. The study breaks down this notion further by also investigating 
if current incentive programs and military compensation are competitive with civilian 
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opportunities to induce aviation maintenance Marines to re-enlist, and if the quality of 
those re-enlisting is comparable to the technical experts aviation community leadership 
strive to retain. The study’s analyses focus on active duty enlisted aviation maintenance 
Marines, holding ranks from E1-E9, who have or are currently filling aviation maintenance 
billets.  
C. PURPOSE 
This study uses multivariate analysis using personal and financial data to identify 
the following: relations between bonus pay elasticities and re-enlistment rates, determine 
if aviation maintenance certified Marines are more likely to re-enlist, quality of those 
Marines taking advantage of SRB opportunities. Maintaining aviation maintenance 
Marines holding CDI, QAR, and CDQAR certifications is critical to the success of Marine 
Corps aviation. My thesis finds aviation maintenance specific skill certified Marines are 
more likely to re-enlist when eligible, compared to aviation maintenance Marines without 
a CDI, CDQAR, or QAR certification. I also find military pay and SRB caps elasticities 
further increase the odds one of these Marines re-enlist. My last portion of results find that 
increasing quality of Marine decreases the odds she will re-enlist because her human capital 
is more transferrable to civilian job market opportunities than lower quality Marines’. The 
correlation between re-enlistment and pay and bonus cap elasticities correlate to increased 
re-enlistment probabilities, but they are not causal.  
Research Questions 
1. Primary Research Question 
• How have bonus elasticities affected retention rates since 2008? 
2. Secondary Research Questions  
• Are Marines that have taken advantage of bonus pays the “high quality” 
the Marine Corps strives to retain through its bonus pay programs? 
• Is the Marine Corps able to meet its goals during times of high 
competition—low unemployment rates and low military-civilian pay 
ratios? 
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• Do other factors—such as marital status, number of dependents, race, test 
scores, compensation, age, years of service, holding a maintenance 
certification—affect the probability of an aviation maintenance Marine re-
enlisting? 
D. METHODS 
To analyze the sample, re-enlistment eligibility and take-up rates, descriptive 
statistics are formulated using panel datasets resulting from merges of personnel database 
and financial database observations. First applying graphical analysis to each portion of the 
study identifies trends for further investigation and establishing trends. Then applying 
multivariate regression models to the datasets determine which human and compensation 
factors correlate to re-enlistment rates.  
A second pooled cross-sectional dataset is created for the quantitative analysis of 
the quality of Marines that have re-enlisted using evaluation information received from the 
personnel database. Applying multivariate regression models to this data demonstrates how 
aviation maintenance Marines’ quality changes over time.  
E. SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS 
Examining re-enlistment rates and quality respective to active duty aviation 
maintenance Marines limits the study. The results do not account for Marine Corps 
manpower requirements outside this community, like special duty assignments, which may 
impact a Marine’s decision to retain or separate. The scope of the study is designed to be 
narrow, to provide Marine Corps policy maker with insight into re-enlistment rates and 
factors affecting aviation maintenance Marines’ decisions. 
Presenting information relative to only primary military occupational specialty 
(PMOS) and specific skills kickers relative to the Marine Corps’ SRB program also limit 
the study. This program is the most relevant to the study’s target population and the primary 
means the Marine Corps has to target specific occupations for re-enlistment initiatives.  
F. ORGANIZATION OF STUDY 
Organization of this thesis separates the information into 5 chapters. Chapter II 
provides background information on aviation maintenance occupations and certifications, 
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aviation maintenance Marines’ impact on aircraft readiness, and incentive pay programs. 
Chapter III presents examples and synthesizes previous research applicable to the present 
research through a literature review. Chapter IV describes the data, statistical models, and 
analyzes the correlation bonus elasticities and human and compensation characteristics 
have to re-enlistment probabilities. The chapter also discusses aviation maintenance 
Marine quality, of those who re-enlist. Chapter V summarizes the study, generates 
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II. BACKGROUND 
A. U.S. MARINE CORPS AVIATION MAINTENANCE  
The Naval Aviation Maintenance Program (NAMP) is a publication, directed by 
the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO), addressing maintenance policies, procedures, and 
responsibilities for all levels of maintenance: organizational, intermediate, and depot level. 
The purpose of this program is to establish standardized protocols for aviation material 
readiness, maintenance policies, procedures, responsibilities, and safety for maintenance 
departments across the operational forces within the Navy and Marine Corps. The NAMP 
is instrumental to a properly functioning maintenance department (United States Navy 
[USN], 2017). This publication is important to this study as it establishes how technically 
proficient and well-trained aviation maintenance Marines are, highlighting the importance 
of this human capital, as well as providing evidence to how important it is to retain these 
highly trained individuals. The aviation maintenance Marines holding CDI, CDQAR, or 
QAR certifications must be experts in their assigned work center or maintenance 
department, and part of that expertise is understanding and holding other maintenance 
Marines accountable to the policies set in the NAMP. 
1. Maintenance Department Composition 
To generate a better understanding of the number of aviation maintenance Marines 
supporting the aviation community this section provides details of maintenance 
departments and the level of responsibility associated with each. 
a. Organizational Level (O-level) 
Aviation maintainers at this level are the Marines directly attached to an operational 
squadron. They are the first line of defense when maintaining a squadron’s aircraft 
readiness. The primary function of the maintenance department at this level includes 
“inspecting, servicing, lubricating, adjusting, and replacing parts, minor assemblies, and 
subassemblies of aircraft, Unmanned Aircraft (UA) or Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS), 
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and aeronautical equipment” (USN, 2017) Figures 1 and 2 depict the general organization 
of fixed-/rotary-wing and UA O-level maintenance departments, respectively.  
 
Figure 1. O-level maintenance department (Marine Corps). 
Source: USN (2017).  
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Figure 2. O-level autonomous maintenance unit concept. 
Source: USN (2017) 
The MOSs comprising each type of O-level department and type, model, series (T/
M/S) of aircraft supported may be different, the overall organization of these maintenance 
departments are the same.  
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b. Intermediate Level (I-level) 
Aviation maintenance departments at this level are the next echelon of aircraft 
repair capability. Typically, these maintenance departments are located with the 
operational aviation units they support. For example, Marine Aviation Logistics Squadron 
(MALS) 26 is the I-level maintenance department supporting all the flying squadrons 
within Marine Aircraft Group (MAG) 26. Since all the squadrons it supports are aboard 
Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS) New River, MALS-26 is located directly next to the 
flight line for maximum support. The maintenance conducted here focuses on those tasks 
that cannot be completed at the O-level due to lack of equipment or qualification, testing 
and repairing aeronautical components and support equipment, calibration of tools, 
technical assistance to O-level units, and manufacturing certain aeronautical components. 
Aviation maintenance Marines in I-level departments may also support non-local activities 
(USN, 2017). If a machine is down at MALS-29, MALS-26 I-level may be able to support 
MALS-29’s maintenance efforts until the machine is fully operational. Figure 3 shows how 
an I-level maintenance department differs from the O-level.  
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Figure 3. I-level maintenance department organization (Marine Corps). 
Source: USN (2017). 
This level of aviation maintenance changes from the O-level by having a production 
control work center, a material readiness manager, support equipment and life support 
systems work centers. Since the I-level is responsible for large-scale (multi-squadron) 
support, it needs divisions to support such a wide range of maintenance. 
c. Depot Level (D-level)
While the maintenance at this level is completed by contractors, I-level aviation 
maintenance Marines work closely with D-level employees. When working with the 
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contractors, the I-level Marines learn new techniques and technical directives, that expand 
individual levels of expertise and knowledge, but are lessons these same Marines can 
impart on others within the I-level department. Particularly, if a new technical directive is 
published and taught by D-level contractors, I-level CDIs, CDQARs, and QARs are the 
ones to ensure these amendments are incorporated into daily operations and aviation 
maintenance Marines are adhering to the new standard (USN, 2017).  
2. Aviation Maintenance MOSs 
Each maintenance echelon is comprised of aviation maintenance Marines filling 
billets that correlate to a four-digit code assigned to individual Marines once they complete 
basic occupational training. The MOS codes also depend on the T/M/S their respective 
maintenance departments’ support. The descriptions of codes in this section correlate 
directly to the population studied in this thesis.  
a. Aircraft Maintenance 
The occupations in this field are responsible for “direct and indirect support of the 
total airframes and power plant package of all aviation aircraft weapons systems” (USMC, 
2013). Marines in this occupational field have opportunities for progression to 
management/supervisory roles, and some MOSs have the advantage of participating in a 
formal apprenticeship program resulting in receipt of a Department of Labor Certification, 
if successfully completed. Table 1 lists the MOSs comprising this occupational field, 
detailing MOS code, title, ranks that can fill the respective billets, and billet descriptions.  
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Table 1. General aviation maintenance MOSs. 
Adapted from USMC (2013). 
 
 
b. Aircraft Maintenance (Rotary-Wing) 
MOSs in this occupational field are focused on maintaining the Marine Corps’ 
rotary-wing assets. After completing basic MOS training, aviation maintenance Marines in 
this field are awarded a 6111 MOS indicating she has successfully completed helicopter/
tiltrotor mechanic training. Follow-on schools are where these Marines are filtered into the 
MOS Title Applicable Ranks Billet Description
6012 Aviation Maintenance Controller/Production Controller Sgt - GySgt
"Plan, direct, and control the performance and execution of 
aviation maintenance department functions at both the O-
Level and I-Level ." 
6018 Aviation QAR/CDQAR/CDI Cpl - MGySgt
"Responsible for the prevention of the occurrence of 
defects. The concept embraces all events from the start of 
the maintenance operation to its completion. They must 
possess a detailed, working knowledge of all Navy-
sponsored aviation maintenance programs and processes."
6019 Aircraft Maintenance Chief MSgt - MGySgt
"Expected to supervise all maintenance areas, personnel 
qualifications and MOS development within respective 
squadrons." 
6023 Aircraft Power Plants Test Cell Operator Cpl - GySgt
"Responsible for inspecting, testing, and performing 
corrective maintenance to aircraft gas turbine engines and 
engine systems."
6033 Aircraft Nondestructive Inspection Technician Cpl - GySgt
"Conduct nondestructive testing of metals in aircraft 
structures and other aircraft or engine components."
6042 Individual Material Readiness List (IMRL) Asset Manager Pvt - MGySgt
"Manage IMRL asset inventories in accordance with 
NAMP and Aircraft Maintenance Material Readiness List 
(AMMRL) program procedures."
6043 Aircraft Welder LCpl - GySgt
"Fabricate and repair aircraft metals through basic welding 
using gas/tungsten/titanium welding/arc welding (GTAW) 
procedures on alloys: aluminum, steel, stainless steel, and 
precipitating hardening nickel based."
6046 Aircraft Maintenance Administration Specialist Pvt - MGySgt
"Maintain aircraft log books, naval aircraft maintenance 
publications, as well as prepare reports, logs records, 
directives, and correspondence." 
6048 Flight Equipment Technician Pvt - GySgt
"Inspect, maintain, and repair parachutes; flight survival 
equipment; flight equipment; carbon dioxide, and other 
gaseous and liquid oxygen equipment."
6049 NALCOMIS Application Administrator/Analyst Sgt - MGySgt
"Conduct data analysis and trend interpretation for 
developing statistical process control methods in support of 
aviation information and readiness reporting 
requirements."
6062 Aircraft I-Level Hydraulic/Pneumatic Mechanic Pvt - GySgt
"Inspect, maintain, and repair aircraft intermediate level 
hydraulic/pneumatic system components."
6072 Aircraft Maintenance Supply Equipment Hydraulic/Pneumatic/Structures Mechanic Pvt - GySgt
"Inspect, maintain, repair, and test aircraft maintenance 
SE, hydraulic/pneumatic/structures systems and system 
components."
6073 Aircraft Maintenance SE Electrician/Refrigeration Mechanic Pvt - GySgt
"Install, inspect, test, maintain, and repair aircraft SE, 
electrical/instrument and refrigeration and air conditioning 
equipment, systems, and components."
6074 Cryogenics Equipment Operator Pvt - GySgt
"Assemble, operate, and maintain liquid oxygen/nitrogen 
(LOX) generating plants, storage and aircraft servicing 
equipment, vaporizing equipment, vacuum pumps, and 
LOX tank purging units."
6092 Aircraft I-Level Structures Mechanic Pvt - Gysgt
"Inspect, maintain, and repair aircraft intermediate level 
structural components."
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various MOS supporting operational rotary-wing and tiltrotor squadrons. Table 2 details 
these MOS, titles, applicable ranks, and billet descriptions. 
Table 2. Rotary-wing and tiltrotor maintenance MOSs. 
Adapted from USMC (2013). 
 
c. Aircraft Maintenance (Fixed-Wing) 
MOSs in this occupational field are focused on maintaining the Marine Corps’ 
fixed-wing assets. After completing basic MOS training, aviation maintenance Marines in 
this field are awarded a 6251 MOS indicating she has successfully completed fixed-wing 
mechanic training. Another basic MOS training complete MOS is 6281, identifying these 
Marines are ready for follow-on safety equipment mechanic training. Follow-on schools 
are where these Marines are filtered into the various MOS supporting operational fixed-
wing squadrons. Table 3 details these MOS, titles, applicable ranks, and billet descriptions. 
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d. Organizational Avionics Maintenance 
Marines in this occupational field are expected to directly and indirectly support all 
the Marine Corps’ aviation weapon systems. As with the structural and components 
mechanics occupational fields, avionics also has career progression opportunities where a 
junior Marine could become a work center supervisor/manager should she have the required 
years of service and requirements completed. As stated in the O-level description of this paper, 
Marines at this level are the “first line of defense” when repairing and maintaining aircraft. 
They are at the operational or flying squadron level. Table 4 details the MOSs comprising this 
occupational field and the respective billet descriptions. 
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Table 4. O-level avionics MOSs. Adapted from USMC (2013). 
 
e. Intermediate Avionics Maintenance 
I-level avionics Marines, like those working in organizational avionics work 
centers, are focused on the direct and indirect support of all aviation weapons systems. The 
skills these Marines learn and develop, through various schools, are similar, but support a 
diverse range of avionics systems. Avionics Marines completing basic MOS training 
receive the 6400 MOS and through follow-on schools develop more advanced skills to fill 
I-level specific avionics billets. Should a Marine serve complete multiple re-enlistments, 
or contracts, she has ample opportunities to progress into supervisory/managerial roles. 
MOS Title Applicable Ranks Billet Description
6313 Aircraft Communications/Navigation/Radar Systems Technician, EA-6 Pvt - GySgt
"Install, remove, inspect, test, maintain, and repair systems, components, and 
ancillary equipment of installed aircraft 
communications/navigation/electrical/radar systems to include deceptive 
electronic countermeasures (DECM systems."
6314 Avionics/Maintenance Technician, UAS Pvt - GySgt
"Install, remove, inspect, test, maintain, and reapir systems, components, and 
ancillary equipment. These Marines also perform launch, recovery, and other 
lfight line operations at the organizational maintenance level."
6316 Aircraft Communications/Navigation Systems Technician, KC-130 Pvt - GySgt
"Install, remove, inspect, test, maintain, and repair systems, components, and 
ancillary equipment of installed aircraft 
communications/navigation/electrical/radar systems to include deceptive 
electronic countermeasures (DECM systems."
6317 Aircraft Communications/Navigation/Radar Systems Technician, F/A-18 Pvt - GySgt
"Install, remove, inspect, test, maintain, and repair systems, components, and 
ancillary equipment of installed aircraft 
communications/navigation/electrical/radar systems to include deceptive 
electronic countermeasures (DECM systems."
6322 Aircraft Avionics Technician, CH-46 Pvt - GySgt
"Install, remove, inspect, test, maintain, and repair systems, components, and 
ancillary equipment of installed aircraft 
communications/navigation/electrical/radar systems to include deceptive 
electronic countermeasures (DECM systems."
6323 Aircraft Avionics Technician, CH-53 Pvt - GySgt
"Install, remove, inspect, test, maintain, and reapir systems, components, and 
ancillary equipment. These Marines also perform launch, recovery, and other 
lfight line operations at the organizational maintenance level."
6324 Aircraft Avionics Technician, UH/AH-1 Pvt - GySgt
"Install, remove, inspect, test, maintain, and repair systems, components, and 
ancillary equipment of installed aircraft 
communications/navigation/electrical/radar systems to include deceptive 
electronic countermeasures (DECM systems."
6326 Aircraft Avionics Technician, MV-22 Pvt - GySgt
"Install, remove, inspect, test, maintain, and repair systems, components, and 
ancillary equipment. These Marines also perform launch, recovery, and other 
lfight line operations at the organizational maintenance level."
6332 Aircraft Avionics Technician, AV-8B Pvt - GySgt
"Install, remove, inspect, test, maintain, and repair systems, components, and 
ancillary equipment of installed aircraft electrical systems." 
6333 Aircraft Electrical Systems Technician, EA-6 Pvt - GySgt
"Install, remove, inspect, test, maintain, and repair systems, components, and 
ancillary equipment of installed aircraft electrical systems." 
6336 Aircraft Electrical Systems Technician, KC-130 Pvt - GySgt
"Install, remove, inspect, test, maintain, and repair systems, components, and 
ancillary equipment of installed aircraft electrical systems." 
6337 Aircraft Electrical Systems Technician, F/A-18 Pvt - GySgt
"Install, remove, inspect, test, maintain, and repair systems, components, and 
ancillary equipment of installed aircraft electrical systems." 
6338 Aircraft Avionics Technician, F-35B Pvt - GySgt
"Install, remove, inspect, test, maintain, and repair systems, components, and 
ancillary equipment of installed aircraft 
communications/navigation/electrical/radar systems to include deceptive 
electronic countermeasures (DECM systems."
6386 Aircraft Electronic Countermeasures Systems Technician, EA-6B Pvt - GySgt
"Install, remove, inspect, test, maintain, and repair systems, components, and 
ancillary equipment of installed aircraft electronic countermeasures systems."
6391 Avionics Chief MSgt - MGySgt
"Supervise the maintenance and repair of aircraft avionics systems, equipment 
and components."
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Table 5 lists the MOSs making-up this occupational field, with respective ranks applicable 
to the billets, and job descriptions. 
Table 5. I-level avionics MOSs. Adapted from USMC (2013). 
 
f. 6018: CDI, CDQAR, QAR Aviation Maintenance Qualifications 
This section further details a small pool of the overall focus population of this study. 
While the research does observe re-enlistment rates of all aviation maintenance Marines, a 
smaller target population is those Marines filling CDI, CDQAR, QAR billets. SRB 
programs, from 2008 to 2018, have been used to induce aviation maintenance Marines to 
re-enlist after 17 months or six years of service (first-term Marines) or six to ten years of 
service (career Marines). The DC, A mentioned, along with other senior officers, aviation 
maintenance Marines must be retained due to the time it takes to train them and the amount 
of experience and knowledge they have developed after their initial contract terms. While 
these Marines are important, a focus group of the FY18 enlistment campaign and aviation 
plan is retaining those Marines holding the 6018 MOS. These Marines have expertise that 
surpasses that of the average first-term Marine. As such, the FY18 SRB program included 
an aviation maintenance kicker targeting those Marines with the 6018 MOS, “responding 
to the Marine Corps’ need to retain qualified maintainers” (Schogol, 2017a). This initiative 
also demonstrates what officers at Manpower and Reserve Affairs (M&RA) have said 






"Inspect, test, maintain, and repair weaon replaceable assemblies, shop replaceable assemblies, 
and ancillary equipment whose aggregate constitutes a complete aircraft communications, 
navigation, or cryptographic system beyond normal fault isolation procedures."
6423 Aviation Electronic Micro/Miniature Component and Cable Repair Technician Pvt - GySgt
"Inspect, test, maintain, and repair modules, cards, printed-circuit boards, cables, and miniature 
and micro-miniature components. They also perform appropriate level corrosion control."
6432 Aircraft Electrical/Instrument/Flight Control Systems Technician, Fixed-wing Pvt - GySgt
"Inspect, test, maintain, and repair components, assemblies, subassemblies, modules, cards, 
printed circuit boards, and ancillary equipment whose aggregate constitutes a complete aircraft 
electrical/flight control system or subsystem."
6433 Aircraft Electrical/Instrument/Flight Control Systems Technician, Rotary wing Pvt - GySgt
"Inspect, test, maintain, and repair components, assemblies, subassemblies, modules, cards, 
printed circuit boards, and ancillary equipment whose aggregate constitutes a complete aircraft 
electrical/flight control system or subsystem."
6434
Advanced Aircraft 
Electrical/Instrument/Flight Control Systems 
Tech
Pvt - GySgt
"Inspect, test, maintain, and repair weapon replaceable assemblies, shop replaceable 
assemblies, and ancillary equipment whose aggregate constitutes a complete aircraft 
electrical/flight control system beyond normal fault isolation procedures."
6469
Reconfiguration Transportable Consolidated 
Automated Supported System (RTCASS) 
Technician
Pvt - GySgt
"Inspect, test, maintain, repair, and analyze airborne weapon replaceable assemblies, shop 
replaceable assemblies, automatic test equipment, and ancillary equipment failures, beyond 
normals fault isolation procedures."
6483 Communication/Navigation/Cryptographic/Countermeasures Systems Technician Pvt - GySgt
"Inspect, test, maintain, and repair airborne weapon replaceable assemblies, shop replaceable 
assemblies and ancillary equipment whose aggregate constitutes a complete aircraft 
communications, navigation, cryptographic, countermeasures system or subsystem beyond 
normal fault isolation procedures."
6492 Aviation Precision Measurement Equipment (PME) Calibration/Repair Technician Pvt - GySgt
"Test, maintain, calibrate, and repair aviation precision measurement and automatic test 
equipment."
6499 Mobile Facility Technician Pvt - GySgt
"Inspect, service, maintain, and repair mobile facilities and associated environmental control 
units, generators, and all other electrical and ancillary equipment."
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about getting the most return on investment from the Marines that receive this extensive 
training.  
Any aviation maintenance Marine may earn a CDI, CDQAR, or QAR qualification 
as long as she is at least a Corporal, meets the pre-requisites, and requirements listed in the 
NAMP. Marines skill qualified in a primary MOS from any of the aviation maintenance 
occupational fields are eligible for these certifications: 60/61/62, aircraft maintenance and 
63/64, avionics (USMC, 2013). As these Marines are responsible for the preventing the 
occurrence of defects, acting as lower echelon quality assurance inspectors, they are 
accountable to the Quality Assurance Officer (QAO) and Aircraft Maintenance Officer 
(AMO) (USMC, 2013). The QAO and AMO are responsible to a squadron’s Commanding 
Officer for ensuring aviation maintenance Marines are following NAMP procedures, thus 
safely and efficiently maintaining aircraft readiness. Since 6018 Marines are the 
responsibility of the QAO, they are expected to achieve the overall concept and objectives 
of the quality assurance (QA) division. The concept of the division is “fundamentally the 
prevention of the occurrence of defects and is an integral part of every maintenance process 
from start to completion.” Meeting the objectives of this work center ensures the 
maintenance department is meeting NAMP standards and safely maintaining aircraft: 
“improve the safety of flight and ground operations; improve the quality, uniformity, and 
reliability of aircraft and equipment; improve the quality of maintenance materials, 
technical data, and processes; improve the skills and consistency in performance of 
maintenance personnel; and eliminate unnecessary man-hours and material expenditures” 
(USN, 2017).  
As CDI, CDQAR, and QAR Marines are directly assigned to QA, they are direct 
representatives of the CO “for ensuring the quality of aircraft, engines, components, and 
equipment, and must possess the highest standards of professional integrity. In addition to 
inspection duties, QARs, CDQARs, and CDIs serve as trainers and mentors in their areas 
of expertise” (USN, 2017). This passage exemplifies the importance of these Marines. Not 
only do they have to be skill qualified in one of the pre-requisite primary MOSs and of the 
appropriate rank, they must also be high performers. The level of responsibility associated 
with these certifications is greater than what the average aviation maintenance Marine must 
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contend with during typical daily operations. Since these Marines are representatives of the 
CO, act as quality assurance inspectors ensuring all aircraft, components, and equipment 
are properly functional and maintained accordingly, and train/mentor Marines in their 
respective primary MOSs, they cannot be “low quality.” The CO, AMO, and QAO rely on 
these Marines to ease the workload on QA and certify aeronautical components and aircraft 
are safe for flight. Ultimately, these Marines are responsible for the safety of the aircrew 
resulting in CDIs, CDQARs, and QARs needing to be “high quality” (USN, 2017).  
(1) Quality Assurance Representative 
These Marines must be at least Staff Sergeants (E6) and “fully qualified in the 
Aviation Maintenance Training and Readiness Program (AMTRP) syllabus in their 
technical field for the T/M/S aircraft supported” (United States Marine Corps [USMC], 
2009). The AMTRP is a publication distributing training standards and regulations 
pertaining to the training of aviation maintenance Marines to the operational fleet. Within 
this document, it specifies the certification process for Marines to earn the QAR billet. This 
process includes all training and readiness (T&R) tasks, both on-the-job training (OJT) and 
NAMP prescribed, 
encompassed within the attainment of Subsystem or System Skill 
Proficiency, Qualification or Designations, and required tests or boards. 
Once the certification process is complete, individuals are “certified 
eligible” to possess the particular Qualification, Designation, or License 
they are working to attain. The term “Certified” does not equate to Qualified 
or Designated. Only when the appropriate authority signs-off the 
Qualification … is an individual authorized to perform the duties to which 
those QDLs pertain. (USMC, 2009)  
They must also complete the personnel qualification standards (PQS) and QAR 
training syllabus applicable to their assigned billet, and pass a written exam administered 
by QA. Marines who desire to achieve this qualification must be skilled in reading, 
researching, and interpreting drawings, maintenance technical manuals, directives, and 
data. They must also be able to write clearly and with technical accuracy, as well as be 
“conscientious and committed to quality in all aspects of naval aviation” (USN, 2017).  
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Marines holding a QAR qualification are subject to lose their certifications should 
they fail to maintain proficiency in all tasks laid out in the qualification syllabus. The 
qualification can also be revoked or suspended. If this happens, Marines have to regain the 
qualification by completing “‘R-coded’ Tasks as delineated in the Qualification syllabus” and 
“observed and signed-off by an individual who meets or exceeds the Task Sign-Off Authority 
for each Task” (United States Marine Corps, 2009). Obtaining this qualification starts when 
a Marine begins completing OJT and NAMP T&R tasks, however much time it takes. She 
must also be recommended by the AMO to the CO, substantiating the Marine has completed 
all required tasks, meets all pre-requisites, and is of the caliber needed to be a QAR. The 
process to obtain and maintain a QAR qualification emphasizes the importance of only “high 
quality” Marines being certified to hold this billet al.so, the timeline to secure the qualification, 
even to re-certify the qualification, the Marine Corps must strive to retain these individuals.  
(2) Collateral Duty Quality Assurance Representative 
While accountable to QA, these Marines are “assigned to production work centers 
when needed to supplement the QA Division’s capacity to perform QAR-level inspections” 
(USN, 2017). These Marines must be at least a Sergeant (E5) and complete the same 
training and testing syllabi as QARs assigned to the respective QA Division billet.  
(3) Collateral Duty Inspector 
Still working under QA oversight, CDIs are expected to “inspect all work and 
comply with the required QA inspections during all maintenance actions performed by 
their production work center” (USN, 2017). Aviation maintenance Marines wishing to 
obtain a CDI certification must be at least a Corporal (E4) and skill qualified in NAMP 
programs and processes applicable to a CDI’s respective production work center. Like 
QARs and CDQARs, CDIs must complete a training syllabus commiserate with their 
assignment, and pass a written exam administered by the QA division.  
(4) Training 
The qualifications an aviation maintenance Marine can obtain act as proficiency, or 
career, milestones. Those high-performing E4s should hold a CDI qualification, and as they 
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progress through an aviation maintenance career should obtain a CDQAR certification 
once promoted to E5 and QAR once becoming a Staff Non-commissioned Officer (SNCO), 
or E6.  
While the NAMP prescribes the training syllabus each aviation maintenance 
qualification must complete, the responsibility of developing procedures for earning such 
certifications are delegated to local leadership.  
Type Wings and Marine Aircraft Wing (MAWs) must publish local 
command procedures (LCP) that include QAR, CDQAR, and CDI training 
syllabus … and a written test for each.… MOS and work center assignment, 
for each T/M/S aircraft supported. I-level activities must establish a QAR, 
CDQAR, and CDI training syllabus … and written test requirements 
specific to engines, components, and equipment they support. The training 
syllabus … and the test, must cover the QA requirements for test, 
inspection, and administrative processes specific to QAR, CDQAR, or CDI 
assignment. (USN, 2017) 
The NAMP dictates what a training syllabus must include, so each certification is 
standardized: AMTRP requirements; formal school requirements applicable to QA billet; 
testing and inspection procedures, like corrosion control; required reading, such as NAMP 
standard operating procedures (SOP) applicable to the QA billet; T/M/S functional check 
flight (FCF) requirements; QA sign-off and certification procedures; data collection and 
monitoring procedures; auditing and monitoring techniques; a written exam; a practical 
application exam; and topics for the oral interview conducted by the QA officer (USN, 
2017).  
Completing the requirements to become a CDI, CDQAR, and QAR do not end at 
passing exams and adequately completing interviews. These Marines then “must be 
designated by the activity’s CO in writing via Quality Assurance Representative/Inspector 
Recommendation/Designation” (USN, 2017). Figure 4 shows the endorsement sheet that 
accompanies each prospective CDI, CDQAR, and QAR package. The sheet shows the level 
of scrutiny involved with choosing the best aviation maintenance Marines for to hold these 
certifications. Once it has been signed by the unit’s Commanding Officer, the completed 




Figure 4. Quality assurance representative/inspector recommendation/
designation (OPNAV 4790/12). Source: USN (2017). 
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The QA officer must ensure a Marine has satisfied all qualification requirements 
before sending his/her recommendation to the AMO. This Marine, typically a Major (O4), 
must also endorse the recommendation prior to forwarding an enlisted aviation 
maintenance Marine’s CDI, CDQAR, or QAR packet to the CO (USN, 2017). Since these 
Marines are certified subject matter experts, the high level of training involved, and the 
time required to obtain such certifications, they must be retained. Otherwise, aviation 
maintenance leadership and the Marine Corps are spending at least four years training 
aviation maintenance Marines to this level of expertise just to have them separate, then 
spend another four years training a replacement, resulting in a total of eight years’ 
experience lost.  
3. Career Timeline 
Aviation maintenance qualifications are highly prized by the Marine Corps, such 
that current bonus programs have included Marines holding these skills as eligible for 
$20,000 during FY18. However, to fully understand why retaining these Marines is 
necessary to aviation success, the section details the training these Marines undergo and 
the time it takes to develop a specific skill certified aviation maintainer.  
Individuals’ first introduction to Marine Corps training is the 13 weeks they spend 
at recruiting depots: Parris Island in Beaufort, SC, and San Diego, CA. After just over 3 
months of basic training, learning how to be Marines, individuals are sent to either School 
of Infantry-East (SOI-East) or School of Infantry-West (SOI-West). Since these Marines 
are not filling combat arms occupations, they will be sent to Marine Corps Training (MCT) 
Battalion aboard SOI-East or SOI-West. Here enlisted Marines spend 29 days learning 
battle skills which allow them to operate in combat environments regardless of MOS. After 
almost 4 months of basic skills training, enlisted Marines are then sent to their respective 
MOS schools. In the case of aviation maintenance, these Marines are sent to MOS training 
all over the country. Tables 6–12 shows the schools required for each MOS. The 
occupations with no information do not have required training since the only pre-requisite 
is to be qualified in a primary MOS. These types of occupations are additional billets 
enlisted Marines can obtain once they meet specific years of service. 
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Table 6. 60XX: aircraft maintenance MOS required training. 
Adapted from USMC (2013). 
 
 





Necessary MOS (NMOS) generated from any 
PMOS: 60XX, 61XX, 62XX, 63XX, or 64XX N/A N/A
6018 Aviation QAR/CDQAR/CDI 
NMOS filled from PMOSs: 60XX, 61XX, 62XX, 
63XX, 64XX N/A N/A
6019 Aircraft Maintenance Chief Must be a qualified 60XX, 61XX, 62XX N/A N/A
6023 Aircraft Power Plants Test Cell Operator
NMOS filled from 6122, 6123, 6124, 6216, 6222, 
6223, 6227 N/A N/A
6033 Aircraft Nondestructive Inspection Technician NMOS filled from 6062, 6092, 615X, 625X
Naval Aircraft Nondestructive 
Inspection Technician Class C1 Pensacola, FL
6042 Individual Material Readiness List (IMRL) Asset Manager IMRL Asset Managers System (IAMS) Meridian, MS
6043 Aircraft Welder Be qualified as an aircraft structures mechanic, 6092 N/A N/A
Aviation Maintenance Administration 
Man Class A1 - "A" school Meridian, MS
Data Analysis Course - "C" school Pensacola, FL    
(AWAT) Pensacola, FL
Aircrew Survival Equipmenet Man 
Common Core Class A1 Pensacola, FL   
Organizational Maintenance
NALCOMIS Aviation Maintenance 
OMA System Administrator/Analyst 
Pipeline
Pensacola, FL
NALCOMIS Aviation Maintenance 
IMA System Administrator/Analyst 
Pipeline
Pensacola, FL
NALCOMIS Aviation Maintenance 
OMA System Administrator/Analyst 
Optimize
Pensacola, FL
NALCOMIS Aviation Maintenance 
IMA System Administrator/Analyst 
Optimize
Pensacola, FL
Aviation Warfare Apprentice Training 
(AWAT) Pensacola, FL
Aviation Structural Mechanic Core - "A" 
school Pensacola, FL
USMC Aircraft Hydraulic Components 
Intermediate Maintenance - "C" school Pensacola, FL
As Apprentice Technical Training Pensacola, FL
AWAT Pensacola, FL
Aviation Support Equipment Technician 
Class A1 Pensacola, FL
Support Equipment Engine/Gas Turbine 
and Related Intermediate Maintenance San Diego, CA/Jacksonville, FL
As Apprentice Technical Training Pensacola, FL
AWAT Pensacola, FL
Aviation Support Equipment Technician 
Class A1 - "A" school Pensacola, FL
Support Equipment 
Electrical/Refrigeration Intermediate 
Mechanic - "C" school
San Diego, CA/Jacksonville, FL
6074 Cryogenics Equipment Operator
Air Separation and Cryogenics 




Aviation Structural Mechanic Core - "A" 
school Pensacola, FL
Advanced Composite Materials Repair Virginia Beach, VA
Airframes Intermediate Maintenance - 
"C" school Oceana, VA
6092 Aircraft I-Level Structures Mechanic
6062 Aircraft I-Level Hydraulic/Pneumatic Mechanic
6072





Aircraft Maintenance SE 
Electrician/Refrigeration 
Mechanic
6046 Aircraft Maintenance Administration Specialist
6048 Flight Equipment Technician
6049 NALCOMIS Application Administrator/Analyst
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Table 7. 61XX: aircraft maintenance, RW required MOS training. 
Adapted from USMC (2013). 
 
 
MOS Title Required MOS Schools Location
6112 Helicopter Mechanic, CH-46
CH-46E Power Plants Power Trains and Rotors 
Organizational Maintenance Jacksonville, NC
6113 Helicopter Mechanic, CH-53
CH-53E Power Plants Power Trains and Related 
Systems Maintenance Jacksonville, NC
AH-1Z/UH-1Y Flight Line Initial Accession 
Pipeline Organizational Maintenance Training 
Track
Camp Pendleton, CA
AH-1W/UH-1N Power Plants Power Trains and 
Rotors Maintenance Camp Pendleton, CA
6116 Tiltrotor Mechanic, MV-22 MV-22 Tiltrotor Mechanics Jacksonville, NC
AWAT Pensacola, FL
Aviation Machinists Mate Common Core Class - 
"A" school Pensacola, FL
Aviation Machinists Mate Helicopter 
Fundamentals Strand Class A1 - "A" school Pensacola, FL
T-58 Engine First Degree Intermediate 
Maintenance - "C" school Jacksonville, NC
AWAT Pensacola, FL
Aviation Machinists Mate Common Core Class - 
"A" school Pensacola, FL
Aviation Machinists Mate Helicopter 
Fundamentals Strand Class A1 - "A" school Pensacola, FL
H53 Power Plant Intermediate Maintenance - "C" 
school Jacksonville, NC
AWAT Pensacola, FL
Aviation Machinists Mate Common Core Class - 
"A" school Pensacola, FL
Aviation Machinists Mate Helicopter 
Fundamentals Strand Class A1 - "A" school Pensacola, FL
T700-GE-401/401C Engine Intermediate 
Maintenance (First Degree) Jacksonville, FL/San Diego, CA
6132 Helicopter/Tiltrotor Dynamic Components Mechanic
Helicopter Dynamic Component Repair 
Intermediate Maintenance Jacksonville, NC
AWAT Pensacola, FL
Aviation Structural Mechanic Core - "A" school Pensacola, FL
Aviation Structural Mechanic Organizational 
Level Strand Pensacola, FL
CH-46E Structural and Hydraulic Systems 
Organizational Maintenance - "C" school Jacksonville, NC
AWAT Pensacola, FL
Aviation Structural Mechanic Core - "A" school Pensacola, FL
Aviation Structural Mechanic Organizational 
Level Strand Pensacola, FL
CH-53E Airframes Organizational Maintenance Jacksonville, NC
AWAT Pensacola, FL
Aviation Structural Mechanic Core - "A" school Pensacola, FL
Aviation Structural Mechanic Organizational 
Level Strand Pensacola, FL
AH-1Z/UH-1Y Airframes Organizational 
Maintenance - "C" school Camp Pendleton, CA
AWAT Pensacola, FL
Aviation Structural Mechanic Core - "A" school Pensacola, FL
Aviation Structural Mechanic Organizational 
Level Strand Pensacola, FL
V-22 Aircraft Familiarization Organizational 
Maintenance - "C" school Jacksonville, NC
6154 Helicopter Airframe Mechanic, UH/AH-1
6156 Tiltrotor Airframe Mechanic, MV-22
6122 Helicopter Power Plants Mechanic, T-58
6123 Helicopter Power Plants Mechanic, T-64
6124 Helicopter Power Plants Mechanic, T-400/T-700
6153 Helicopter Airframe Mechanic, CH-53
6114 Helicopter Mechanic, UH/AH-1
6152 Helicopter Airframe Mechanic, CH-46
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Table 8. 62XX: aircraft maintenance, FW required MOS (6212 – 6227) 
training. Adapted from USMC (2013). 
 
MOS Title Required MOS Schools Location
AWAT Pensacola, FL
Aviation Machinists Mate Common Core Class - 
"A" school Pensacola, FL
Aviation Machinists Mate Turbojet Fundamentals 
Strand - "A" school Pensacola, FL
AV-8B Aircraft Mechanic Organizational 
Maintenance - "C" school Cherry Point, NC
AWAT Pensacola, FL
Aviation Machinists Mate Common Core Class - 
"A" school Pensacola, FL
Aviation Machinists Mate Turbojet Fundamentals 
Strand - "A" school Pensacola, FL
EA-6B Power Plants and Related Systems (Initial) 
Organizational Maintenance - "C" school Oak Harbor, WA
6214 Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) Mechanic
Aviation Machinist Mate Common Core Class - 
"A" school Pensacola, FL
Aviation Machinist Mate Turboject Aircraft 
Fundamentals Strand Class A1 - "A" school Pensacola, FL
KC-130J Aircraft Mechanic Initial Accession 
Maintenance - "C" school Little Rock, AR
AWAT Pensacola, FL
Aviation Machinist Mate Common Core Class - 
"A" school Pensacola, FL
Aviation Machinist Mate Turboject Aircraft 
Fundamentals Strand Class A1 - "A" school Pensacola, FL
F/A-18A/B/C/D Power Plants and Related 




Aviation Machinists Mate Common Core Class - 
"A" school Pensacola, FL
Aviation Machinists Mate Turbojet Fundamentals 
Strand - "A" school Pensacola, FL
F-35B Aircraft Mechanic
AWAT Pensacola, FL
Aviation Machinists Mate Common Core Class - 
"A" school Pensacola, FL
Aviation Machinists Mate Turbojet Fundamentals 
Strand - "A" school Pensacola, FL
F402-RR-408A/MK.4 CR00305 Gas Turbine 
Starter (GTS)/F402-44-406A Intermediate 
Maintenance - "C" school
Cherry Point, NC
AWAT Pensacola, FL
Aviation Machinists Mate Common Core Class - 
"A" school Pensacola, FL
Aviation Machinists Mate Turbojet Fundamentals 
Strand - "A" school Pensacola, FL
J52 Engine First Degree Intermediate 
Maintenance - "C" school Oak Harbor, WA
Aviation Machinists Mate Common Core Class - 
"A" school Pensacola, FL
Aviation Machinists Mate Turbojet Fundamentals 
Strand - "A" school Pensacola, FL
Aircraft Power Plants Mechanic T-56 Cherry Point, NC
AWAT Pensacola, FL
Aviation Machinists Mate Common Core Class - 
"A" school Pensacola, FL
Aviation Machinists Mate Turbojet Fundamentals 
Strand - "A" school Pensacola, FL
F404-GD-400/402 Engine First Degree 
Intermediate Maintenance Lemoore, CA/Oceana, VA
Fixed-Wing Aircraft Power 
Plants Mechanic, J-526223




6216 Fixed-Wing Aircraft Mechanic, KC-130





Fixed-Wing Aircraft Power 
Plant Mechanic, F-4046227
Fixed-Wing Aircraft Power 
Plants Mechanic, T-566226
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Table 9. 62XX: aircraft maintenance, FW required MOS (6252 – 6288) 
training. Adapted from USMC (2013). 
 
MOS Title Required MOS Schools Location
AWAT Pensacola, FL
Aviation Structural Mechanic Core - "A" school Pensacola, FL
Aviation Structural Mechanic Organizational 
Level Strand - "A" school Pensacola, FL
AV-8B Airframe Organizational Maintenance 
Course - "C" school Cherry Point, NC
AWAT Pensacola, FL
Aviation Structural Mechanic Core - "A" school Pensacola, FL    
Level Strand - "A" school Pensacola, FL   
Organizational Maintenance - "C" school Oak Harbor, WA
AWAT Pensacola, FL
Aviation Structural Mechanic Core - "A" school Pensacola, FL
Aviation Structural Mechanic Organizational 
Level Strand - "A" school Pensacola, FL
KC-130J Initial Accession Airframes Mechanic Little Rock, AR
AWAT Pensacola, FL
Aviation Structural Mechanic Core - "A" school Pensacola, FL
Aviation Structural Mechanic Organizational 
Level Strand - "A" school Pensacola, FL
F/A-18 Aviation Hydraulic/Structural Mechanic 
(Initial) Organizational Maintenance Pensacola, FL/Virginia Beach, VA
AWAT Pensacola, FL
Aviation Structural Mechanic Core - "A" school Pensacola, FL
Aviation Structural Mechanic Organizational 
Level Strand - "A" school Pensacola, FL
F-35B Aviation Structural Mechanic Strand Pensacola, FL
F-35B Aircraft Airframe Mechanic
AWAT Pensacola, FL
Aviation Structural Mechanic E (Safety 
Equipment) Core Class A1 - "A" school Pensacola, FL
AV-8B Aircraft Safety Equipment Mechanic 
Organizational Maintenance - "C" school Cherry Point, NC
AWAT Pensacola, FL
Aviation Structural Mechanic E (Safety 
Equipment) Core Class A1 - "A" school Pensacola, FL
EA-6B Safety Equipment (Initial) Organizational 
Maintenance Whidbey Island, WA
AWAT Pensacola, FL
Aviation Structural Mechanic E (Safety 
Equipment) Core Class A1 - "A" school Pensacola, FL
KC-130J Initial Accession Safety and Survival 
Systems Technician - "C" school Little Rock, AR
AWAT Pensacola, FL     
Equipment) Core Class A1 - "A" school Pensacola, FL      
Equipment (Initial) Organizational Maintenance - Pensacola, FL/Virginia Beach, VA
Aviation Structural Mechanic E (Safety 
Equipment) Core Class A1 - "A" school Pensacola, FL
F-35 Aviation Structural Mechanic E (Safety 
Equipment) Strand Pensacola, FL
F-35B Aircraft Safety Equipment Mechanic
6286
Fixed-Wing Aircraft Safety 
Equipment Mechanic, EA-66283




Fixed-Wing Aircraft Airframe 
Mechanic, F-35B6258
6256
Fixed-Wing Aircraft Airframe 
Mechanic, EA-66253
6288 Fixed-Wing Aircraft Safety Equipment Mechanic, F-35B




Fixed-Wing Aircraft Safety 
Equipment Mechanic, KC-
130/V-22
Fixed-Wing Aircraft Airframe 
Mechanic-AV-8/TAV-86252
Fixed-Wing Aircraft Airframe 
Mechanic, F/A-186257
Fixed-Wing Aircraft Airframe 
Mechanic, KC-130
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Table 10. 63XX: O-level avionics required MOS (6313 – 6326) training  









MOS Title Required MOS Schools Location
Marine Avionics ATT Pensacola, FL
AWAT Pensacola, FL
Avionics Technician O Level Class A1 Pensacola, FL
EA-6B ICAP 2/Block 86 




Marine Avionics ATT Pensacola, FL
Avionics Technician O Level Class A1 Pensacola, FL
Unmanned Aircraft System Repairer Ft Huachuca, AZ
AWAT Pensacola, FL
Marine Avionics ATT Pensacola, FL
Avionics Technician O Level Class A1 Pensacola, FL
KC-130J Communication/Navigation Technician 
Initial Accession Little Rock, AR
AWAT Pensacola, FL
Marine Avionics ATT Pensacola, FL
Avionics Technician O Level Class A1 Pensacola, FL
Pipeline F/A-18 Avionic Systems (Initial) 
Organizational Maintenance Pensacola, FL/Virginia Beach, VA
AWAT Pensacola, FL
Marine Avionics ATT Pensacola, FL
Avionics Technician O Level Class A1 Pensacola, FL




Marine Avionics ATT Pensacola, FL
Avionics Technician O Level Class A1 Pensacola, FL
CH-53E Communication/Electrical System 
Organizational Maintenance Jacksonville, NC
AWAT Pensacola, FL
Marine Avionics ATT Pensacola, FL
Avionics Technician O Level Class A1 Pensacola, FL
H-1 Avionics Systems Organizational 
Maintenance Camp Pendleton, CA
AWAT Pensacola, FL
Marine Avionics ATT Pensacola, FL
Aviation Electricians Mate Strand Class A1 Pensacola, FL
V-22 Avionics Jacksonville, NC




Radar Systems Technician, 
F/A-18
6322 Aircraft Avionics Technician, CH-46
Aircraft Avionics Technician, 
MV-226326




Radar Systems Technician, 
EA-6






Table 11. 63XX: O-level avionics required MOS (6332 – 6391) training  
Adapted from USMC (2013). 
 
MOS Title Required MOS Schools Location
AWAT Pensacola, FL
Marine Avionics ATT Pensacola, FL
Aviation Electricians Mate Strand Class A1 Pensacola, FL
AV-8B Electrical Systems Organizational 
Maintenance Cherry Point, NC
AWAT Pensacola, FL
Marine Avionics ATT Pensacola, FL
Aviation Electricians Mate Strand Class A1 Pensacola, FL
EA-6B Initial Electrical and Instrument Systems 
Organizational Maintenance Oak Harbor, WA
AWAT Pensacola, FL
Marine Avionics ATT Pensacola, FL
Aviation Electricians Mate Strand Class A1 Pensacola, FL
Electrical Technician Initial Accession Little Rock, AR
AWAT Pensacola, FL
Marine Avionics ATT Pensacola, FL
Aviation Electricians Mate Strand Class A1 Pensacola, FL
F/A-18 Electrical/Instrument Systems (Initial) 
Organizational Maintenance Pensacola, FL/Virginia Beach, VA
AWAT Pensacola, FL
Marine Avionics ATT Pensacola, FL
Aviation Electricians Mate Strand Class A1 Pensacola, FL
F-35 Aviation Electricians Mate Strand Pensacola, FL
F-35B Aircraft Avionics Systems Technician
AWAT Pensacola, FL
Marine Avionics ATT Pensacola, FL
Avionics Technician O Level Class A1 Pensacola, FL
EA-6B ECM Initial Organizational Maintenance Oak Harbor, WA
6391 Avionics Chief
N/A - must complete requirements for one of the 





Aircraft Avionics Technician, 
AV-8B6332
Aircraft Electrical Systems 
Technician, EA-66333
Aircraft Electrical Systems 
Technician, F/A-186337
Aircraft Avionics Technician, 
F-35B6338
Aircraft Electrical Systems 
Technician, KC-1306336
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Table 12. 64XX: I-level avionics required MOS training.  
Adapted from USMC (2013). 
 
 
Due to the length of training these schools require, Marines holding 63/64 MOSs 
are required to complete a five-year contract, while 60/61/62 MOS Marines are expected 
to complete four years of initial service. Once an enlisted aviation maintenance/avionics 
Marine joins the operating forces, she is either a Pvt or a PFC. As they continue learning 
and working in their respective work centers, become promoted to Cpl, and given how well 
they perform, they will become eligible to complete the CDI training syllabus. Once CDI 
certified, the Marine will have another year or two continuing to learn and completing CDI 
tasks/responsibilities. This is the first decision point she encounters: re-enlist for another 






Marine Avionics ATT Pensacola, FL
Aviation Electricians Mate Strand Class A1 Pensacola, FL
Miniature Electronics Repair San Diego, CA
AWAT Pensacola, FL
Marine Avionics ATT Pensacola, FL
Aviation Electricians Mate Strand Class A1 Pensacola, FL
Aircraft Electrical/Instrument Intermediate 











Marine Avionics ATT Pensacola, FL
Avionics Technician I Level Class A1 Pensacola, FL
USMC Cass High Power Configuration 
Operator/Maintainer/Technician San Diego, CA/Virginia Beach, VA
AWAT Pensacola, FL
Marine Avionics ATT Pensacola, FL
Avionics Technician I Level Class A1 Pensacola, FL
Helicopter Deceptive Electronics 
Countermeasures Intermediate Maintenance Cherry Point, NC
AWAT Pensacola, FL
Marine Avionics ATT Pensacola, FL
Avionics Technician I Level Class A1 Pensacola, FL
Aviation Basic Calibration Technician Pipeline Biloxi, MS
AWAT Pensacola, FL
Marine Avionics ATT Pensacola, FL
Aviation Electricians Mate Strand Class A1 Pensacola, FL























and Cable Repair Technician
6423
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four years or separate. Should she continue serving, she will keep working in maintenance 
departments, and once they promote to Sgt and are deemed the “right” caliber of Marine 
to hold a second-tier aviation maintenance qualification, she will be certified as a CDQAR. 
The Marine will then encounter his/her second decision point. At this time, she will have 
9–10 years of service on their record. Continuing to serve will bring her closer to obtaining 
the QAR certification. The Marine will most likely have been promoted to SSgt. During 
the second and third re-enlistment contracts, these Marines are eligible for special duty 
assignment: recruiting duty, drill instructor, or MCT instructor. Marines are well aware of 
these opportunities and must consider the possibility of being selected, taken out of their 
primary occupation for an entire enlistment period, and having to retrain once they return 
to their MOS, when deciding whether or not to re-enlist. However, they are still eligible to 
obtain aviation maintenance qualifications. Figure 5 is a visual depiction of an enlisted 
aviation maintenance/avionics Marine’s potential career progression, with decision points. 
It starts with at a Marine’s first duty station and ends with retirement. 
 
Figure 5. Enlisted aviation maintenance/avionics career progression 
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B. AVIATION MAINTENANCE IMPACT ON AIRCRAFT READINESS 
The other sections of this chapter provide wide-lens information regarding aviation 
maintenance, department composition and responsibilities, the MOSs comprising the 
occupational field, and the CDI, CDQAR, and QAR certification process to identify the 
level of support and training these Marines undergo to ensure the Marine Corps can 
complete aviation operations.  
Per the CNO, aircraft readiness goals are 73 percent mission capable (MC) and 56 
percent full mission capable (FMC) across naval aviation (USN, 2017). Each T/M/S has 
more specific aircraft readiness goals, which are defined by the mission essential subsystem 
matrix (MESM). “Overall … aircraft readiness is calculated as an average from specific T/
M/S MC and FMC rates” (USN, 2017). To fulfill these goals, there are 72 MOSs filling 
aviation billets in 69 operational squadrons and 12 I-level aviation maintenance activities, 
supporting over 500 aircraft during training and deployed operations. Due to quantity of 
aircraft the Marine Corps needs all those MOSs to keep squadrons operational. However, 
it needs the expertise of CDIs, CDQARs, and QARs to maintain high aircraft readiness of 
these intricate and diverse weapons systems. “Historically, aviation readiness has been 
inextricably linked to qualifications and designations of our personnel” (United States 
Marine Corps (USMC), 2018).  
This claim is supported by a prior study where the authors observed the effects 
enlisted aviation maintenance qualifications have on aircraft readiness. As with this thesis, 
they focus on CDI, CDQAR, and QAR certifications of aviation maintenance Marines 
supporting heavy (CH-53), light/attack (UH/AH-1), and tiltrotor squadrons (MV-22). The 
authors use multivariate statistical modeling to determine that these qualifications “have a 
positive effect on MC readiness. The advancement of qualifications in a USMC squadron 
is a linear progression” (Germershausen & Steele, 2015). The authors find as an aviation 
maintenance Marine progresses through the qualification levels (from CDI to CDQAR to 
QAR), the magnitude of his/her impact on readiness increases (Germershausen & Steele, 
2015). They conclude, overall, aviation maintenance qualifications have a positive impact 
on aircraft readiness, of studied helicopter squadrons, and recommend that Marine Corps 
36 
manpower align its re-enlistment and retention goals with these qualifications directly 
considered (Germershausen & Steele, 2015). 
C. SELECTIVE RETENTION BONUS PROGRAM 
For the FY18 SRB program, Marine Corps manpower leadership exercised this 
recommendation via the aircraft maintenance kicker. “All Corporals through Gunnery 
Sergeants holding current qualifications of … CDI … CDQAR … QAR … who reenlist 
for 48 months … will rate a 20,000 kicker in addition to the PMOS bonus amount listed” 
(Steele, 2017). This initiative was the means to meet goals set by senior leadership within 
the aviation community—to retain highly trained aviation maintenance Marines as they 
greatly impact aircraft readiness. 
 A previous DC, A stated one of the lessons he learned is “that it is imperative to 
have high-quality, highly trained, motivated and incentivized Marines in the right 
qualification density to meet and exceed our readiness requirements” (Schogol, 2017c). 
The DC, A further emphasized this point by stating “One of the Corps’ top priorities should 
be retaining enough of its most experienced enlisted maintainers” (Schogol, 2017c). An 
urgent push to retain these highly qualified aviation maintenance Marines is to shift the 
aviation maintenance culture back to highly trained and extremely safe. A rise in aviation 
ground mishaps is a consequence of this shift of aviation maintainers out of the Marine 
Corps. Other factors contributing to the rise in mishaps include inadequate technical 
expertise, lack of safety expertise in the squadrons, and administrative tasks saturating 
already high-volume workloads (USMC, 2018). These sentiments were made reality with 
the current DC, A’s MOS initiative, published in the 2018 Aviation Plan. This program 
“will improve our readiness through increased visibility of trained and experienced 
personnel. The MOS initiative will inform assignment, retention, and promotion processes 
in an effort to optimize the return on investment in Marine aviation training” (USMC, 




The reason the SRB program was chosen as the method to complete this goal is due 
to its design. “SRBs … are monetary incentives paid to enlisted members at the time of re-
enlistment to assist in attaining and sustaining the requisite number of career enlisted 
personnel in designated … PMOSs” (USMC, 2016). The Marine Corps wants to shrink the 
gap between supply of re-enlistees compared to demand for them, so what better means 
than a program created just for that reason. Another reason this program was utilized is due 
to aviation maintenance CDI, CDQAR, and QAR qualified Marines meet the requirements 
for an SRB designation. 
1. The critical personnel shortage in a particular PMOS with respect to at 
least three of the preceding year groups, as defined by Headquarters 
Marine Corps (HQMC). 
2. The potential impact of the critical personnel shortage on the mission of 
the Marine Corps. 
3. The degree to which retention in particular PMOS does not meet 
established retention objectives. 
4. The high cost of training associated with the PMOS. 
5. The relatively arduous or otherwise demanding nature of the PMOS, as 
compared to other military or civilian alternatives. 
6. The degree to which retention is likely to improve in this reenlistment or 
extension category, as compared to the overall cost of the bonus in a 
particular PMOS. 
7. The high demand for the skill associated with the PMOS in the civilian 
labor market (USMC, 2016).  
2. Zone Eligibility 
Where these bonus pays come into effect is at decision points, like those present in 
Figure 5 (p. 27). After an enlisted Marine’s first-term, around the 4/5-year mark, she must 
decide to re-enlist or separate. If the Marine is eligible for an SRB, that decision is weighted 
more heavily because now the Marine has to decide, does she want extra money to retain 
for another 4 years, or take her chances in the civilian labor market. The SRB program 
categorizes enlisted Marines based on years of service. First-term Marines are those 
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enlisted members with their decision point at the 4/5-year mark. The SRB program 
designates them into zone A. “17 months to exactly 6 years active service” (USMC, 2016). 
The extra year past the normal contract length are for those enlisted Marines who may have 
served in another branch of the armed forces and transferred to the Marine Corps, or 
Marines who started their contract time in a different MOS, but laterally transferred to a 
new one, accumulating an additional year of service due to training. The second decision 
point faced is by zone B Marines. “6 years and 1 day to exactly 10 years total active 
service.” Decision point three is those comprising zone C. “10 years and 1 day to exactly 
14 years of total active service.” After another contract zone D enlisted Marines must 
decide to separate after about 14 years of service or attempt to continue until retirement. 
“14 years and 1 day to exactly 18 years of total active service.” Should a Marine retain to 
decision point 5, she is close to retirement. Zone E Marines are those with “18 years and 1 
day to exactly 20 years of total active service” (USMC, 2016). SRBs are designed to cover 
every re-enlistment decision point an enlisted Marine may face.  
3. Amounts and Payment 
The SRB program has criteria limiting the bonus amounts an enlisted Marine is 
eligible to receive and how it must be paid. The first stipulation is Marines are allowed 
only one bonus per re-enlistment zone. So, if a zone A Marine takes up a bonus, she is not 
allowed to opt in to zone A bonus if she re-enlists a second time. SRBs are subject to other 
criteria, as well: payment caps, must be paid in lump sum amounts, eligible PMOSs and 
zones will be published, an SRB amount cannot exceed $100,000, and enlisted members 
may be eligible for more than one bonus (FY18 certain aviation maintenance Marines were 
eligible for PMOS bonus and the aviation maintenance kicker bonus), but the total combine 
amounts of the bonuses over the course of a Marine’s career cannot exceed $200,000 
(USMC, 2016). Figure 6 depicts how SRB caps have changed over the past decade. These 
changes could be considered the Marine Corps response to retention problems. Raising the 
total amount an enlisted Marine may be eligible to receive makes re-enlistment a more 
enticing option.  
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Figure 6. Changes to SRB cap amounts 
After eligibility zones, skills, and PMOSs and SRB amount caps have been 
determined. The Marine Corps designates what each zone, PMOS, and skill is eligible to 
take-up. To determine these amounts the Marine Corps uses a “The pre-tax flat rate SRB 
amounts … based on the Marines reenlistment Zone, the Marines grade on the date of 
reenlistment, the PMOS for which the Marine is reenlisting, and the kicker or initiative the 
Marine selects (if any)” (Steele, 2017). Unlike the SRB multipliers other service branches 
use, the one the Marine Corps opts for does not change the amount a Marine is eligible to 
receive based on years of service or the amount of the time she may re-enlist. Table 11 
details which PMOSs, respective zones, and SRB amounts certain enlisted Marines are 
eligible to take-up, as of FY18.  
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Table 13. FY18 SRB zones, PMOSs, and amounts. 
Adapted from Steele (2017). 
 
Columns headed with designators such as E5 > are shorthand for enlisted Marines holding the 
rank of E5 or above. For those columns headed with a label like < E6 identifies those enlisted 
Marines holding ranks of E6 or below. The amounts listed under each zone correlate to 
PMOS codes listed in the first column. Any blank areas before and/or after those amounts 
identifies those PMOSs are not eligible for bonuses at different zones. The last row of the 
table identifies the aviation maintenance kicker bonus E4—E7 are eligible to receive should 
they hold a CDI, CDQAR, or QAR certification, thus correlating to the ranks listed at the top 
of the table.  
 
Appendix A has tables similar to this. These tables depict the same type of 
information just for the remaining fiscal years studied in this thesis. Training these Marines 
cost the Marine Corps money and time, and they possess skills the civilian labor market 
desires. The only means the Marine Corps currently has of competing with external firms 
is to induce re-enlistment through bonus pay. 
PMOS E3 E4 E5 > < E5 E6 > E6 E7 >
6062 7,500$        8,250$        
6114 6,000$        6,750$        
6116 12,750$  14,500$      16,000$      6,000$        6,750$        
6156 12,750$  14,500$      16,000$      12,250$      13,500$      
6217 12,000$      13,250$      
6218 4,250$    4,750$        5,250$        6,000$        6,750$        
6257 12,750$  14,500$      16,000$      12,000$      13,250$      
6258 4,250$    4,750$        5,250$        6,000$        6,750$        
6286 12,250$      13,500$      
6287 7,500$        8,250$        
6288 8,500$    9,750$        10,750$      6,000$        6,750$        
6314 4,250$    4,750$        5,250$        6,000$        6,750$        
6316 4,250$    4,750$        5,250$        6,000$        6,750$        
6317 6,000$        6,750$        
6324 6,000$        6,750$        
6326 8,500$    9,750$        10,750$      6,000$        6,750$        
6336 6,000$        6,750$        
6337 6,000$        6,750$        
6338 4,250$    4,750$        5,250$        6,000$        6,750$        
6423 6,000$        6,750$        
6432 6,000$        6,750$        
6469 6,000$        6,750$        




20,000$      20,000$      20,000$      20,000$      20,000$      20,000$      
Zone A Zone B Zone C
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This chapter provides background information explaining personnel supply 
problems within Marine Corps aviation maintenance; composition of the three 
maintenance levels; the various MOSs comprising aviation maintenance and their 
responsibilities; training progression for each MOS; the CDI, CDQAR, and QAR 
certification process and responsibilities of each qualification holder; aviation maintenance 
impact on readiness; and the SRB program’s purpose and guidelines. This information sets 
the foundation for Chapter II by identifying the highly technical fields comprising aviation 
maintenance and bonus pay programs used to induce re-enlistments. 
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III. ACADEMIC LITERATURE REVIEW 
Chapter II details aviation maintenance and the MOSs responsible for maintaining 
Marine Corps aviation assets. It also delved into the qualifications aviation maintenance 
Marines are eligible to obtain, and how these certifications positively impact aircraft 
readiness. Chapter I explained the primary question of this study, which is how bonus pay 
elasticities affect re-enlistment rates, or retention. Past studies presented in this chapter not 
only give details about analytical processes used to design the empirical frameworks used 
for this research, they also provide economic theories affecting retention within the 
military. The chapter divides these studies into three categories: reasons for separation; the 
effects of compensation on retention; determinants of the quantity and quality of re-
enlistments.  
A. REASONS FOR SEPARATION 
1. Survey Responses 
After the completion of a fiscal year, personnel within HQMC’s manpower office 
compile and analyze end of active service (EAS) survey results. These questionnaires 
originally started in FY05 to determine Marines’ overall satisfaction with the Marine Corps 
and military life, as well as find factors that influence retention the most. The target 
population of these surveys are those active duty Marines, regardless of MOS, in zones A 
through C who have separation dates in the respective fiscal year (United States Marine 
Corps, 2015). The zones focused on include enlisted Marines at critical points in their 
careers, and are the population targeted by SRB programs. Yearly SRBs express bonus pay 
amounts based on eligibility, which is determined by a Marine’s zone and other factors 
spelled out in the SRB MARADMIN.  
Within the survey, Marines are asked to rank reasons driving an individual’s 
decision to separate and reasons causing them to be more likely to re-enlist. The number 
one reasons influencing a Marine’s decision to not re-enlist are civilian job opportunities 
(United States Marine Corps, 2015). This ranking did not change between FY15 and FY16, 
but the overall percentage of those Marines stating they are not likely to re-enlist increased 
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7 percent between the fiscal years (United States Marine Corps, 2015). While only 7 
percent of respondents completed the survey, other studies were found describing the same 
factor influencing retention.  
An article in the Marine Corps Times reporting on the FY15 EAS survey and 
trouble manpower planners were having in the beginning months of FY16 inducing 
Marines to re-enlist, also points to civilian job opportunities as strong contributor to 
Marines’ lack of interest in continued service (Schogol, 2017c).  
Fewer first-term Marines are signing on for a second re-enlistment 
compared to this time last year.… The Marine Corps is making slower 
progress towards re-enlistment targets for fiscal year 2016. … But re-
enlistment intent is on the decline across the enlisted ranks, according to the 
results of the 2015 EAS Enlisted Retention Survey. Of more than 4,200 
Marines who took that survey, 38 percent said they were unlikely to sign on 
for another term, up 7 percent since 2013. Respondents listed civilian job 
opportunities … as … the top reason influencing their decision to leave the 
Corps. (Schogol, 2017c) 
A second article also describes the same findings as presented in the Marine Corps 
Times article and FY16 EAS Enlisted Retention Survey. The article being published at the 
beginning of FY16 breaks down the FY15 EAS survey results, “the very first reason is 
‘civilian job opportunities.’ This is a perennial problem for the military ever since the all-
volunteer force debuted in the 1970s. The military is often at the mercy of the economic 
cycle. When there are more jobs on the outside, fewer people want to be on the inside” 
(United States Marine Corps, 2015).  
2. Alternative Opportunities: The Civilian Economy 
a. “An Analysis of Staffing and Special and Incentive Pays in Selected 
Communities” Study 
The first study supporting the survey results is a chapter of the 11th Quadrennial 
Review of Military Compensation. While the review does not focus on the occupations 
studied in this thesis, those jobs it studies face the same retention problems. The jobs 
mentioned in the review include highly trained individuals (which is costly to the DoD) 
that bring a high level of expertise and knowledge to their respective fields, but also suffer 
from high turnover rates. The authors of the Quadrennial Review analyze special and 
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incentive pays in these specialized communities: special operating forces (SOF), mental 
health professionals, linguists/translators, and remotely piloted vehicle (RPV) operators 
(Hogan et al., n.d.). Their methodology includes analyses of recruiting and retention 
experiences, civilian labor market alternatives using annualized cost of leaving (ACOL) 
models, and retention incentives. The authors collect historical and current pay, personnel, 
and bonus information, as well as individual community manning problems, civilian labor 
market supply and demand, and bonus pay response behavior (Hogan et al., n.d.).  
When conducting their analyses, the authors use past literature to help guide their 
study to determine special and incentive (S&I) pays are 5 percent of total compensation. 
These pays help manpower planners structure the force to meet mission and end strength 
requirements by targeting specific occupations rather than the entire group. The criteria the 
authors apply to S&I pays to six categories: “extraordinary civilian earnings opportunities, 
high training/replacement costs, rapid demand growth, onerous or dangerous conditions of 
service, special skills and proficiency, and performance and productivity,” none of these 
being mutually exclusive (Hogan et al., n.d.). Their analytical methods include SRB and 
career pay marginal costs comparisons, identification of civilian opportunities—presence 
of direct correlations between military and civilian occupations or highly sought skills if 
there is no comparison, expected growth in occupational fields, and review of workplace 
environments. 
As stated previously, the four occupational fields the review analyses are mental 
health, linguistics/translations, RPV operations, and SOF (Hogan et al., n.d.). Within the 
mental health profession, the authors find an increase in labor demand with a need for 
psychiatrists increasing by 10–12 percent for the Navy, Army, and Air Force. They also 
find non-physician officer specialties were also growing by 25–40 percent across those 
same services; and individuals in this profession receive military pay, including bonuses, 
equivalent to or greater than median civilian earnings (Hogan et al., n.d.). They conclude 
“retention rates for most mental health specialties are adequate, though retention rates for 
Navy enlisted and some officer specialties are below those of the other services. Current 
S&I pays appear to provide satisfactory incentives for managing the force.” However, to 
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remain competitive and meet growth goals, the authors recommend the services “recruit 
trained professionals using loan forgiveness and accession bonuses” (Hogan et al., n.d.). 
Within the linguistics field, the authors find compensation compares favorably with 
civilian alternatives, although there are shortages being experienced with the Navy and 
Marine Corps (Hogan et al., n.d.). These shortages are likely correlated to “substantial 
unmeasured differences in working conditions.” The Marine Corps uses the Foreign 
Language Proficiency Bonus (FLPB) to maintain language proficiency levels, but this 
incentive does not target specific manning requirement well (Hogan et al., n.d.). The FLPB 
is simply a stipend added to a Marine’s monthly compensation when she tests at specific 
skill levels. If the Marine scores a 1, she earns an additional $100 per month, with a 
maximum stipend of $500, based off maximum proficiency (Foreign Language Proficiency 
Bonus Installment Rates). As such, for the Navy and Marine Corps to have a more effective 
approach to linguist/translator retention a more aggressive use of SRBs should be 
implemented (Hogan et al., n.d.).  
The SOF occupational field is expected to grow, with 50 percent increased demand 
for explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) technicians and 39 percent increased demand for 
SEAL officers (Hogan et al., n.d.). Retention remains high as long as unexpected economic 
improvements do not occur. Due to this, meeting future personnel requirements will rely 
more on increased training capacity rather than retention improvements via incentive pays 
(Hogan et al., n.d.).  
Overall, the authors determine that direct civilian counterparts to military 
occupations affect retention if there is a large difference in compensation. SOF personnel 
are more likely to continue serving not only due to compensation, but also as a result of 
“high esprit de corps and commitment to mission” (Hogan et al., n.d.). RPV operators do 
not have a direct civilian job comparison but do have training and skills desired by civilian 
firms. Linguists and mental health professionals have high levels of training and experience 
that make them highly desirable by civilian firms, because those firms “poaching” 
employees from the military means they are receiving trained individuals and will not have 
the extra training expense.  
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b. “The Effect of the Civilian Economy on Recruiting and Retention” 
Study 
The second chapter of the 11th Quadrennial Review studies the relationship between 
the civilian economy and an individual’s probability to serve. The authors describe past 
studies identifying factors relating to military recruiting and retention and what events 
affect both (Warner, n.d.). While the study splits its findings into two categories: recruiting 
and retention, I present the authors’ findings concerning retention, as this concept is the 
focus of this thesis. The first model used in this study was the ACOL framework. This 
model evaluates financial returns of staying versus leaving (similar to a net present value 
(NPV) calculation) over all possible future periods. An individual’s decision to retain or 
separate is based on the period with highest value (Warner, n.d.). A positive value is 
indicative of an individual’s preference to continue his/her military service; whereas a 
negative value indicates his/her favoring separation. The authors do recognize there is an 
unobservable taste-for-service factor that drives individuals’ decisions, but as long as the 
maximum value is positive continued service is probable (Warner, n.d.).  
The authors amend this simple model to be more applicable to panel data, or 
longitudinal data (n individuals over T periods), using the ACOL-2 model. “Introduction 
of random shocks at each decision point allows low-taste individuals to remain in service 
if they draw a ‘good’ shock and high-taste individuals to leave if they draw a ‘bad’ shock” 
(Warner, n.d.). The authors find high-taste personnel are more likely to retain than low-
taste individuals, despite these “shocks,” as this model accounts for this self-selection.  
In this study, the authors expound on the Dynamic Retention Model (DRM). In this 
framework, “an individual with a given … taste for service evaluates the payoff to all 
possible future stay-leave sequences and makes a retention decision based on a weighted 
average of these payoffs compared to the payoff from immediate separation” (Warner, 
n.d.). Simply, it is a detailed combination the of ACOL and ACOL-2 frameworks. Using 
these frameworks, the authors conclude that retention rates are elastic with pay levels. 
“Holding constant civilian sector wage opportunities, a 10 percent increase in overall 
current and future military compensation is estimated to increase the supply of high-quality 
enlisted recruits by between 6 and 11 percent (Warner, n.d.). The authors determine such 
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a rise would increase first-term retention by 15–20 percent, second-term retention by 10–
13 percent, and third-term re-enlistments by 5 percent (Warner, n.d.). This finding leads 
the authors to determine retention is sensitive to the state of the economy, which makes 
sense as military service may be viewed as a safety net when civilian opportunities are low.  
The authors expound on this idea when they describe supply and demand 
constrained recruits. They state high-quality recruits—those with a high school diploma 
and an Armed Forces Qualification Test (AFQT) score greater than 50 (average score) are 
supply constrained, while low-quality—those individuals scoring less than 50 and may or 
may not have a high school diploma, as demand constrained (Warner, n.d.). High-quality 
recruits are more likely to be in more technical fields, thus having skills highly desired by 
civilian firms, resulting in a higher probability of having civilian job opportunities. 
Logically, this means these individuals are more susceptible to market factors and military/
civilian pay opportunities. However, low-quality individuals are demand constrained 
because more can be recruited as needed. One example is when service branches were 
recruiting in high volume to sustain forces during Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi 
Freedom (OEF/OIF). Recruiters wanted high-quality individuals, but those people were 
either already serving or taking advantage of civilian opportunities. Since the military 
needed bodies, recruiters began signing low-quality individuals. Personnel in this category 
are less affected by the economy and are more likely to “require” less money to induce 
them to serve as their civilian opportunities may be less than their high-quality 
counterparts. While retention is susceptible to civilian economies, the authors determined 
“retention rates rise with experience and independently of compensation due to a sorting 
effect” (Warner, n.d.). Those with more experience have a higher taste for service, thus 
having higher retention. Since they have a higher taste and are more likely to retain, they 
are less likely to be swayed by compensation changes. 
To make military service more competitive with civilian opportunities, inducing 
personnel to retain to higher experience levels, manpower personnel use incentive pays to 
target a specific group for retention. In the case of high-quality individuals, they would be 
the target population. The authors find retention is responsive to bonuses targeted at 
specific groups, while being cost-effective for the military (Warner, n.d.). This matches the 
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intent described in the Marine Corps’ SRB program, as well as the goal current Marine 
Corps aviation leadership have of retaining high-quality individuals at the lowest cost.  
B. EFFECTS OF COMPENSATION ON RETENTION 
1. Elasticity 
a. “Why Do Pay Elasticity Estimates Differ?” Study 
The purpose of this Center for Naval Analyses (CNA) study is to examine 
variations in literature concerning enlistment supply pools and relationships between pay 
elasticities and changes in re-enlistment behavior (Hansen & Wenger, 2002). To determine 
pay elasticity is useful to manpower planners because “elasticities measure the 
‘responsiveness’ of people to changes in pay, higher elasticities mean larger increases in 
reenlistment for a given pay change. More simply, percentage changes in re-enlistment 
behavior for every percentage change in pay or bonus amounts. Similarly, the marginal 
costs of achieving reenlistment targets depend heavily on the pay elasticity” (Hansen & 
Wenger, 2002). Using ACOL framework and a dichotomous logit model, the authors 
examine the compensation and retention relationship.  
“In an ACOL model, ‘pay’ is the discounted difference between expected military 
compensation (if a person were to reenlist) and expected civilian compensation (if a person 
were to leave the Navy)” (Hansen & Wenger, 2002). The authors state the advantage of 
this model is “that it reveals the (person-specific) time horizon over which relative military 
compensation should be calculated” (Hansen & Wenger, 2002). Essentially, the ACOL 
framework gives insight into an individual’s options at a decision point. Most literature 
involving ACOL models target base pay, subsistence and housing allowances, and 
retirement pay. The authors use this same method in their study, but use “predictions of 
promotion opportunities, future dependency status, and retirement pay” when predicting 
future military compensation (Hansen & Wenger, 2002). Further adjusting the model, the 
authors include variables reflecting willingness to serve and civilian labor market 
prospects. The first variable determining taste-for-service is expected sea-shore rotation, 
which relates to an individual’s work environment. If she likes the environment, they are 
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more likely to re-enlist than those who do not like their place of work. ACOL models help 
the authors establish baseline expected compensations.  
As the study continues, they use a standard logit regression model (this is a logistic 
function to model the odds of the dependent variable being 1 or 0. In this study and my 
research, 1 being re-enlisting and 0 being separating) to estimate the correlation between 
pay elasticities and retention (Hansen & Wenger, 2002). Interpreting the results of this 
model is not clear due to nonlinear relationships between explanatory and dependent 
variables. The authors then measure pay elasticity of reenlistment (Hansen & Wenger, 
2002). The authors find “a 1-percent increase in basic pay leads to a 1.5-percent increase 
in reenlistment,” and “a one-level increase in the SRB multiplier is associated with an 
increase in the reenlistment rate of 2.5 percentage points” (Hansen & Wenger, 2002).  
The authors then examine how changes to explanatory variables affect the baseline 
estimates. First, they exclude individuals not eligible to reenlist. The pool of ineligible 
personnel is only 2 percent of the sample, so their exclusion from the model leaves the 
estimates unaltered. The authors suggest other reasons for this lack of change: the 
possibility of ‘adequately controlled for demand differences’ and “the true relationship 
between compensation and retention is identical for all Sailors, regardless of reenlistment 
eligibility” (Hansen & Wenger, 2002). Initially, race/ethnicity and age are included in only 
predictions concerning civilian compensation which yielded estimates 40 percent lower 
than those found in the baseline model. The authors state these findings match prior 
research suggesting “models using individual-level data are sensitive to the inclusion/
exclusion of these variables” (Hansen & Wenger, 2002).  
Through all the models implemented in this study, the authors conclude “baseline… 
pay elasticity estimate of 1.5 and a one-level increase in SRB multiplier…increase re-
enlistment by 2.5 percentage points” are comparable to past studies (Hansen & Wenger, 
2002). However, using alternative specifications, the pay elasticities range from 0.4 to 2.9, 
spanning the variation found in past literature. The authors express since the same data was 
used to “estimate each alternative model, the variation in estimated pay elasticities do not 
reflect real changes in the responsiveness” of individuals to pay, “rather the differences in 
amount of responsiveness the models attribute to pay” (Hansen & Wenger, 2002). “Models 
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with smaller pay elasticities or reenlistment place more emphasis on other variables in their 
explanations of reenlistment behavior” (Hansen & Wenger, 2002). The authors conclude 
“pay elasticity of reenlistment has not markedly changed over time,” but service members’ 
“responsiveness to pay was different during drawdown years” (Hansen & Wenger, 2002). 
Knowing how pay elasticities affect re-enlistment, this thesis can then begin describing the 
two categories comprising military compensation: basic pay and bonuses. 
2. Basic Compensation 
a. “Military Compensation—Trends and Policy Options” Study 
The authors of this study conduct their research to address DoD leadership’s 
concern regarding military compensation and retention. The study reviews current pay and 
retention situations and analyze specific compensation policies (Rand, 2000). First, the 
authors assess the current military pay climate examining pay gap magnitudes and other 
factors affecting retention. The authors estimate the pay gap is at 13.5 percent, but this 
difference is “the increase of civilian pay since FY82 relative to the increase in basic pay 
since that date” (Rand, 2000). The period covered in the study is FY82 to FY99. Measuring 
the increase in civilian pay is determined by the Employment Cost Index (ECI). Changes 
to military pay are measured by an index of basic pay. The authors find the “annual 
percentage increases in basic pay have been the same regardless of rank or years of service” 
(Rand, 2000). The authors do discuss how the DoD uses a lagged ECI to track pay gaps. 
However, they discuss problems with using ECI for military/civilian wage comparisons: 
“ECI population is not representative of military in key dimensions: age, education, 
occupation; Civilian wages are known to change differently for different age, education, 
occupation groups; Therefor, to gauge civilian wage change relevant to the military, the 
index population should represent the military population; and ECI is a single index and 
cannot be tailored to groups of interest to the military, e.g., officers, enlisted” (Rand, 2000). 
This makes sense as the military does not change an individual’s wages based on these 
mentioned characteristics, only when one is promoted to a higher rank.  
Knowing how ECI does not facilitate an accurate apples-to-apples comparison, the 
authors construct a Defense Employment Cost Index (DECI), where the “weights reflect 
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the composition of active duty personnel by age, education, occupation, gender, and race/
ethnicity” (Rand, 2000). The authors offer this new wage index offers a flexibility not 
available with ECI—now military pay gap estimates can be calculated for specific groups 
in the military. This allows for a determination of whether a gap for a particular “group is 
larger or smaller than an overall estimate, and therefore whether to expect more or less 
stress on retention” (Rand, 2000). The authors then estimate pay gaps for officers and 
enlisted members using the DECI. The study finds “a substantial difference between 
officers and enlisted personnel overall: no gap for enlisted personnel but a negative gap for 
officers. Most enlisted personnel have a high school education,” and during the early 1990s 
wages for high school graduates grew minimally. However, for officers, the pay gap is 20 
percent. “Their gap reflects the rapid civilian wage growth of college-educated workers” 
(Rand, 2000). The findings reflect fluctuating factor trends help determine pay gaps. “The 
positive gap for enlisted personnel in 1993–1997 means that since 1982 basic pay has 
grown 5 to 10 percent faster than civilian wages for workers with age, education, and 
occupations … similar to those of enlisted personnel. The gap computation does not 
assume that in 1982 enlisted pay equaled that of civilian counterparts” (Rand, 2000). The 
authors conclude that while military pay, during the study period, is above average, 
decision-makers need to be careful with long-term expectations. “The military wants to 
recruit and keep high-quality, well-trained personnel, yet military careers involve unusual 
rigors and at times extremely high risks. What the absolute pay comparisons include … is 
that to obtain the quantity and quality of personnel needed to meet the challenges of 
military duty, the services must pay well above the average” (Rand, 2000).  
The authors expound on these pay gap estimates by comparing the pay gaps of 
junior (five or fewer years of service) and senior (those with more than five years of 
service) enlisted. Using the “mark of the modern military,” the authors complete this 
comparison using education levels based on what is reported in Defense Manpower Data 
Center (DMDC), since modern militaries desire well-educated personnel (Rand, 2000). 
The findings include a “pay gap for junior personnel is positive … but the pay gap for 
senior personnel with some college is negative. This suggests that for junior personnel with 
intentions of getting further education … whatever pay advantage they enjoy would 
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dissipate if they remained in service after obtaining the education” (Rand, 2000). This 
suggests junior enlisted would be less incentivized to remain in service after acquiring their 
desired education level.  
These findings support an incident I experienced. I worked with a Marine (a senior 
Marine by the study’s definition, as he had 10 years of service) who completed his 
bachelor’s degree, then separated a year later. He knew he had better civilian opportunities 
once completing his college education, thus inducing him to opt out of continued service.  
Next, the authors review other factors affecting retention. The main area of concern 
for Asch and Hosek’s study is the findings concerning employment opportunities because 
these add another factor-level to an individual’s decision to re-enlist or separate. Due to 
economic expansion, new jobs have been created “driving the unemployment rate down 
from over 7.5 percent in 1992 to around 4.5 percent” in 1998 (Rand, 2000). “Low 
unemployment increases the odds of finding a job. As a result, a lower unemployment rate 
increases expected earnings in the civilian labor market” (Rand, 2000). The authors assume 
DECI findings “that military pay growth of junior personnel has not lagged civilian pay 
growth, there is all the more reason to believe that the low unemployment rate has been a 
factor that has hurt recruiting” (Rand, 2000). These findings support prior literature, 
discussed previously, focused on the effects of civilian competition on military retention. 
While past studies discuss that direct military to civilian occupation equivalents affect 
retention negatively, the “Military Compensation” study presents another aspect affecting 
civilian job opportunities: unemployment rate. Lower unemployment rates create more 
civilian job opportunities that may be more appealing to enlisted service members than 
continued service. This is especially true if civilian wages outpace military compensation.  
b. “Military Recruiting and Retention after the Fiscal Year 2000 Military 
Pay Legislation” Study 
This study summarizes the effects of pay legislation changes on military recruiting 
and retention. Responding to low retention in technical occupations and mid-careerists’ 
unhappiness with the current retirement program, because it was less generous than its 
predecessor, TRIAD was implemented (Rand, 2002). This program is the result of the 
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FY00 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) that included three provisions related 
to military compensation: “each year basic pay would be increased by 0.5 percentage points 
more than the change in the Employment Cost Index…the basic pay table” was restructured 
“giving somewhat higher raises to more experienced members who reached a specific 
rank” more quickly than the average service member, eliminating certain “notches” in the 
pay table; and “allowed members covered by the REDUX and getting a $30,000 bonus at 
year of service 15 in exchange for a commitment to complete 20 years of service” (Rand, 
2002). 
The authors are concerned with high-quality recruits and junior enlisted/officer 
retention. Using past literature, the authors choose a pay elasticity “upper and lower bounds 
of 2.5 and 0.5,” when estimating the effects of TRIAD on re-enlistment (Rand, 2002). Since 
pay increases are perceived differently by individual service members and a member may be 
undecided about her future in the military, future pay was discounted. “The discounting 
recognizes that a dollar tomorrow is worth less than a dollar today and the probability of 
staying in the military is less than one” (Rand, 2002). Past literature finds discount rates of 20 
percent for enlisted personnel, so the authors of this study use this metric when computing the 
effects of increases to TRIAD on re-enlistment. This results in finding “the increase is greater 
for people making zone B reenlistment decisions primarily because they are closer in time to 
the $30,000 retirement bonus” (Rand, 2002).  
Regarding military-civilian pay ratio elasticities, a decline in this value for zone A 
enlisted service members led to a predicted re-enlistment decrease from FY98-FY99 
compared to prior fiscal years. However, under “TRIAD, with its larger increase in 
military/civilian pay, the increase in reenlistment from FY99 to FY00 is larger. The story 
is the same for zone B, except that predicted reenlistment did not decline prior to TRIAD” 
(Rand, 2002). So, junior enlisted members, zone A individuals, are more susceptible to 
changes in military compensation compared to civilian pay than zone B, because they are 
not as close to retirement or the benefit of a retirement bonus, as well as this point, they 
may determine there is a range of civilian job opportunities greater than military 
opportunities. Ultimately, the authors found increases in TRIAD pays and unemployment 
rates resulted in increased re-enlistment from FY00-FY01 (Rand, 2002).  
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As far as retention is concerned, the services find three sources: “robust civilian 
economy that provided attractive opportunities to military personnel, especially to well-
educated individuals and individuals in highly technical areas. Demand for trained workers 
was unusually strong in certain sectors of the civilian economy, such as the airline industry” 
(Rand, 2002). Second, a large increase in peacetime deployments requiring separation of 
service members and their families to perform hostile duties affected retention. Finally, 
how the services managed decreases in end strength also affected retention (Rand, 2002). 
As a means to address retention concerns, the services use SRBs to increase the probability 
of enlisted members’ re-enlistment.  
The services track re-enlistment rates. These metrics are defined as “the percentage 
of personnel who reenlist or extend among those who reach a reenlistment or extension 
decision date within the 18-month period that begins at the start of the fiscal year” (Rand, 
2002). The authors obtain E1-E6 retention rates from DMDC, and they independently 
calculate these rates for first-term (zone A) individuals. The authors amend the definition 
of re-enlistment rates to “the percentage of personnel who make a new obligation 25 
months of more, relative to the population nearing the end of a service obligation and not 
extending” (Rand, 2002). Using this information, the study finds the retention rates of first-
term Marines remained steady at 21 percent, between FY95-FY99. In FY00, the rate 
increased to 25 percent (Rand, 2002). The authors determine that “perhaps as a result of 
pay increases contained in the FY00 National Defense Authorization Act, first-term 
retention improved for the Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps in FY00 and held steady for 
the Army” (Rand, 2002).  
Not only did changes to basic pay positively affect retention, changes to bonus pay 
also affected retention. “The purpose of SRBs is to provide the services with the flexibility 
to respond to temporary changes in reenlistment rates, such as those resulting from cyclical 
changes in the civilian economy that alter the flow of personnel to the midcareer and senior 
ranks” (Rand, 2002). From past literature, the authors find the average value of bonus pays 
is 8 percent of average cash compensation, but despite this small monetary value, these 
incentives have a positive effect on retention (Rand, 2002). “Special pays help to maintain 
the stock … of personnel in different occupation areas by recognizing important 
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differences in their duty requirement, skill requirements” (Rand, 2002). As such, SRB 
budgets have grown, over the years, but have also expanded to include more skill areas 
eligible for bonuses. “Eligible skills have risen from 129 to 176 in the Marine Corps since 
1997” (Rand, 2002). Since bonuses positively affect retention, the SRB program expanding 
to include multiple skills eligible for incentive pay would logically impact retention in a 
positive manner. As long as the military is able to maintain a high military/civilian pay 
ratio, or prevent it from reducing, and can continue leveraging SRBs, retention goals should 
be easily met.  
3. Selective Retention Bonuses 
a. “Cash Incentives and Military Enlistment, Attrition, and Reenlistment” 
Study 
Prior studies, and the Marine Corps’ SRB order, describe these incentive pays as a 
means to target specific occupations and/or skills enlisted members obtain during their 
service contracts. Military services use these bonuses to improve retention and meet re-
enlistment goals, so incentive pays are a means to supplement basic military compensation 
to keep military opportunities competitive with civilian job opportunities.  
The last study briefly discusses how SRBs had a positive impact on retention, this 
research further explores bonus effectiveness. The authors estimate a re-enlistment model 
using Army re-enlistment data from DMDC for the FY02-FY06 range (Rand, 2010). The 
authors generate a linear probability model of re-enlistment likelihood based off specific 
variables: SRB multiplier, if an individual received hostile fire pay, an individual’s receipt 
of non-hostile pay for deployment, years of service, education level, gender, AFQT score, 
race, and rate of promotion (Rand, 2010). Through the analyses conducted in this study, 
the authors find an absence of incentive pays would reduce re-enlistment rates, and that 
bonuses actually increase the length of re-enlistment chosen (Rand, 2010). Enlisted soldiers 
are able to choose the lengths of their next contracts (2-4 years of service), should they 
continue serving. For services, like the Marine Corps, where re-enlistment length is not left 
to the individual, bonuses do affect an individual’s willingness to re-enlist for an additional 
48 months of service. The authors offer this effect of bonus on length of re-enlistment as 
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diminishing returns. “As the SRB multiplier increases, the length of obligated service 
increases, but at higher multiplier levels, the positive effect on the length of obligation 
decreases” (Rand, 2010). Regardless of SRB amounts, an individual will reach a point 
where benefits of high bonus pay are overshadowed by the length of obligated service. The 
authors discuss factors causing such an effect: bonus caps, limit the ability of individuals 
to choose service length, and flexibility.  
Service members are aware of bonus caps. There is an excerpt from FY18’s bonus 
message explaining a Marine can receive no more than $200,000 in bonus pays, over the 
course of his/her career (Steele, 2017). An enlisted member deciding to separate or retain 
must account for bonus pays she may opt for this year and how that amount will affect 
future amounts, should incentives be offered. The Marine Corps also has the same policy 
the authors list as producing the diminishing effect of bonuses. Individuals are unable to 
choose contract length. In the bonus messages, Marines are informed should they take-up 
a bonus they must complete an obligatory 48 months of service. This means Marines do 
not have the same options as soldiers, where they can choose contract length based on the 
amount of bonus pay, they wish to accrue. As for the last factor, “re-enlistees faced with a 
higher multiplier may choose shorter term lengths that give them the flexibility to leave 
earlier to take advantage of civilian opportunities” (Rand, 2010). First-term Marines may 
have higher inclinations to take-up bonus amounts because what is an additional 4 years of 
service when one is 22. In the case of aviation maintenance Marines, they can have 8–9 
years-experience and training, making them more appealing to civilian firms, receive a 
decent sized bonus, and still have civilian job opportunities before 30.  
The literature discussion in the previous sections provide information to describe 
why enlisted Marines separate (competition from civilian labor markets) and how 
compensation (pay elasticities and SRBs) affects retention. Overall, the studies find re-
enlistment rates increase with high military-civilian pay ratios, low competition from 
civilian labor markets, and increased bonus amounts, to a certain point.  
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b. Example of Military-Civilian Pay 
I conduct a brief analysis of pay differences between military and civilian 
compensation for an E4 (Cpl) with 4 years’ experience. I chose this rank because it is the 
average grade of an enlisted Marine at decision point 1, the first re-enlistment opportunity. 
After the first comparison, I add another level of variability by including dependents and 
changing the Marine’s military compensation to reflect the additional money she would 
receive. The compensation with dependents includes basic pay, basic housing allowance 
(BAH), and basic allowance for subsistence (BAS) based on a Marine working aboard 
MCAS New River in Jacksonville, NC. I choose this location to pay homage to my first 
duty station. In the civilian sector, an avionics technician’s median salary is $62,650. Her 
military compensation, without dependents is $28,440, per 2018 base pay rates. With the 
additional BAH, her military pay increases to $40,664, and including BAS her total 
compensation totals to $45,097. Table 12 compares what this Marine would earn were she 
to re-enlist (without and with dependents), if she took the PMOS and aviation (av) 
maintenance (mx) kicker bonus, the annual salary comparison at each year (assuming no 
changes in base pay or BAH), and the total after four years.  
Table 14. Military-civilian pay comparison 
 
The rows identify a Marine’s total earnings over a four-year period given she has no dependent 
(top), has dependents (middle), or not applicable as civilian pay does not adjust based on 
dependents (bottom). Pay is what she will receive annually: top row is base pay, second row is base 
pay plus allowances, third row is civilian pay in an equivalent job. Y1 is what she makes in year 1 if 
she takes the bonus and kicker. Y2-Y4 corresponds to pay since bonuses are paid in a lump sum. 
Adapted from Defense Financial and Accounting Service (n.d.); Defense Travel Management 
Office (n.d.); Glassdoor (n.d.); Steele (2017); and USN (2017). 
 
The totals are a simple sum. Use of NPV is applicable to show the thought process 
an enlisted Marine should have if she is at a decision point, but for the purposes of 
comparison I use addition. When accounting for dependents, the civilian job market does 
MOS/Job Dependents PMOS bonus Av. MX kicker Pay Y1 Y2 Y3 Y4 Total
6116 N $14,500 $20,000 $28,440 $62,940 28,440$     28,440$   28,440$  $148,260
6116 Y $14,500 $20,000 $45,097 $79,597 45,097$     45,097$   45,097$  $214,888
Avionics 
Technician N/A N/A N/A 62,650$   62,650$   62,650$     62,650$   62,650$  250,600$   
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not pay extra for spouses and/or having children, thus these table columns are labeled N/
A. Pay is the annual salary the Marine earns given the controls-having dependents and 
bonus amounts, and Y1 is the total first year salary if she re-enlists or separates. The first 
row Y1 amount $62,940 is the total of the PMOS bonus, av. mx kicker, and pay columns. 
I use the same logic for the remaining observations. Y2-Y4 are what she earns in the 
remaining years. Again, this scenario is comparing what she makes if she re-enlists for an 
additional 4 years versus what she makes working an equivalent job in the civilian labor 
market. The total is the sum of all four years earnings. The differences in total earnings is 
apparent. As an enlisted Marine with no dependents, she earns $102,340 less than working 
in the civilian labor market, even with the bonus. The gap reduces if the Marine has 
dependents (Δ = $35,772), but potentially not enough to induce retention.  
This example highlights what past literature presents and potential reasons why the 
Marine Corps is having retention issues, especially in highly technical fields. Per this 
example, an enlisted Marine earns almost two times as much money in the civilian labor 
market as she can re-enlisting for an additional four years. Other immeasurable factors do 
play a role in a Marine’s decision to retain job satisfaction, such as overall satisfaction with 
the Marine Corps, flexibility of hours, etc., but compensation is a primary factor.  
This chapter provides insight into past studies examining pay changes and bonus 
programs’ effects on re-enlistment, as well as provides information on civilian market 
trends posing high levels of competition for military services and quality of service 
members dependent on times within a year they re-enlist. This information guides this 
thesis. Chapter III provides multivariate models and analyzes the results which examine 
how re-enlistment rates change over time, how re-enlistment changes with regards to 
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IV. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
A. DATA  
1. Data Sources 
I put together panel data that includes Marines’ re-enlistment, compensation, 
demographic characteristics, and job performance evaluations. Having data in panel form 
allows for a more comprehensive analysis of how a subset of Marines reacts to pay and 
bonus changes over time (elasticities); and how the quality of these Marines change during 
the study period. Longitudinal or panel data follows the same individual Marine. In the 
case of this study, re-enlistment, compensation, and evaluation information are panel 
datasets. My demographic data is in cross-sectional form with observations starting at the 
beginning of the study.  
Each row in the dataset corresponds to an individual’s information at the time of 
the information pull. The sample includes all aviation maintenance Marines (serving and 
separated) from fiscal years 2008–2018 but using only the latest personal information 
available in Marine Corps Total Force System (MCTFS). The final set of variables includes 
cross-sectional data of SRB payments, along with pay receipt dates. This dataset lists the 
total amount of bonus pays a Marine has taken up, so it is not broken down by monthly 
snapshots, preventing identification of bonus types taken. Total Force Data Warehouse 
(TFDW) provides the panel and cross-sectional data. TFDW stores monthly snapshots of 
Marines’ personnel files from (MCTFS). MCTFS captures individual’s training and 
personnel information. TFDW provides historical personnel information to facilitate my 
answering the study’s primary question. I use historical base pay data, for all enlisted 
Marines over the study period, from Defense Finance and Accounting Service (DFAS). 
This data allows for military and civilian compensation comparisons and generating pay 
ratios that affect re-enlistment rates. The U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) provides 
historical median civilian salaries, from 2008–2018, for three broad occupational fields: 
avionics, aircraft service and maintenance technician, and aircraft structure, surface, 
rigging and systems assemblers (aircraft assembly for remainder of study). These are the 
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only aviation maintenance specific occupations in the historical pay charts, however, they 
are equivalent to the MOSs in the Marine Corps’ aviation maintenance field.  
2. Data Processing 
I use most of the study’s research period cleaning and coding data. I use Excel to 
create tables for information found on DFAS and BLS. I also use STATA to import all 
Excel datasets and text data, clean the information, and merge it into various files for 
analysis, creating three primary databases. The first is an individual re-enlistment data 
consisting of re-enlistment indicators, pay ratios, and personnel characteristics. The second 
dataset includes fitness report markings, proficiency/conduct averages, and re-enlistment 
indicators. This set includes officer information. Some of the observations may be prior 
enlisted, so fitness report data covers periods of enlistment and post-commissioning. I drop 
officer observations since the study focuses on enlisted personnel. The third set is strictly 
compensation information but includes military and civilian pays. Collapsing each dataset 
prior to running regressions mitigates the multiple entries each observation has, at a given 
point in time. For example, the original compensation dataset has monthly snapshots of 
individuals’ compensation over the course of their service. So, person 1 may have 20 dates 
next to her identification number, while person 5 may have 100. The new panel provides 
information in fiscal year snapshots. Instead of person 1 having 20 observations, she now 
has 5 corresponding to service fiscal years.  
a. Variables 
(1) Demographic  
Assuming demographic data play a role in a Marine’s decision to re-enlist or 
separate, I include them in the models. The major variable in this data are PMOSs, in tables 
1-5 (p. 16–27), especially the MOS code for CDI, QAR, and CDQAR, since the study 
focuses on how bonus pays affect the re-enlistment of Marines with one of these aviation 
maintenance qualifications. The numeric variable for the CDI/CDQAR/QAR MOS is 
6018; I then create a binary indicator for the 6018 PMOS.  
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I include the following demographic variables as they are essential in determining 
what other aspects of a Marine’s life affects re-enlistment decisions: age, years of service, 
rank, number of dependents, and binary indicators for: some college, bachelor’s degree, 
master’s degree, doctorates, female,” “black, Hispanic, married, military spouse. “ are all 
numeric variables.  
(2) Re-enlistment and Pay 
I then create re-enlistment eligible and re-enlisted binary variables using re-
enlistment data. The re-enlisted variable equates to an occurrence when a re-enlistment 
date matches a date of re-enlistment eligibility.  
I use monthly pay types to create a single compensation variable and generate a 
compensation plus bonus variable for all Marines who have total SRB amounts associated 
with their identification number. After merging these variables, I create pay ratios, dividing 
military compensation by annual civilian pay. All pay ratios and pay variables (including 
SRB caps) are numeric.  
(3) Quality  
I use the AFQT scores in the demographic data to create a quality binary variable. 
Per past research, “high-quality” individuals were those scoring above 50 on their AFQT, 
while “low-quality” are those scoring below 50. Working off this assumption, I create a 
quality variable categorizing Marines with AFQT scores of 50 or greater as “high-quality” 
and those scoring 49 or below as “low-quality.” The AFQT score variable, in Table 15, is 
numeric and shows the range of scores for the sample.  
(4) Descriptive Statistics 
Although I specifically mention only a few variables in this section, most of the 
demographic information is crucial to include in the multivariate models in this study. 
Table 15 presents descriptive statistics of those variables most important to a Marine’s 
decision to re-enlist or separate.  
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Table 15. Descriptive statistics of key demographic variables 
 
 
b. Data Cleaning 
I begin by cleaning the compensation data. There are 12 types of pay in the 
compensation data, so for analysis I combine certain categories. I also aggregate total 
annual pays across snapshot month for each year, per person. Once complete, I merge 
compensation data into the demographic dataset.  
Using this new database, I create demographic variables for analysis. I drop 
variables whose values are mostly missing (e.g., assigned and future billet codes). Marital 
status includes married, widowed, divorced, separated, single, and annulled, so I create two 
categories: married and single. Those individuals listed as widowed, divorced, separated, 
single, or annulled are all grouped as single. I generate indicators for whether the military 
spouse is in the active forces, reserves, or National Guard. Race and ethnicity variables are 
cleaned and categorized into white, black, or Asian; and ethnicity as Hispanic or non-
Observations Mean Min. Max. Observations Mean Min. Max.
Age 320,126 27.158 17 57 Female 320,126 0.063 0 1
(5.934) (0.242)
AFQT Score 320,126 66.883 0 99 Hispanic 320,126 0.159 0 1
(16.090) (0.366)
Aircraft Assembly Civilian Pay 320,146 50,488.050  43,600  55,400  Married 320,134 0.576 0 1
(3,592.468) (0.494)
Aircraft Assembly Mil/Civ Pay Ratio 320,146 0.741 -1.525 6.536 Masters Degree 320,126 0.003 0 1
(0.403) (0.057)
Aircraft Maint. Tech. Civ. Pay 320,146 58,244.080  51,650  62,540  Military Spouse - Active Duty 320,134 0.046 0 1
(3,531.766) (0.210)
Aircraft Maint. Tech. Pay Ratio 320,146 0.642 -1.294 5.611 Number of Dependents 320,134 1.172 0 12
(0.349) (1.363)
Asian 320,126 0.025 0 1 Rank 305,545 10.871 8 13
(0.155) (1.307)
Aviation Maintenance Qualification 320,134 0.008 0 1 Re-enlisted 320,126 0.303 0 1
(0.091) (0.460)
Avionics Civilian Pay 320,146 58,054.210  49,360  63,650  Some College 320,126 0.037 0 1
(4,458.543) (0.189)
Avionics Mil./Civ. Pay Ratio 320,146 0.645 -1.293 5.593 SRB Cap 320,146 109,543.000  0 200,000     
(0.351) (39,049.060)
Bachelors Degree 320,126 0.031 0 1 SRB + Military Compensation 320,146 378.698 0 1,233,918  
(0.173) (13,603.010)
Black 320,126 0.085 0 1 Total Military Compensation 320,146 37,359.410    77,829  343,341     
(0.279) (20,389.910)
Doctorate 320,126 0.000 0 1 Years of Service 305,545 7.522 0 35
(0.008) (5.717)
Eligible for Re-enlistment 320,126 1.990 1 2
(0.099)
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Hispanic. I then codify education variables into indicators for: less than a high school 
education, high school diploma, GED, some college, Bachelor’s degree, Master’s degree, 
or a Doctorate.  
Re-enlistment data is the third dataset I clean. This set includes pay entry base date 
(PEBD), re-enlistment dates, armed forces active duty base date (AFADBD), expiration of 
current contract (ECC) date, and snapshot dates, which I convert from string variables to 
numeric. I translate the re-enlistment eligible, source of entry, and present grade variables 
from string to numeric. The source of entry variables corresponds to an enlistment a Marine 
is serving (first, second, third, etc.) and I use these to create zones corresponding to the 
ones in the SRB Program (United States Marine Corps, 2016).  
Fitness report data is the final dataset I clean. I create new variables for rank, report 
occasion, fitness test scores, MOS, duty type, adverse report, special case report, and 
commendatory material report. I generate first, second, and third-class physical fitness test 
(PFT) and combat fitness test (CFT) variables using actual scores in the data. Each duty 
assignment is broken down into one of six categories: school, combat/joint deployment, 
combat deployment, joint billet, peacetime billet, or MEU/MAGTF deployment. Then, I 
create variables identifying whether a Marine has a recommendation for accelerated 
promotion, promotion with peers, or no promotion. I also translate report average, report 
high, average, and observation period to numeric variables after all other cleaning is 
complete. Once each Excel sheet is clean, I merge them into one master dataset for analysis. 
c. Creating Analysis Variables 
Since analysis of pay is in the fiscal year timeline, I create fiscal year variables and 
array the panel data with respect to fiscal year as opposed to calendar year. 
My first set of analyses focus on re-enlistment rates at the aggregate level. For this 
level of analysis, I generate the denominator as the maximum number of re-enlistment 
eligible Marines in a fiscal year. The numerator is the sum of Marines who re-enlisted over 
the fiscal year-month. I then calculate the re-enlistment ratio by dividing the number of 
who re-enlist that fiscal year-month by the total number of eligible to re-enlist over the 
fiscal year. Then, I calculate pay ratios. I merge annual civilian pay into the master 
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demographic-compensation dataset after I extract fiscal years and fiscal year-months from 
snapshot dates. Then I add SRB maximum amounts to this master file, and I finish 
collapsing the set into a more streamline panel dataset. Each observation corresponds to 
one Marine’s fiscal year of total compensation value and maximum demographic values. 
After, I generate a bonus total by adding the compensation total and an SRB amount, if one 
exists. Then, I calculate three pay ratios using avionics civilian pay, aircraft service and 
technician civilian pay, and aircraft assembly civilian pay. I then divide total compensation 
by each pay to create a respective military-civilian pay ratio. Once all cleaning and coding 
is complete, I begin the multivariate analysis. 
B. MULTIVARIATE REGRESSION ANALYSIS 
1. Multivariate regression analysis method 
Multivariate linear regression (MLR) analyzes the relationships between two or 
more variables by fitting a linear equation to the data. These types of regressions use 
explanatory variables (independent characteristics) to help explain variations in the 
dependent variable, or the outcome.  
Outcomes of MLR include estimates, signs, and statistical significance. I use these 
same aspects to interpret the results of the regressions. The sign identifies whether an 
explanatory variable causes the dependent variable to increase or decrease. The estimate 
tells the magnitude at which the dependent variable will change per a 1 unit change to an 
explanatory variable, holding all other independent variables constant. The statistical 
significance relies on the independent variable’s p-value. P-values have thresholds of 0.05, 
0.01, and 0.001, indicating the degree of confidence the explanatory variable is statistically 
significant. The remainder of this chapter discusses the three aspects the researcher studies 
with regards to re-enlistment and quality of Marines.  
2. Re-enlistment Rates 
a. Findings 
Through graphical and MLR analysis, this study finds time of year and personal 
demographics correlate to re-enlistment odds of Marines eligible to re-enlist. The models 
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show which variables consistently correlate to statistically significant changes in re-
enlistment odds. Between both quarters, increased AFQT score and levels of education 
make the odds of re-enlistment less likely than a Marine with high school diploma or a 
Marine with a low AFQT score. This follows what I found in the literature. Individuals 
with high AFQT scores tend to be in more technical fields which tend to have more 
opportunities outside the military. The skills learned in the highly technical fields are 
transferrable to an equivalent civilian job, should it exist. The human capital aspect is also 
promising to civilian firms because hiring a trained military member negates the need for 
training once in the civilian firm. The firm saves time and money. Higher levels of 
education also correlate to greater job opportunities. A Marine with an undergraduate or 
postgraduate degree has potentially better opportunities in the civilian market than in the 
military because the Marine Corps may not regard civilian education as highly as it does 
professional military education.  
Models for both quarters identify being married, the number of dependents, years 
of service, rank, fiscal year, and holding an aviation maintenance qualification correlate to 
higher odds of re-enlistment. Continuing to serve means a Marine’s family continues to 
have free health and dental care. Housing and food allowances continue, and other services 
remain open to a Marine’s family should she re-enlist. Family care correlates to increasing 
re-enlistment likelihood. Increased rank and years of service push a Marine closer to 
retirement, so she continues re-enlisting to obtain a retirement pension. Increased fiscal 
years are equivalent to increased years of service. The more a Marine serves, the closer she 
is to retirement. 
Differences between the models show being African American is statistically 
significantly increasing the odds a Marine re-enlists during the first quarter, but not during 
the last quarter. This change identifies African American Marines may be more motivated 
or higher quality than white Marines, so they re-enlist early. Being female also changes in 
statistical significance, between the two quarters. At the first of the year, women are not 
statistically significantly more or less likely to re-enlist than men, but during the last quarter 
women have higher odds of re-enlisting. Maybe, women family plan during the first of the 
year and start those families during the later part, so re-enlistment becomes more likely to 
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secure a job and benefits. Being Hispanic also changes the likelihood. In the first quarter, 
Hispanic Marines have higher odds to re-enlist than non-Hispanic Marines, but during the 
last quarter of the year the odds are lower. Potentially, Hispanic Marines are more 
motivated to re-enlist early, so fewer re-enlistments occur at fiscal year’s end.  
b. Graphical Analysis 
The primary question of this study asks how changes to bonus amounts (elasticities) 
affect retention rates. The study covers the period of 2008–2018, researching fluctuations 
in re-enlistment and bonus amounts as the Marine Corps adjusts its force structure. For the 
remaining analyses, all Marines are from the aviation maintenance occupational field, but 
I refer to individuals as Marine to reduce confusion and redundancy when speaking of 
aviation maintenance qualifications. I first create graphs representing how re-enlistment 
rates vary over the course of a fiscal year, for each zone. Chapter I states zones are what 
the Marine Corps uses to determine bonus eligible populations. Zone A are generally junior 
Marines (E1-E4) completing their first enlistment, zone B (E5/E6) complete a second 
enlistment, and so on, until zone E (E7/E8) where senior enlisted complete a fifth 
enlistment and potentially retain past 20 years of service. Appendix B contains the graphs 
for this portion of the study. Figure 7 is the average monthly re-enlistment rate of zone B 
Marines during FY08.  
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Figure 7. Zone B re-enlistment rates 
Appendix B does begin with zone A re-enlistment rates, but the lack observations 
is not conducive for observing trends. Re-enlistment rates for zone A are so low due to the 
data. The average age of Marines in this data set is about 27-years-old, which means the 
average Marine in the sample is older than an average first-term Marine. The data contains 
numerous observations that have separated after one enlistment. Between these two factors 
and average years of service being higher than 4, the number of zone A re-enlistments is 
low. Since the dataset may be older, zone A re-enlistments only occur during the first two 
fiscal years displayed in Figure 6. My remaining graphs in this appendix examine re-
enlistment rates for zones B-E. Since it progresses over a fiscal year, month 4 is January 
and month 12 is September. This same logic applies to all graphs in appendix B. Generally, 
the red lines correspond to times throughout the fiscal year the Marine Corps stopped bonus 
pays for specific MOSs due to meeting re-enlistment goals. In this figure, the line at month 
4 corresponds to when the Marine Corps stops all bonuses due to no National Defense 
Authorization Act (NDAA) approval, as a result of the continuing resolution. However, 
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NDAA approval occurs at the end of January and bonus pays resume. Month 7 is the first 
cut-off date for FY08 bonuses. Zone A Marines in specific aviation maintenance MOSs 
are no longer eligible for those bonuses but can continue re-enlisting. The line at month 12 
is a bonus pay suspension given the assumption that since no messages occur prior to this 
date, and it being the end of the fiscal year. The FY08 re-enlistment rate figures all start at 
month 4 of that year because the data does not start until January 2008, but not having that 
first quarter’s data does not greatly impact this study. 
 Each graph is unique, but overall the greatest fluctuations in re-enlistment rates 
occur at the beginning and end of the fiscal years. This is logical because those highly 
motivated individuals are more likely to re-enlist tend to do so at the earliest opportunity. 
Those who wait until the end of the fiscal year may be undecided about their future in the 
Marine Corps or less motivated to re-enlist.  
c. MLR Model—Re-enlistment Rates 
Corresponding to the previous monthly graphic analysis, basic MLR models 
determine how zones, months in the fiscal year, and fiscal years affect re-enlistment rates. 
The general model examines re-enlistment trends and how they vary across zones and 
dates. The model I estimate is 
Y = β0+ β1X1 + β2X2 + ε  
where 
Y= monthly re-enlistment rate 
X1 = vector of zone indicators 
X2 = indicators for month in fiscal year or fiscal year  
ε = residual 
Each numbered column represents a model, the dependent variable is under the number at 
the top of each column, the explanatory variables are on the left side of the table, with the 
constant, number of observations, and R-squared values at the bottom.  
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Table 16. Linear regression models of fiscal year, month, and zone effects 
on monthly re-enlistment rates 
 
(1) (2)
Re-enlistment Rate Re-enlistment Rate
Zone
B 0.469 *** 0.469 ***
(0.029) (0.017)
C 0.545 *** 0.545 ***
(0.029) (0.017)
D 0.536 *** 0.535 ***
(0.029) (0.017)












































Month 12 (Sep.) 0.095 *
(0.046)




Standard errors in parentheses
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
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I use model 1 to evaluate re-enlistment rate differences among zones and the month 
a Marine chooses to re-enlist. Since zone and month are categorical, each needs a reference 
group: zone A and October. The constant is a starting point. A zone A Marine in month 1 
has a re-enlistment rate of 0.025. This Marine is new to fleet, so having a low re-enlistment 
rate makes sense. A lot could happen over the course of her first contract affecting her odds 
of re-enlisting. Holding month constant, Zone B Marines have re-enlistment rates of 0.469 
higher than zone A; zone C Marines re-enlist at rates of 0.545 higher than zone A; zone D 
Marines at 0.536 higher than zone A; and zone E Marines at 0.428 higher than zone A. 
Magnitudes of zone re-enlistment rates increase, but zones C and D have the highest re-
enlistment rates. These Marines are closer to retirement, so if they stay in long enough, 
they are guaranteed a pension. Zone E Marines re-enlisting for service past 20 years are 
Sergeant Majors (SgtMaj) or SgtMaj selectee hopefuls. Very few Marines become SgtMajs 
or wish to serve past 20 years, thus lower zone E re-enlistment rates than zones C or D. All 
these values are statistically significant, meaning zone greatly correlates to increased re-
enlistment rates. Months of re-enlistment are not statistically significant, except for 
September. As September is the last month a Marine can re-enlist for a specific fiscal year, 
missing the deadline to submit re-enlistment paperwork by 30th results in an unemployed 
Marine. While the remaining months are not statistically significant, they do follow the 
patterns observed in appendix B graphs. The largest magnitudes occur at the early and final 
months of the fiscal year, so Marines re-enlist at higher rates at the beginning or end of 
fiscal years. 
Since months are not statistically significant, I use model 2 to investigate if each 
fiscal year and zone correlate to re-enlistment rates. The reference categories for this model 
are zone A and fiscal year 2008. Each zone is statistically significantly correlated to re-
enlistment rates. The magnitudes increase, with zones C and D having the highest re-
enlistment rates. Unlike the months in model 1, each fiscal year is statistically significantly 
correlated to re-enlistment rates. As the fiscal years progress from 2009 to 2018, the re-
enlistment rates increase. Compared to 2008, re-enlistment rates in 2009 are 0.168 higher. 
2010’s rate decreases slightly compared to 2009. This may reflect SRB amount reduction 
between the fiscal years. The end strength of the Marine Corps did not change, so a 
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drawdown would not be a potential cause. However, the re-enlistment rate in 2010 is 0.156 
higher than the rate in 2008. 2011 re-enlistment rates are 0.309 higher than 2008 re-
enlistment rates. Re-enlistment rates in 2012 are 0.546 higher than 2008. 2013 re-
enlistment rates are 0.593 higher than 2008. Re-enlistment rates in 2014 are 0.497 higher 
than 2008 re-enlistment rates. 2015 re-enlistment rates are 0.519 higher than 2008. 2016 
re-enlistment rates are 0.525 higher than 2008. Re-enlistment rates in 2017 are 0.545 higher 
than rates in 2008. 2018 re-enlistment rates are 0.564 higher than 2008 rates. The one 
fluctuation is 2014 when the re-enlistment rate decreases. 2014 is the year the Marine Corps 
introduces the Voluntary Enlisted Early Release Program (VEERP) to facilitate a force 
drawdown, so this decrease might be a result of that program. 2015–2018 re-enlistment 
rates slightly increase, but overall stay relatively stagnant.  
d. Logistic Regression Model—Re-enlistment Rates 
I next estimate a logistic regression model using individual level data to determine 
the likelihood re-enlistment for an individual Marine occurs. Given the more aggregate 
time trends explored in the previous models, this more robust estimation allows me to 
determine if demographic and time variables statistically significantly correlate to a 
Marine’s probability of re-enlisting if she is eligible for re-enlistment.  
The general models I use estimate how demographics correlate to a Marine’s 
likelihood of re-enlisting during the first and last quarter of the fiscal year, and how date 
changes correlate to the same probability. The first estimation equation examines how 
categorical fiscal years correlate to re-enlistment probabilities.  
Pr(Y)t = β0 + β1X1 + β2X2 + β3X3 + β4X4 + β5X5 + β6X6 + β7X7 + β8X8 + β9X9 
+ β10X10 + β11X11 + β12X12 + β13X13 + β14X14 + β15X15 + ε 
where 
Y = probability of re-enlistment 
X1 = active duty  
X2 = AFQT score  
X3 = age 
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X4 = Asian  
X5 = aviation maintenance qualification  
X6 = bachelor’s degree  
X7 = black  
X8 = fiscal year indicators 
X9 = less than a high school education 
X10 = married 
X11 = master’s degree 
X12 = number of dependents 
X13 = rank 
X14 = reserves 
X15 = years of service 
ε = residual 
For this portion of the analysis, I include only Marines who are eligible for re-enlistment 
in the first and last quarters of the fiscal years. I note t=1 for the first quarter of the FY, and 
t=2 for the last quarter. I omit zone from these regressions because I include years of 
service. Years of service are more telling of a Marine’s probability of re-enlisting than 
zone. Zones encompass four years, but years of service update every year, so a Marine’s 
years of service change more frequently than her zone. I use categorical fiscal years to 
verify the trend observed in the previous regressions. Table 17 depicts the odds ratios 
resulting from the models. The odds ratio is the odds of re-enlistment relative to not, with 
a 1 unit change to an explanatory variable, while holding all other variables constant. Odds 
ratios greater than 1 signify higher odds the event will occur, while odds ratios less than 1 
identify the event is less likely to occur.  
75 
Table 17.  Logit models of the pr(re-enlisting): Odds ratios 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Pr(Re-enlist) Pr(Re-enlist) Pr(Re-enlist) Pr(Re-enlist)
t = 1 t = 2 t = 1 t = 2
Active Duty Spouse 1.135 ** 1.006 1.152 ** 1.112 ***
(0.048) (0.034) (0.047) (0.034)
AFQT Score 0.997 *** 0.997 *** 0.998 *** 0.998 ***
(0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Age 0.974 *** 1.006 * 0.975 *** 1.015 ***
(0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003)
Asian 0.781 *** 0.827 *** 0.812 ** 0.826 ***
(0.049) (0.034) (0.050) (0.033)
Aviation Maintenance Qualification 1.491 *** 2.030 *** 1.562 *** 2.132 ***
(0.105) (0.106) (0.107) (0.105)
Bachelors Degree 0.656 *** 0.762 *** 0.723 *** 0.781 ***
(0.027) (0.024) (0.028) (0.022)
Black 1.114 ***
(0.033)
Doctorate 0.079 *** 0.980 ***
(0.400) (0.046)
Female 1.194 *** 1.167 ***
(0.033) (0.031)




2010 0.028 *** 0.007 ***
(0.002) (0.000)
2011 0.032 *** 0.070 ***
(0.002) (0.002)
2012 0.365 *** 0.502 ***
(0.015) (0.011)
2013 1.375 *** 0.590 ***
(0.045) (0.013)
2014 1.302 *** 0.579 ***
(0.042) (0.013)
2015 1.348 *** 0.577 ***
(0.043) (0.012)
2016 1.358 *** 0.535 ***
(0.044) (0.012)




Hispanic 0.931 *** 0.920 ***
(0.015) (0.014)
Less than a high school education 0.590 *** 0.738 ** 0.568 *** 0.813 *
(0.079) (0.066) (0.075) (0.071)
Married 1.303 *** 1.348 *** 1.310 *** 1.377 ***
(0.033) (0.025) (0.032) (0.024)
Masters Degree 0.399 *** 0.557 *** 0.479 *** 0.552 ***
(0.048) (0.050) (0.052) (0.042)
National Guard Spouse 2.179 *** 2.049 ***
(0.347) (0.316)
Number of Dependents 1.151 *** 1.181 *** 1.175 *** 1.214 ***
(0.009) (0.007) (0.009) (0.007)
Rank 1.611 *** 1.717 *** 1.454 *** 1.587 ***
(0.022) (0.017) (0.019) (0.015)
Reserve Spouse 0.738 ** 0.988 0.743 **
(0.070) (0.510) (0.070)
Some College 0.944 *
(0.025)
Years of Service 1.147 *** 1.132 *** 1.144 *** 1.108 ***
(0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.003)
Constant 0.007 *** 0.007 *** 0.000 *** 0.000 ***
(0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Observations 178,745 281,491 190,449 299,640
Pseudo R-Squared 0.292 0.339 0.250 0.289
Standard errors in parentheses
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
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The comparison group I establish for all models in the table is an 18-year-old single 
white non-Hispanic male, with no dependents, who graduated high school, and holds an 
aviation maintenance MOS. These characteristics distinguish the reference group because 
the average enlisted Marine has these traits. Also, any changes to an explanatory variable 
that affect the dependent occur while all other variables are held constant. As each model 
changes, the amount of variation each model explains, and the number of observations also 
change. Model 1 explains 29.2% of the variation observed in re-enlistment probability of 
the total 178,745 observed; model 2 explains 25% of that variation of 190,449 
observations; model 3 explains roughly 34% of dependent variable variation of 281,491 
observations; and model 4 explains about 29% variation of 299,640 observations. The 
changes in observations between first and last quarter indicate more Marines re-enlist 
during the last quarter, and more observations occur during that period. Including the 
respective reference groups in the model increases the number of observations Stata uses 
to calculate re-enlistment odds. 
My prior regressions determine which variables are statistically significant and 
which are excludable to the final models. Most importantly, Marines with aviation 
maintenance qualifications have higher re-enlistment odds than non-certified Marines. 
These Marines are likely ones with relatively more taste for military service to be motivated 
to complete the certification process. This motivation likely carries over to other aspects of 
an individual’s life, including job. A highly motivated Marine who loves her job has greater 
odds of re-enlisting. Increasing age 1 year statistically significantly lowers the odds of first 
quarter re-enlistment but those odds increase during the last quarter. A Marine married to 
an active duty service member starts as statistically significant, resulting higher odds of re-
enlisting than a Marine married to a civilian. However, during the last quarter, active duty 
spouses are not statistically significantly correlated to a Marine’s re-enlistment odds. 
African American Marines have statistically significantly higher odds of first quarter re-
enlistment, 1.114 to 1, than white Marines. “Active duty spouse” is not statistically 
significantly correlated also during the last quarter. Other interesting relationships are 
“Doctorate” and “female” are statistically significant during the last quarter, but not during 
the first. Having a doctorate results in lower odds of re-enlistment, and being a woman 
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increases those odds. Also, Hispanic Marines have lower odds of re-enlisting during the 
last quarter, than non-Hispanic Marines, but ethnicity is not a decision factor during the 
first quarter. National Guard spouses increase the odds a Marine re-enlists during the last 
quarter, 2.179 to 1, compared to a Marine married to a civilian. While reserve spouses 
lower the odds a Marine re-enlists, compared to a civilian spouse, the statistical 
significance is present only during the first quarter. Demographic traits correlate to higher 
or lower re-enlistment odds during specific times of year, but how do individual years 
affect those odds once these traits are introduced into the environment?  
My fiscal years’ results show the willingness to serve or re-enlist increases as the 
years progress from 2008–2018. The reference group is 2008. No observations exist for 
2009, so the first analysis year is 2010. The odds of re-enlisting in 2010 are 0.028 to 1, 
lower than 2008 odds. The odds in 2011 are lower than 2008. 2012 odds are 0.365 to 1, 
lower than 2008 odds. However, in 2013 there is a shift where the odds show Marines are 
more likely to re-enlist than they were in 2008, 1.375 to 1. This change could be the result 
of the Marine Corps beginning to draw OEF/OIF to a close. 2013 is also the year the 
VEERP is announced, so Marines may be motivated to complete more years of service to 
qualify for and apply to the program. 2014 Marines have higher odds of re-enlisting than 
2008 Marines. 2015 has higher odds than 2008. 2016 Marines have higher odds of re-
enlisting than 2008 Marines, 1.358 to 1. 2017 Marines have greater odds of re-enlisting 
than 2008 Marines, 1.389 to 1. 2018 results as 1 because only a single observation that met 
the criteria occurs during those years. Since only one observation exists, there is no 
prediction Stata calculates that will be different from 1. Fiscal years in this model show the 
same trend as in model 1, increasing years correlate to increased re-enlistment odds and an 
increased willingness to serve.  
I use models 3 and 4 to examine the same variables as the previous models but use 
continuous years rather than categorical. Most of models’ 1 and 2 trends are in models’ 3 
and 4. Significant differences I note are “some college” and “fiscal year.” Some college is 
only statistically significant during the last quarter, and completing more college lowers 
the odds a Marine re-enlists. I relate this to past studies where increased education 
generates greater numbers of opportunities. The fiscal year variable is also important 
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because it mirrors categorical years’ trends, as years progress Marines are more likely and 
willing to re-enlist than past years.  
I use four models to examine how demographic variables and changes in fiscal year 
affect the odds a re-enlistment eligible Marine will re-enlist during either the first or last 
quarter of the fiscal year. I determine the test periods using trends observed in appendix B 
figures. I include fiscal years because Marines’ re-enlistment opportunities are fiscal year 
based, and the demographic traits I use are similar to ones I found in past studies. Now that 
part of my primary question has an answer, I examine how pay and bonus elasticities affect 
re-enlistment rates and odds.  
3. Compensation and SRB Pays 
a. Findings 
Per the models in this section, I find SRB amounts are not statistically significantly 
correlated to re-enlistment odds, but SRB caps and compensation changes are statistically 
significantly correlated to re-enlistment probabilities. Only a few variables I include in the 
estimation models are statistically significantly correlated to the odds of re-enlisting during 
the first quarter. Fiscal year and changes to total military compensation and SRB caps have 
statistical significance towards the odds of re-enlisting. Like previous models, increasing 
fiscal year results in higher odds a Marine will re-enlist. Increasing compensation 1-percent 
also results in higher odds a Marine will re-enlist. However, increasing SRB caps 1-percent 
lowers the odds a Marine re-enlists during the first quarter. The difference may be Marines 
are focused on the “big picture.” They understand having a higher salary produces greater 
long-term benefits than having an additional $10,000 in bonus money they may or may not 
be eligible to take. Reverse causality could also affect re-enlistment rates. The Marine 
Corps increases SRB caps in years they have low re-enlistment expectations, leading to a 
negative estimated relationship between SRB and re-enlistments. 
While first quarter re-enlistments are more financially focused, I find last quarter 
re-enlistment odds correlate to more demographic variables than first quarter odds. 
Increases in AFQT score, increased education levels, being Asian, being female, and 1-
percent increases in SRB caps statistically significantly lower the odds a Marine re-enlists 
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during this period. Being married, rank, zone, years of service, year progression, age 
increases, and having an aviation maintenance qualification statistically significantly 
increase the odds a Marine will re-enlist. Marines re-enlisting during the last quarter have 
more factors to consider than those who re-enlist early in the year. They have to weigh 
prospective external options, impact to family, and loss of personal benefits should they 
miss the re-enlistment deadline.  
b. Graphical Analysis 
 I generate military-civilian pay comparisons and pay ratios figures prior to 
executing regressions. These diagrams identify pay trends and illustrate how the Marine 
Corps lessens the gap between military and civilian salaries. Appendix C contains base 
military pay and annual civilian pay comparisons. Pays increase from 2008–2018, but the 
average base military pay is much lower than average civilian pays. I discover zones D and 
E Marines’ pay gaps decrease across fiscal years, but Marines make less than civilian 
counterparts 
Appendix D contains average total military annual pay (includes BAH and BAS) 
and mean civilian annual pay, per zone. I find an interesting outcome: military salaries are 
still lower than annual civilian salaries. Zones A and B Marines earn less total 
compensation than their average aviation maintenance counterparts. Zone C Marines from 
2008–2015 also earn less than civilian peers, but this difference begins to reduce in FY 
2016. The changes to zone C could be due to a 1.30% pay raise (Department of Defense, 
n.d.). Military base pay continues increasing in 2017 and 2018, matching the higher 
military pay seen in the later years of that zone. The fortunate Marines consistently earning 
more than average civilian aviation maintainers are zones D and E Marines. They earn 
more than the median civilian aviation maintenance salary, but these Marines have 
anywhere from 14–20 years of service only to make slightly more than an entry-level 
civilian maintainer. The appendix also contains average base military annual salaries 
compared to average civilian aviation maintenance pays over a decade, for each zone. 
Without BAH and BAS, Marines annually earn less than the average civilian aviation 
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maintainers, but past research uses pay ratios instead of salary comparisons to examine the 
effects of military versus civilian pays on retention. 
The figures in appendix E show pay ratios using total compensation (base pay, 
BAH, BAS) and bonuses. Zone A pay increases when including BAH and BAS, resulting 
in elevated ratios, but the trend matches Figure 8’s pattern, these Marines earn less than 
civilian counterparts. The remaining zones follow a pattern similar to the one observed in 
appendix D diagrams. The actual ratios increase due to military pay, but military members 
earn less than civilian aviation maintainers. Including BAH and BAS increases the total 
compensation a Marine earns, lessening the gap between military and civilian 
compensation. However, with extra padding from allowances, the Marine Corps underpays 
its Marines. Since bonus pays are integral to this study, I include graphs in this appendix 
depicting pay ratios using bonus amounts plus total compensation. Zone A does not have 
a graph due to no Marines taking up bonuses. Zone B shows ratios are high from 2009–
2012, then decrease from 2013–2016, with none being taken in 2017, and a dramatic 
increase in 2018. While the bonuses keep the ratios high, the decrease is most likely due to 
drawdown efforts. Marines may deem it more lucrative to get out during the drawdown, 
find an equivalent job earning more money, than take a bonus and stay in an organization 
that was looking for reasons to separate people. Zones C and D follow this same pattern, 
but zone E has spikes at 2009 and 2010 with no data present for the remaining periods. 
Those Marines have either retired or are no longer eligible for bonus pays.  
c. MLR Model—Pay Ratios 
I now examine how zone, fiscal year, and pay elasticities affect re-enlistment rates 
after completing re-enlistment-pay trends visualizations. Table 18 identifies the initial and 
final models of re-enlisting given fiscal year quarter and pay ratios being greater than zero. 
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Table 18. Pay ratio MLR models 
 
 
I use models 1–3 to examine the affects zone, fiscal year, and pay ratios have on 
re-enlistment rates. I include observations occurring during the first quarter to examine re-
enlistment rates. Model 1 explains 13.9% of the variation in 130,616 observations. 
However, in model 2, I use only those observations occurring during the last quarter of the 
fiscal year. This model explains 4.7% of the variation in 6,889 observations. I use model 3 
to examine how my entire sample varies after including pay ratios into the estimation 
equation. Model 3 explains 15.8% of the variation in 143,921 observations. As the results 
(1) (2) (3)
Re-enlist Re-enlist Re-enlist
t = 1 t = 2
Zone 0.133 *** 0.091 *** 0.117 ***
(0.001) (0.005) (0.001)
FY -0.007 *** -0.012 *** -0.046 ***
(0.000) (0.002) (0.001)
Aircraft Assembly Pay Ratio 3.936 ***
(0.980)
Aircraft Maintenance Pay Ratio 6.58 ***
(0.115)
Avionics Pay Ratio -11.051 ***
(0.163)
Constant 14.621 * 24.099 *** 92,876 ***
(0.840) (3.518) (1.392)
Observations 130,616 6,889 143,921
R-Squared 0.139 0.047 0.158
Standard errors in parentheses
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
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of the models are not odds ratios, estimate signs determine whether the dependent variable 
increases or decreases. The estimation equation for the models is  
Yt = β0+ β1X1 + β2X2 + β3X3 + β4X4 + β5X5 + ε  
where 
Y= re-enlist 
X1 = zone 
X2 = fiscal year 
X3 = aircraft assembly pay ratio 
X4 = aircraft maintenance pay ratio 
X5 = avionics pay ratio 
ε = residual 
t = 1 if first quarter or 2 if last quarter 
During the first quarter, increasing zone 1 unit has higher re-enlistment rates of 0.133, but 
the magnitude decreases during the last quarter. Increasing zone 1 unit in the year’s last 
three months results in higher re-enlistment rates of only 0.091. “Fiscal year” shows 1 year 
increases lower re-enlistment rates. This is the opposite trend from what I observe from the 
re-enlistment models where increasing fiscal years shows increased odds of re-enlisting; 
however, when accounting for pay elasticities, civilian pay outpacing military 
compensation reduces the willingness to serve.  
I implement model 3 using a similar format to model 2, but I include pay ratio 
variables. Zone and fiscal year are statistically significant, and the magnitude of fiscal year 
increases, but still shows decreasing re-enlistment rates. If civilian pay continually 
outpaces military pay, each year, Marines have potential for greater financial success 
external to the service. In the first two models, I examine how zone and fiscal year correlate 
to re-enlistment rates while holding pay ratio constant. However, I want to explore how 
military-civilian pay ratios affect my sample. So, I break pay ratios into three categories 
equivalent to the civilian jobs I researched: aircraft assembly, aircraft maintenance, and 
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avionics. My results show all pay ratios are statistically significant but correlate to re-
enlistment rates differently. If aircraft assembly pay ratios increase 1 unit, re-enlistment 
rates are 3.936 higher than if no change occurs. Increasing aircraft maintenance pay ratios 
1 unit increases re-enlistment rates 6.580. However, a 1 unit increase in avionics pay 
reduces re-enlistment rates 11.051. Two-thirds of my ratios behave in an expected manner, 
as they increase, the willingness to re-enlist increases. The only unexpected outcome is the 
avionics pay ratio. Maybe increasing military pay is not enough leverage to induce avionics 
Marines to re-enlist. These Marines have the most technical jobs and tend to be more 
cerebral than other aviation maintainers, so they may be more sensitive to poor leadership 
and work environments. Resulting in a lower willingness to chance future assignments. 
As with the re-enlistment rate models, zone and fiscal year are statistically 
significantly correlated to re-enlistment rates. Once I include pay ratios, I find they are 
statistically significantly correlated to re-enlistment rates. My pay ratio results are similar 
to past literature stating that as the military-civilian pay ratio increases, service members 
are more likely to re-enlist because compensation is on par with or greater than civilian 
compensation.  
d. Logistic Regression Model—Pay Elasticities 
After establishing how pay ratios correlate to re-enlistment rates, I examine how 
pay elasticities and demographic characteristics correlate to the odds a Marine will re-
enlist. Table 19 shows various iterations of models examining how changes to military 
compensation, SRB amounts, and SRB caps correlate to re-enlistment probabilities during 
the fiscal year’s first and last quarters while pay ratios are greater than 0. The estimation 
equation is  
Pr(Y)t = β0 + β1X1 + β2X2 + β3X3 + β4X4 + β5X5 + β6X6 + β7X7 + β8X8 + β9X9 
+ β10X10 + β11X11 + β13X13 + β14X14 + β15X15 + ε 
where 
Y = probability of re-enlistment 
X1 = AFQT score 
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X2 = age 
X3 = Asian 
X4 = aviation maintenance qualification 
X5 = bachelor’s degree 
X6 = female 
X7 = log(military compensation) 
X8 = log(SRB amount) 
X9 = log(SRB cap) 
X10 = married 
X11 = master’s degree 
X12 = rank  
X13 = some college 
X14 = years of service 
X15 = zone 
ε = residual 
t = 1 if first quarter or 2 if last quarter 
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Table 19. Logit models of Pr(Re-enlisting) given compensation and 





t = 1 t = 2 t = 2
AFQT Score 0.993 *** 1.010
(0.000) (0.114)
Age 1.024 *** 0.913
(0.003) (0.072)
Asian 0.887 ** 1.128
(0.040) (1.409)
Aviation Maintenance Qualification 1.438 *** 1.849
(0.087) (0.267)
Bachelor Degree 0.616 *** 0.064 **
(0.019) (0.064)
Compensation FY 1.336 *** 1.064 ***
(0.044) (0.004)
Female 0.819 *** 0.223 *
(0.021) (0.153)




Log(SRB Cap) 0.357 ** 0.367 *** 68.000 **
(0.113) (0.012) (92.354)
Married 1.215 *** 0.448
(0.018) (0.208)
Masters Degree 0.653 *** 1
(0.061) (omitted)
Rank 1.501 *** 1.180
(0.015) (0.385)
Some College 0.834 *** 0.911
(0.025) (0.675)
Years of Service 1.043 *** 1.200
(0.005) (0.139)
Zone 0.926 1.122 *** 1.663
(0.048) (0.016) (0.693)
Constant 0.000 *** 0.000 *** 0.000 *
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Observations 1,847 137,473 245
Pseudo R-Squared (0.027) (0.157) (0.158)
Standard errors in parentheses
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
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Models 1–3 show how demographic characteristics, time, and pay changes interact 
with re-enlistment probabilities. When I refer to pay, I include military compensation, 
bonus amounts, and bonus totals Marines may receive over an entire service. My 
observations vary as I transition between time periods: model 1 examines first quarter re-
enlistment odds, explaining 2.7% of the variation in 1,847 observations; model 2 examine 
last quarter odds, explaining 15.7% of the variation in 137,473 observations; and model 3 
also examines last quarter occurrences, explaining 15.8% of 245 observations. The number 
of observations drastically decrease between models 2 and 3 because of the regression 
criteria I set. Model 3 includes individual bonus elasticities, whereas model 2 does not. 
Since only a small subset of my sample has SRB amount occurrences, the number of 
observations is much lower. My reference group for the models is an 18-year-old non-
Hispanic single white male, who graduated high school, with an aviation maintenance 
MOS, has no dependents and who did not take up bonus pays.  
My results show that during the first quarter, only fiscal year and compensation and 
SRB cap elasticities are statistically significant. Increasing fiscal year 1-year results in 
greater odds of re-enlisting. This is different from the previous model, but I associate that 
with using military compensation elasticities instead of pay ratios. Marines may be less 
knowledgeable of equivalent civilian jobs’ salaries, so increasing military pay each fiscal 
year does increase their re-enlistment odds. A 1-percent increase in military compensation 
results in higher re-enlistment odds than no change and increasing SRB caps 1-percent 
lowers the odds of re-enlistment. Increasing SRB caps may induce more Marines to re-
enlist, making boat spaces more competitive, so fewer people are willing or able to re-
enlist. But the average person does not make decisions in a vacuum, or based off a single 
variable, she includes personal characteristics when weighing her options.  
I incorporate demographic characteristics in the last quarter that are not statistically 
significantly correlated to re-enlistment odds during the first quarter. I find SRB cap 
elasticities produce the same results, but compensation changes are not statistically 
significantly correlated to re-enlistment odds. If a Marine waits until the last quarter to re-
enlist, she may assume any future pay increases are sunk costs due to low re-enlistment 
ability during a time when boat spaces are limited, and competition is high. Factors other 
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than pay affect re-enlistment odds. As with prior models, increasing education levels and 
AFQT scores lower the odds of re-enlistment. Individuals fitting these criteria tend to have 
higher potential external opportunities. Female and Asian Marines also have lower odds of 
re-enlisting. These Marines may be the ones with higher AFQT scores or higher education 
levels, so they have greater civilian market prospects. Other personal characteristics 
correlating to higher re-enlistment odds include 1-unit increases in rank, zone, and years 
of service; being married; 1-year increases in age and fiscal year; and holding an aviation 
maintenance qualification. These traits express which factors lower or raise the odds a 
Marine re-enlists during the last quarter, but the last variable I examine answers my primary 
question.  
My final model includes SRB amount elasticities during the last quarter. I omit the 
SRB amount variable from my first quarter model because no observations have SRB 
amounts, so the variable is only in model 3. However, I find SRB amounts are not 
statistically significantly correlated to re-enlistment odds. The bonus variable that is 
statistically significantly correlated is SRB caps. A 1-percent increase in SRB caps increase 
the odds a Marine re-enlists 68 to 1. The results of this model may be overstated because 
the sample subset used are those observations where SRBs occur. The SRB data includes 
very few observations and is a total of bonus pays individuals receive over the course of 
the study. Since the subset is so small, the correlation of SRB amounts and caps to re-
enlistment probabilities may not be an accurate reflection of the entire sample. However, 
per the models SRB amounts do not statistically significantly correlate to re-enlistment 
odds, but SRB caps and compensation changes statistically significantly correlate to re-
enlistment probabilities. I examine different traits and decision factors a Marine may use 
when making re-enlistment decisions, and I have answers to my primary question and a 
couple of my secondary questions. My last question to answer examines how quality 
correlates to re-enlistment.  
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4. Quality of Marines 
a. Findings 
I find quality of Marine is not statistically significantly correlated to changes in 
SRB amounts or caps. Other factors affect what quality of Marine re-enlists, though. 
Generally, increases in education levels tend to lower the odds that a Marine re-enlists. 
Overall, high-quality Marines tend to have lower odds of re-enlisting because they tend to 
have greater human capital than low-quality Marines. Marines of this caliber are high 
performers who continuously expand their capital because they are motivated to be and do 
better. They strive for excellence. We define “high-quality” as those individuals with 
AFQT scores greater than 50, and “low-quality” as individuals with AFQT scores less than 
50. High-quality Marines generally work in more technical fields, so they receive more 
extensive and greater volumes of training to qualify for their pre-determined occupations. 
As such, some of these fields require continued education and training to earn certifications 
allowing them continued work in their current occupation or to progress to the next rank. 
This continual build of knowledge and skills broadens these Marines’ talent and 
strengthens their resumes should they opt for civilian job market opportunities. Because of 
these various factors, high-quality Marines have more options outside the Marine Corps 
than low-quality Marines. The following sections explain my findings.  
b. Graphical Analysis—Quality 
My diagrams in appendix F show fitness report averages, over the span of time I 
use for the study, for Sgts, SSgts, GySgts, MSgts, and MGySgts. The quality of all aviation 
maintenance Marines receiving fitness reports, except for GySgts, decrease. The averages 
decrease from 2008–2018. GySgt averages decrease up to 2017, then in 2018 a slight spike 
occurs. This change could indicate senior SNCOs are improving. Decreasing averages for 
Sgts and SSgts may indicate Marines promote too quickly in order to fill the gaps left by 
those leaving the service. The decreases in MSgts and MGySgts averages could be the 
cause of fewer enlisted Marines at those levels currently, than ten years ago. These figures 
identify NCO and SNCO quality is decreasing, but I still need to examine what factors 
affect first-term re-enlistment.  
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c. MLR—Quality 
(1) Re-enlistment on Marine Quality 
In this section, I examine how zone and Marine quality correlate to re-enlistment 
rates. Table 20 shows my findings. I defined quality of Marine by AFQT scores in this 
study using the same parameters as past studies. The estimation model I use is 
Yt = β0 + β1X1 + β2X2 + ε 
where 
Y = re-enlistment 
X1 = quality of Marine or quality of SRB taking Marine 
X2 = zone 
ε = residual 
t = 1 if first quarter of fiscal year or 2 if last quarter of fiscal year 




Quality of Marine -0.037 *** -0.047 ***
(0.002) (0.003)




Constant 0.335 *** 0.230 *** 0.590 ***
(0.002) (0.001) (0.004)
Observations 320,134 421,530 129,344
R-Squared 0.001 0.001 0.027
Standard errors in parentheses
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
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My first model examines how changing the quality of Marine affects re-enlistment 
rates. Increasing quality 1-point results in re-enlistment rates statistically significantly 
decreasing. Model 2 examines how quality of Marines taking bonus pays correlate to re-
enlistment rates. This quality variable is not statistically significantly correlated to re-
enlistment rates. Marine A, who takes a bonus, is not higher or lower quality than Marine 
B, who also takes a bonus. I find both variables in model 3 are statistically significant. 
Increasing quality 1-point lowers re-enlistment rates, but increasing zone 1-unit (i.e., 
moving from zone A to zone B) results in 0.061 higher re-enlistment rates than junior 
zones. So, more senior Marines have higher re-enlistment rates than junior Marines. The 
increased rates are most likely the result of those senior Marines striving for retirement. 
However, high-quality Marines have lower re-enlistment rates than low-quality 
individuals. Next, I examine how SRB elasticities correlate to Marine quality.  
(2)  Quality of Marine Given Re-enlistment  
Table 21 displays how changes in SRB amounts and caps correlate to the quality 
of re-enlisting Marines. I use the following estimation equation for this portion of the study. 
Y = β0 + β1X1 + β2X2 + ε 
where 
Y = quality of Marine 
X1 = log(SRB amount) 
X2 = log(SRB cap) 
ε = residual 
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Table 21. Quality of re-enlisted Marine 
 
 
I find SRB amounts do not statistically significantly correlate to quality of those who re-enlist 
nor do SRB caps. Since neither of these variables correlate to quality of Marine, I conclude 
bonus pays do not induce one quality of Marine to re-enlist at higher rates than another quality 
of Marine. My remaining regressions investigate how evaluations and demographic traits 
affect the odds high-quality Marines re-enlist versus low-quality Marines.  
d. Logistic Regression—Quality  
This portion of the study examines how demographic characteristics and E1-E4 
evaluations correlate to the probability a Marine re-enlists given her quality and quarter of re-
enlistment.  
(1) Re-enlistment Probabilities of High-Quality Marines 
My results in Table 22 identify the odds a high-quality Marine re-enlists, comparing 
first quarter to the last quarter of the fiscal year. My results are odds ratios, so estimates 
(1) (2)









Standard errors in parentheses
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
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less than 1 indicate a reduction in odds re-enlistment occurs. Estimates greater than 1 
correlate to increased odds in re-enlistment probability. My reference group for this study 
portion is the same as the past two: an 18-year-old single white non-Hispanic male with a 
high school diploma, no dependents, and no aviation maintenance certification. My 
estimation model is 
Pr(Y)t = β0 + β1X1 + β2X2 + β3X3 + β4X4 + β5X5 + β6X6 + β7X7 + β8X8 + β9X9 
+ β10X10 + β11X11 + β12X12 + β13X13 + β14X14 + ε 
where 
Y = probability of re-enlistment 
X1 = age 
X2 = Asian 
X3 = aviation maintenance qualification 
X4 = bachelor’s degree 
X5 = compensation fiscal year 
X6 = conduct evaluation 
X7 = female 
X8 = married 
X9 = master’s degree 
X10 = proficiency evaluation  
X11 = rank  
X12 = some college 
X13 = years of service 
X14 = zone 
ε = residual 
t = 1 if first quarter or 2 if last quarter 
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Aviation Maintenance Qualificat 1.279 ***
(0.087)
Bachelor Degree 0.632 *** 0.558 ***
(0.020) (0.055)
Compensation FY 1.023 *** 1.438 ***
(0.003) (0.014)




Married 1.120 *** 1.731 ***
(0.019) (0.075)
Masters Degree 0.762 **
(0.074)




Some College 0.856 ***
(0.028)




Constant 0.000 *** 0.000 ***
(0.000) (0.000)
Observations 105,012 32,620
Pseudo R-Squared 0.130 0.475
Standard errors in parentheses
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
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Since this section focuses on quality, my model mainly includes evaluation and 
educational levels creating a more complete picture of quantifiable quality. I omit AFQT 
score from the model because I use the scores to generate the quality variable used in this 
section. Once I complete the regression, I find the following variables are statistically 
significantly correlated to re-enlistment odds.  
Importantly, increasing proficiency evaluations 0.10 points results in higher odds 
of re-enlistment. High-quality Marines tend to have above average proficiency, so those 
with higher proficiency markings may be more motivated than the average high-quality 
Marine. Earning high proficiency ratings motivates those Marines because they are being 
rewarded for their efforts, thus they are more likely to re-enlist. Conversely, increasing 
conduct evaluations by 0.10 points lowers the odds a high-quality Marine re-enlist early in 
the fiscal year. This difference may be attributed to leadership. If these Marines observe 
they receive the same treatment from leadership as a Marine with lower conduct markings, 
they may be less inclined to re-enlist because their good behavior is rarely rewarded. These 
two variables are crucial in determining the odds a first-term Marine re-enlists, because 
this group is who the Marine Corps wants to retain.  
Like the previous models, other factors play a role in a Marine’s re-enlistment 
decision. During the first quarter, 1-year increases in age, years of service, and fiscal year 
result in higher re-enlistment odds. Married Marines, those who move from one zone to 
the next, and Marines with aviation maintenance qualifications also have higher odds of 
first quarter re-enlistments. The highlight of these results is those with aviation 
maintenance certifications have higher odds of re-enlisting. Again, this is the population 
the Marine Corps strives to retain, so the increased likelihood they re-enlist is beneficial to 
the firm. Increasing education levels, Asian Marines, and female Marines all have lower 
odds a high-quality Marine re-enlists during the first quarter. However, in the last quarter, 
“married,” “bachelor’s degree,” “fiscal year,” and “conduct evaluation” are the only 
statistically significant variables correlating to re-enlistment odds, and the estimates’ 
effects on this correlation do not change. Marines with bachelor’s degrees have lower odds 
of re-enlisting than Marines with high school diplomas. A 0.10-point increase in conduct 
evaluations lower the odds a Marine re-enlists. Increasing fiscal year 1-year results in 
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higher odds of re-enlisting and being married results in higher odds of re-enlisting than a 
single Marine.  
In the beginning of the fiscal year, Marines have more time to evaluate the different 
aspects driving a re-enlistment decision. High-quality Marines typically have higher levels 
of education, increasing the number of civilian job market opportunities available, so 
increased education reduces the odds a high-quality Marine re-enlists. Increased rank, 
zone, and years of service increase the likelihood of re-enlistment because these Marines 
are closer to retirement, and a pension, than more junior Marines, making senior enlisted 
more motivated to re-enlist. If money is not a significant decision factor for an individual, 
simple motivation and love of the Corps may be the reason for re-enlistment at senior 
enlisted levels.  
During the final months of the fiscal year, time is short so only a few decision 
factors affect Marines’ re-enlistment decisions: undergraduate education level, fiscal year, 
having a spouse, and conduct markings. Education levels correlation to high-quality re-
enlistment follows the same logic during this period as it does during the first quarter. 
Those with more education have more knowledge and skills tending to increase civilian 
job market opportunities than Marines with a high school diploma. Marriage is significant 
because the spouse may be convincing the service member to re-enlist, or the Marine is 
concerned with continued family care benefits if no opportunities outside the Marine Corps 
are available. My results show that regardless of quarter, high-quality Marines re-
enlistment odds are dependent on conduct evaluations, fiscal year, spouses, and education 
levels. How do low-quality re-enlistment odds compare? I answer this question in the next 
section. 
(2) Re-enlistment Probabilities of Low-Quality Marines 
Table 23 displays the results of this section’s estimation equations examining how 
demographic and evaluation variables correlate to low-quality Marine re-enlistments. The 
estimation model is  
Pr(Y)t = β0 + β1X1 + β2X2 + β3X3 + β4X4 + β5X5 + β6X6 + β7X7 + β8X8+ ε 
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where 
Y = probability of re-enlistment 
X1 = compensation fiscal year 
X2 = conduct evaluation 
X3 = married 
X4 = master’s degree 
X5 = proficiency evaluation  
X6 = rank  
X7 = some college 
X8 = zone 
ε = residual 
t = 1 if first quarter or 2 if last quarter 
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Compensation FY 1.395 ***
(0.029)
Conduct Evaluation 0.078 *** 0.600 ***
(0.033) (0.026)
Married 1.239 *** 1.905 ***
(0.051) (0.195)
Masters Degree 0.254 ***
(0.087)
Proficiency Evaluation 9.529 ***
(4.071)
Rank 1.351 *** 2.822 ***
(0.034) (0.139)




Constant 0.291 *** 0.000 ***
(0.030) (0.000)
Observations 19,656 5,730
Pseudo R-Squared 0.141 0.487
Standard errors in parentheses
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
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Proficiency and conduct evaluations play a significant role in affecting the odds a 
low-quality Marine re-enlists during the beginning months of a fiscal year. A 0.10-point 
increase in proficiency markings increase a low-quality Marine’s odds of re-enlisting 9.529 
to 1. Like high-quality individuals, those performing at high-aptitude levels receive a 
reward. This recognition tends to motivate the Marine to continue serving. If a low-quality 
Marine performs at above-average levels, the Marine Corps is more willing to allow a re-
enlistment; doing so cuts down on future training costs of replacing that individual and 
probability the replacement performs at a lower level. However, while conduct is 
statistically significant, a 0.10-point increase in that evaluation decreases the odds of re-
enlistment 0.078 to 1. Similar to high-quality individuals, if these Marines are not seeing 
any benefit of behaving more professionally than a peer, they are less likely to re-enlist.  
Model 2 examines how demographics affect last quarter low-quality re-enlistments. 
I find increasing fiscal year by 1 year increases the odds a low-quality Marine re-enlists 
1.395 to 1. Being married increases the odds a Marine re-enlists 1.905 to 1, compared to a 
single Marine, and increasing rank 1 unit increases the odds of re-enlistment 2.822 to 1. 
Increasing conduct evaluations by 0.10 points lowers the odds a Marine re-enlists 0.600 to 
1. Quality of Marine differs by AFQT scores, but these Marines are similar with regards to 
which attributes affect their re-enlistment decisions.  
Since high-quality Marines typically have higher levels of education, proficiency, 
and skill, they tend to have greater civilian job market opportunities than low-quality 
Marines. As such, any success in the Marine Corps had by low-quality Marines motivates 
their continued service and increases likelihoods to re-enlist compared to high-quality 
individuals. Overall, a Marine’s quality cannot be determined based off pay elasticities, but 
different qualities of Marines have similar characteristics influencing their re-enlistment 
odds. Chapter V summarizes my findings and provides recommendations for future 
research and ways forward.  
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V. SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. SUMMARY 
Maintaining highly qualified and highly trained aviation maintenance Marines, 
specifically those holding CDI, QAR, and CDQAR certifications is critical to the success 
of Marine Corps aviation. Having modern jets, helicopters, tiltrotors, and UAVs is not an 
economical use of the Marine Corps’ limited budget if the skills needed to keep them flying 
are non-existent. My thesis finds aviation maintenance specific skill certified Marines are 
more likely to re-enlist when eligible, compared to aviation maintenance Marines without 
a CDI, CDQAR, or QAR certification, with the odds increasing in the final months of a 
fiscal year. I also find changes to compensation and SRB caps compound onto the 
likelihood these Marines re-enlist, especially in the fiscal year’s last quarter. Marines re-
enlisting during this period may be waiting to re-enlist to identify potential pay changes for 
the subsequent fiscal year, then weighing their options between future civilian and military 
earnings. My results continue by finding that increasing quality of Marine decreases the 
odds she will re-enlist because she has human capital transferrable to numerous civilian 
job market opportunities. The correlation between re-enlistment and pay and bonus cap 
elasticities correlate to increased re-enlistment probabilities, but they are not causal. My 
thesis uses aviation maintenance Marines’ personal and financial data to identify re-
enlistment trends and predict re-enlistment odds.  
B. CONCLUSIONS 
The following conclusions are summarized using questions I present in Chapter I.  
1. Primary Research Question 
• How have bonus elasticities affected retention rates since 2008? 
My MLR analyses show changes to SRB caps positively influence the probability 
of re-enlistment, but SRB amount elasticity is not statistically significantly correlated to 
re-enlistment. However, my findings may be underestimated due to the small subset of the 
sample that took bonus pays. Since very few of my observations have bonus occurrences, 
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the influence bonus amounts had on their re-enlistment may be overshadowed by the 
majority of observations without bonus pays.  
Secondary Research Questions 
• Are Marines that have taken advantage of bonus pay the “high-quality” 
the Marine Corps strives to retain through its bonus pay programs?  
Increased elements of quality, like education levels, lower the odds a Marine will 
re-enlist. As a Marine develops new skills and thought processes through various education 
levels, her total human capital increases and generates greater numbers of civilian job 
market opportunities allowing her to be more transferrable with greater potential success 
outside the Marine Corps. My regressions using SRB caps and amounts find these 
elasticities are not statistically significantly correlated to quality. Bonus pays do not 
influence what quality of Marine takes incentive pays.  
• Is the Marine Corps able to meet is goals during times of high 
competition—low military-civilian pay? 
Based on my analysis, the majority of pay ratios have steadily increased, and 
increasing them does statistically significantly affect the probability a Marine will re-enlist. 
My findings show base compensation is much lower than the median equivalent civilian 
aviation maintenance salaries. The ratio increases once allowances are added to base pay, 
but total military compensation does not exceed median civilian earnings until a Marine is 
nearing the 15-year mark. This difference may influence knowledgeable Marines, but 
Marines deciding whether to re-enlist or separate may not pursue civilian job opportunities 
in the aviation maintenance field, so the pay ratios may not be entirely relevant to their 
decision.  
• Do other factors—such as marital status, number of dependents, race, test 
scores, compensation, age, years of service, holding a maintenance 
certification—affect the probability of an aviation maintenance Marine re-
enlisting? 
My analysis shows the traits that consistently influence re-enlistment odds are 
marital status, number of dependents, ethnicity, age, sex, years of service, rank, aviation 
maintenance qualifications, and level of education. These variables statistically correlate 
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to the probability of re-enlistment. Certification, spouses, increases to number of 
dependents, years of service, rank, and age, all increase the odds a Marine re-enlists, 
regardless of quality or pay. Ethnicity, race, and gender typically lower the odds of re-
enlistment. For there to be a positive outcome, or a Marine re-enlists, the effects of the first 
6 characteristics must outweigh the effects of the last three.  
C. RECOMMENDATIONS 
1. Changes 
The Marine Corps has started to align its workforce with strategic goals—
incentivizing aviation maintenance qualifications through bonus pays. FY 2018 is the first 
year an aviation maintenance specific kicker bonus is available to this population of 
Marines. Its target population is those Marines with CDI, CDQAR, or QAR certifications, 
and its purpose is to incentivize their continued service. Despite my findings, I know this 
program is too new to make recommendations for changes. The aviation maintenance 
kicker bonus should continue being offered to enlarge the data pool. However, one 
suggestion is to defer those Marines who hold one of those qualifications from being pulled 
from a maintenance department to fill a billet at a recruiting depot or drill field. Deferring 
such orders prevents loss of qualified aviation maintainers at the O- and I-levels. Speaking 
with a prior-enlisted Marine, he states one of his main reasons for separating is not wanting 
to be a drill instructor or recruiter for 3–4 years instead of continuing his job as a 
communications technician. If aviation maintenance Marines have the same feelings, 
deferring them from being placed on one of these secondary duties might induce a greater 
number of future re-enlistments.  
2. Areas for Future Study 
I recommend further study of this same topic after the kicker bonus has been offered 
for more than four years. I also suggest exploring what tiers of Marines are taking up 
bonuses and the rates they are being taken to help with future force structure planning. 
Since the Marine Corps fills boat spaces bycategorizing Marines in tiers—1 are top 
performers, 2 are average performers, and 3 are below average performers. The lowest tier 
is used to fill any remaining boat spaces to meet end strength goals. Determining rates at 
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which each tier re-enlists or takes up bonuses could help manpower planners schedule 
incentives more efficiently.  
Other areas of interest include studying the amount of time it takes aviation 
maintenance Marines to complete CDI, QAR, and CDQAR certifications. I also suggest 
examining aviation and maintenance mishaps trends during the periods of end strength 
fluctuations. Further study of these areas could lead to models appropriately incentivizing 
human capital gains that could be used for other highly technical areas. 
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APPENDIX A. SRB TABLES 
Table 24. FY17 SRB amounts. Adapted from Steele (2016).  
 
PMOS E3 E4 E5 > < E5 E6 > E6 E7 >
   6042   $ 12,000        13,250$
   6073   $ 12,000        13,250$
   6116   $ 12,500        $ 14,250        15,750$ $ 18,000        19,750$
   6156   $   8,250         $ 9,500         10,500$ $ 12,000        13,250$
   6216   $ 12,000        13,250$
   6217   $ 12,000        13,250$
   6257   $ 12,500        $ 14,250        15,750$ $ 12,000        13,250$
   6287   7,250$   8,000$   
   6288   $ 12,500        $ 14,250        15,750$
   6314   $ 12,000        13,250$
   6316   $ 12,000        13,250$
   6317   $ 12,000        13,250$
   6326   $ 12,500        $ 14,250        15,750$
   6338   $ 12,000        13,250$
   6492   $ 12,000        13,250$
   6499   $ 12,000        13,250$
Zone A Zone B Zone C
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Table 25. FY16 SRB amounts. Adapted from Spafford (2015). 
 
PMOS E3 E4 E5 > < E5 E6 >
6042 $ 11,750  13,000$   
6116 $ 12,000 14,000$  15,000$ $ 17,500  19,250$   
6156 $ 12,000 14,000$  15,000$ $ 17,500  19,250$   
6216 $ 11,750  13,000$   
6217 $ 11,750  13,000$   
6218 $ 12,000 14,000$  15,000$ $ 17,500  19,250$   
6256 $   8,250  $   9,250  10,250$ $ 11,750  13,000$   
6257 $   8,250  $   9,250  10,250$ $ 11,750  13,000$   
6258 $ 12,000 14,000$  15,000$ $ 17,500  19,250$   
6282 $ 11,750  13,000$   
6288 $ 12,000 14,000$  15,000$ $ 17,500  19,250$   
6314 $   8,250  $   9,250  10,250$ 
6316 $   8,250  $   9,250  10,250$ $ 11,750  13,000$   
6317 $ 11,750  13,000$   
6326 $   8,250  $   9,250  10,250$ $ 11,750  13,000$   
6336 $   8,250  $   9,250  10,250$ 
6338 $   8,250  $   9,250  10,250$ $ 11,750  13,000$   
6492 $ 11,750  13,000$   
6499 $ 11,750  13,000$   
Zone A Zone B
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PMOS E3 E4 E5 > < E5 E6 >
6042 $ 11,750  13,000$  
6046 $   4,000         $ 4,750  5,000$    
6072 $   4,000         $ 4,750  5,000$    
6074 $   4,000         $ 4,750  5,000$    
6113 $   4,000         $ 4,750  5,000$    
6114 $   4,000         $ 4,750  5,000$    
6116 $ 16,250 18,500$  20,500$  $ 17,500  19,250$  
6124 $   4,000         $ 4,750  5,000$    
6132 $ 12,250 14,000$  15,250$  
6153 $   4,000         $ 4,750  5,000$    
6154 $   4,000         $ 4,750  5,000$    
6156 $ 16,250 18,500$  20,500$  $ 17,500  19,250$  
6213 $ 20,250 23,250$  25,500$  
6216 $ 12,250 14,000$  15,250$  $ 11,750  13,000$  
6217 $   8,250  $   9,250  10,250$  $ 11,750  13,000$  
6218 $ 12,250 14,000$  15,250$  $ 17,500  19,250$  
6227 $   8,250  $   9,250  10,250$  
6253 $   8,250  $   9,250  10,250$  
6256 $ 16,250 18,500$  20,500$  $ 11,750  13,000$  
6257 $   8,250  $   9,250  10,250$  $ 11,750  13,000$  
6258 $ 12,250 14,000$  15,250$  $ 17,500  19,250$  
6282 $ 11,750  13,000$  
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6288 $ 12,250 14,000$  15,250$  $ 17,500  19,250$  
6314 $ 24,500 28,000$  30,750$  
6316 $ 12,250 14,000$  15,250$  $ 11,750  13,000$  
6317 $   8,250  $   9,250  10,250$  $ 11,750  13,000$  
6323 $   4,000         $ 4,750  5,000$    
6326 $ 24,500 28,000$  30,750$  $ 11,750  13,000$  
6312 $ 12,250 14,000$  15,250$  
6332 $ 12,250 14,000$  15,250$  
6333 $ 12,250 14,000$  15,250$  
6336 $ 12,250 14,000$  15,250$  
6337 $   8,250  $   9,250  10,250$  
6338 $ 16,250 18,500$  20,500$  $ 11,750  13,000$  
6423 $   8,250  $   9,250  10,250$  
6432 $   8,250  $   9,250  10,250$  
6469 $   4,000         $ 4,750  10,250$  
6483 $   8,250  $   9,250  10,250$  
6492 $   8,250  $   9,250  10,250$  $ 11,750  13,000$  
6499 $   8,250  $   9,250  10,250$  $ 11,750  13,000$  
Zone A Zone B
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PMOS E3 E4 E5 > < E5 E6 >
6042 $ 11,500        12,750$
6046 $   4,000         $ 4,500         5,000$  
6072 $   4,000         $ 4,500         5,000$  
6074 $   4,000         $ 4,500         5,000$  
6112 $   4,000         $ 4,500         5,000$  
6113 $   8,000         $ 9,250         10,000$
6116 $ 17,250        19,250$
6124 $   8,000         $ 9,250         10,000$
6132 $ 12,000        $ 13,750        15,250$
6156 $ 12,000        $ 13,750        15,250$
6213 $ 16,000        $ 18,500        20,250$
6216 $ 16,000        $ 18,500        20,250$
6218 $   8,000         $ 9,250         10,000$
6227 $   8,000         $ 9,250         10,000$
6253 $   8,000         $ 9,250         10,000$
6256 $ 12,000        $ 13,750        15,250$
6258 $   4,000         $ 4,500         5,000$  
6282 $ 11,500        12,750$
6288 $   8,000         $ 9,250         10,000$
6313 $   4,000         $ 4,500         5,000$  
6314 $ 20,250        $ 23,000        25,250$
6316 $ 12,000        $ 13,750        15,250$ $ 11,500        12,750$
6317 $   8,000         $ 9,250         10,000$
6322 $   8,000         $ 9,250         10,000$
6323 $   4,000         $ 4,500         5,000$  
6326 $ 24,250        $ 27,750        30,250$
6332 $ 12,000        $ 13,750        15,250$
6333 $ 12,000        $ 13,750        15,250$
6336 $ 12,000        $ 13,750        15,250$
6337 $   8,000         $ 9,250         10,000$
6338 $ 12,000        $ 13,750        15,250$
6423 $   8,000         $ 9,250         10,000$
6432 $   4,000         $ 4,500         5,000$  
6483 $   4,000         $ 4,500         5,000$  
6492 $   4,000         $ 4,500         5,000$  $ 11,500        12,750$
6499 $   8,000         $ 9,250         10,000$ $ 11,500        12,750$
Zone A Zone B
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PMOS E3 E4 E5 > < E5 E6 >
  6074  $    8,000      $    9,000     10,000$      
6112 $    8,000      $    9,000     10,000$      
6113 $    4,000     $    4,500    5,000$        
6116 $    4,000     $    4,500    5,000$        
6124 $  12,000     $  13,500    15,000$      
6152 $  19,750     $  22,750    24,750$      
6156 $  15,750     $  18,250    20,000$      
6213 $  15,750     $  18,250    20,000$      
6216 $    8,000      $    9,000     10,000$      
6227 $  12,000     $  13,500    15,000$      
6253 $  12,000     $  13,500    15,000$      
6256 $    4,000     $    4,500    5,000$        
6282 $  34,250     37,750$      
6283 $  34,250     37,750$      
6312 $    8,000      $    9,000     10,000$      
6313 $    8,000      $    9,000     10,000$      
6314 $    8,000      $    9,000     10,000$      
6316 $  12,000     $  13,500    15,000$      
6317 $    4,000     $    4,500    5,000$        $  17,000    18,750$      
6322 $  27,750     $  31,750    34,750$      
6323 $    4,000     $    4,500    5,000$        
6326 $  23,750     $  27,250    29,750$      
6332 $    8,000      $    9,000     10,000$      
6333 $    8,000      $    9,000     10,000$      
6336 $  15,750     $  18,250    20,000$      
6337 $  12,000     $  13,500    15,000$      
6338 $  12,000     $  13,500    15,000$      
6386 $    4,000     $    4,500    5,000$        $  11,500    12,500$      
6432 $    8,000      $    9,000     10,000$      
6483 $    8,000      $    9,000     10,000$      
Zone A Zone B
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Table 29. FY12 SRB amounts. Adapted from Barber (2011).  
 
 
PMOS E3 E4 E5 > < E5 E6 > E5 E6 E7 >
6062 $  27,250     $  31,250    34,250$      $  11,250     12,250$      
  6073  $   6,000      $   6,750      7,500$        
6074 $    7,750    $    9,000    9,750$        $  11,250     12,250$      
6112 $  11,750    $  13,500    14,750$      
6113 $  11,750    $  13,500    14,750$      
6114 $    7,750    $    9,000    9,750$        
6116 $    7,750    $    9,000    9,750$        
6124 $  19,500    $  22,250    24,500$      
6132 $  16,750    18,500$      
6152 $  27,250     $  31,250    34,250$      
6154 $    7,750    $    9,000    9,750$        
6156 $  27,250     $  31,250    34,250$      
6213 $  23,500    $  26,750    29,500$      
6227 $  15,500    $  17,750    $     19,500    
6252 $  11,750    $  13,500    14,750$      
6253 $  27,250     $  31,250    34,250$      
6256 $    7,750    $    9,000    9,750$        
6258 $  11,750    $  13,500    14,750$      
6282 $  16,750    18,500$      
6283 $    4,000    $    4,500    5,000$        $  16,750    18,500$      
6312 $  11,750    $  13,500    14,750$      
6313 $  23,500    $  26,750    29,500$      
6314 $  27,250     $  31,250    34,250$      $  16,750    18,500$      
6316 $  23,500    $  26,750    29,500$      
6317 $  15,500    $  17,750    $     19,500    $  16,750    18,500$      
6322 $  11,750    $  13,500    14,750$      $  33,500    37,000$      
6323 $  11,750    $  13,500    14,750$      
6324 $  23,500    $  26,750    29,500$      $  11,250     12,250$      
6326 $  35,000    $  40,250    44,000$      
6332 $  31,250    $  35,750    39,250$      $  11,250     12,250$      
6333 $  23,500    $  26,750    29,500$      
6336 $  27,250     $  31,250    34,250$      $  11,750    $  13,500    15,000$      
6337 $  23,500    $  26,750    29,500$      
6338 $  23,500    $  26,750    29,500$      
6386 $  19,500    $  22,250    24,500$      $  22,500    24,750$      
6414 $    7,750    $    9,000    9,750$        
6423 $    4,000    $    4,500    5,000$        
6432 $  23,500    $  26,750    29,500$      
6433 $  19,500    $  22,250    24,500$      
6434 $  11,750    $  13,500    15,000$      
6463 $  23,500    $  26,750    29,500$      $  28,000    31,000$      
6464 $  23,500    $  26,750    29,500$      
6466 $  28,000    31,000$      
6467 $  23,500    $  26,750    29,500$      $  28,000    31,000$      
6469 $  23,500    $  26,750    29,500$      $  28,000    31,000$      
6483 $    4,000    $    4,500    5,000$        
6484 $  23,500    $  26,750    29,500$      $  28,000    31,000$      
6492 $    4,000    $    4,500    5,000$        
Zone A Zone B Zone C
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Table 30. FY11 SRB amounts. Adapted from Barber (2010).  
 
PMOS E3 E4 E5 > < E5 E6 > E5 E6 E7 >
  6046  $    7,750      $    8,750      9,750$        $  11,000     12,250$      
6048 $    3,750    $    4,500    4,750$        $  11,000     12,250$      
6062 $  11,500    $  13,250    14,500$      $  11,000     12,250$      
6072 $  16,500    18,250$      $    5,750      $    6,750     7,500$        
6073 $    5,750      $    6,750     7,500$        
6074 $  11,500    $  13,250    14,500$      
6092 $    7,750      $    8,750      9,750$        $  16,500    18,250$      
6113 $  19,250    $  22,000    24,250$      $    5,500    6,000$        
6114 $  27,000    $  30,750    33,750$      $  11,000     12,250$      $    5,750      $    6,750     7,500$        
6116 $  30,750    $  35,250    38,750$      $  16,500    18,250$      
6123 $    3,750    $    4,500    4,750$        $    5,500    6,000$        
6124 $  27,000    $  30,750    33,750$      $  11,000     12,250$      
6132 $    7,750      $    8,750      9,750$        $    5,500    6,000$        
6152 $    5,500    6,000$        
6153 $    7,750      $    8,750      9,750$        $    5,500    6,000$        
6154 $  19,250    $   22,000    24,250$      $    5,500    6,000$        
6156 $  34,500    $  39,500    43,500$      $  27,500    30,500$      
6212 $    3,750    $    4,500    4,750$        
6213 $  15,500    $  17,500    $     19,250    $  16,500    18,250$      
6214 $  30,750    $  35,250    38,750$      
6216 $  16,500    18,250$      
6217 $  11,000     12,250$      
6218 $  19,250    $  22,000    24,250$      $  27,500    30,500$      
6222 $  15,500    $  17,500    $     19,250    
6223 $    3,750    $    4,500    4,750$        $  11,000     12,250$      
6227 $    3,750    $    4,500    4,750$        $  11,000     12,250$      
6252 $  11,500    $  13,250    14,500$      
6253 $  23,000    $  26,500    29,000$      $  11,000     12,250$      
6257 $  16,500    18,250$      
6258 $  19,250    $  22,000    24,250$      $  27,500    30,500$      
6282 $   15,500    $  17,500    $     19,250    $    5,500    6,000$        
6286 $    7,750      $    8,750      9,750$        $  11,000     12,250$      
6288 $  19,250    $  22,000    24,250$      $  27,500    30,500$      
6312 $    7,750      $    8,750      9,750$        $  16,500    18,250$      
6313 $    7,750      $    8,750      9,750$        $  16,500    18,250$      
6314 $  30,750    $  35,250    38,750$      $    5,500    6,000$        
6316 $  15,500    $  17,500    $     19,250    $    5,500    6,000$        
6317 $  15,500    $  17,500    $     19,250    $  16,500    18,250$      $    5,750      $    6,750     7,500$        
6322 $    7,750      $    8,750      9,750$        $  22,000    24,500$      
6323 $  27,000    $  30,750    33,750$      $  16,500    18,250$      
6324 $  30,750    $  35,250    38,750$      
6326 $  34,500    $  39,500    43,500$      $  16,500    18,250$      
6332 $  30,750    $  35,250    38,750$      $    5,500    6,000$        
6333 $  23,000    $  26,500    29,000$      
6336 $    7,750      $    8,750      9,750$        
6337 $  30,750    $  35,250    38,750$      
6338 $  34,500    $  39,500    43,500$      $  33,250    36,500$      
6386 $  27,000    $  30,750    33,750$      $  16,500    18,250$      
6414 $    7,750      $    8,750      9,750$        18,250$      
6423 $  11,500    $  13,250    14,500$      
6432 $    7,750      $    8,750      9,750$        
6433 $  30,750    $  35,250    38,750$      
6434 18,250$      $    5,750      $    6,750     7,500$        
6463 $  27,000    $  30,750    33,750$      
6466 $    3,750    $    4,500    4,750$        $    5,500    
6467 $  30,750    $  35,250    38,750$      $  11,000     
6469 36,500$      $  13,250     14,750$      
6483 $  15,500    $  17,500    $     19,250    
6484 $  27,000    $  30,750    33,750$      $  33,250    36,500$      
6492 $  19,250    $  22,000    24,250$      $    5,500    6,000$        
6493 $  34,500    $  39,500    43,500$      $  33,250    36,500$      
Zone A Zone B Zone C
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PMOS < E3 E4 E5 > < E5 E6 > E5 E6 E7 >
   6042  $     7,000      $    8,000      9,000$       $   25,500     $       28,500    
  6046 $     7,000      $    8,000      9,000$       $   25,500     $       28,500    
  6048 $   14,500    $   16,500    $      18,000    $   25,500     $       28,500    
  6062 $   10,500    $   12,500    13,500$      $   25,500     $       28,500    
  6072 $   20,500    22,500$      
  6073 $   10,500    11,500$      
  6074 $   25,000    $   28,500    31,500$      $   20,500    22,500$      
  6092 $   14,500    $   16,500    $      18,000    $   20,500    22,500$      
  6112 $   20,500    22,500$      
  6113 $   25,000    $   28,500    31,500$      $   20,500    22,500$      
  6114 $   36,000    $   41,000    45,000$      $   31,000    34,000$      
  6116 $   39,500    $   45,000    49,500$      $   20,500    22,500$      $   38,000     $   43,500     48,000$      
  6122 $   10,500    11,500$      
  6123 $     7,000      $    8,000      9,000$       $   15,500    17,000$      
  6124 $   32,000    $   37,000    40,500$      $   15,500    17,000$      
  6132 $   10,500    $   12,500    13,500$      $   15,500    17,000$      
  6152 $   15,500    17,000$      
  6153 $   18,000    $   20,500    22,500$      $   25,500     $       28,500    
  6154 $   25,000    $   28,500    31,500$      $   25,500     $       28,500    
  6156 $   32,000    $   37,000    40,500$      $   31,000    34,000$      $   22,000    $   25,000    27,500$      
  6212 $   18,000    $   20,500    22,500$      $   10,500    11,500$      
  6213 $   18,000    $   20,500    22,500$      $   20,500    22,500$      
  6214 $   53,500    $   61,500    67,500$      $   20,500    22,500$      
  6216 $   25,500     $       28,500    
  6217 $   25,500     $       28,500    
  6218 $   36,000    40,000$      
  6222 $   18,000    $   20,500    22,500$      
  6223 $   10,500    $   12,500    13,500$      $   20,500    22,500$      
  6227 $   25,500     $      28,500    
  6252 $   18,000    $   20,500    22,500$      $     5,000    5,500$        
  6253 $   18,000    $   20,500    22,500$      $   20,500    22,500$      
  6257 $   25,500     $      28,500    
  6258 $   36,000    40,000$      
  6282 $   28,500    $   33,000    $     36,000    
  6283 $   10,500    11,500$      
  6286 $   10,500    11,500$      
  6288 $   36,000    40,000$      
  6312 $   21,500    $   24,500    27,000$      $   36,000    40,000$      
  6313 $   21,500    $   24,500    27,000$      $   25,500     $      28,500    
  6314 $   53,500    $   61,500    67,500$      $   25,500     $      28,500    $   16,500    $   18,500    $     20,500    
  6316 $   25,000    $   28,500    31,500$      $   20,500    22,500$      
  6317 $   25,000    $   28,500    31,500$      $   31,000    34,000$      
  6318 $   36,000    40,000$      
  6322 $   21,500    $   24,500    27,000$      $   31,000    34,000$      
  6323 $   32,000    $   37,000    40,500$      $   25,500     $      28,500    
  6324 $   36,000    $   41,000    45,000$      $     5,000    5,500$        
  6326 $   43,000    $   49,000    54,000$      $   15,500    17,000$      $   16,500    $   18,500    $     20,500    
  6332 $   28,500    $   33,000    36,000$      $   41,000    45,500$      
  6333 $   32,000    $   37,000    40,500$      $   20,500    22,500$      
  6336 $     3,500    $     4,000    4,500$        $   20,500    22,500$      
  6337 $   32,000    $   37,000    40,500$      $  10,500    11,500$      
  6338 $   36,000    40,000$      
  6386 $   25,000    $   28,500    31,500$      $   25,500     $      28,500    
  6414 $   28,500    $   33,000    $      36,000    $      28,500    $   12,500    14,000$      
  6423 $   20,500    
  6432 $   14,500    $   16,500    $      18,000    
  6433 $   18,000    $   20,500    22,500$      
  6434 $      28,500    
  6463 $   14,500    $   16,500    $      18,000    $     5,000    
  6466 $     7,000      $    8,000      9,000$       $   31,000    
  6467 $   46,500    $   53,000    58,500$      $   20,500    $   25,000    27,500$      
  6469 40,000$      $   25,000    27,500$      
  6482 $   18,000    $   20,500    22,500$      
  6483 $   10,500    $   12,500    13,500$      $   10,500    11,500$      
  6484 $   25,000    $   28,500    31,500$      $   36,000    40,000$      
  6492 $     7,000      $    8,000      9,000$       $   10,500    11,500$      
  6493 $   28,500    $   33,000    $      36,000    $   36,000    40,000$      
Zone A Zone B Zone C
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Table 32. FY09 SRB amounts. Adapted from Bock (2008). 
 
 
PMOS < E3 E4 E5 > < E5 E6 > E5 E6 E7 > < E7 E8 >
      6042      $       22,500     $       25,500     29,500$      $       17,000     20,500$      $   16,500     $   18,000     21,000$      
      6046      $       27,500     $       31,500     36,000$      $       24,500     28,500$      $   11,000     $   12,000     14,000$      
      6048      $       24,000     $       27,500     31,500$      $       17,000     20,500$      $   11,000     $   12,000     14,000$      
      6062      $       20,500     $       23,500     27,000$      $       34,000     40,000$      $   19,500     $   21,000     24,500$      
      6072      $       22,500     $       25,500     29,500$      $       29,000     34,500$      $   25,000     $   26,500     31,500$      
      6073      $       22,500     $       25,500     29,500$      $       24,500     28,500$      $   25,000     $   26,500     31,500$      
      6074      $         7,000     $         8,000     9,000$        $       24,500     28,500$      $   19,500     $   21,000     24,500$      12,000$  
      6092      $       29,000     $       33,500     38,500$      $       27,000     31,500$      $   19,500     $   21,000     24,500$      
      6112      $         9,000     $       10,000     11,500$      $       19,500     23,000$      $   19,500     $   21,000     24,500$      
      6113      $       36,000     $       41,000     47,500$      $       34,000     40,000$      $   19,500     $   21,000     24,500$      
      6114      $       41,000     $       47,000     54,000$      $       22,000     26,000$      $   19,500     $   21,000     24,500$      
      6116      $       36,000     $       41,000     47,500$      $       53,000     62,500$      $   22,000     $   23,500     28,000$      
      6122      $         9,000     $       10,000     11,500$      $       19,500     23,000$      $   14,000     $   15,000     17,500$      
      6123      $       22,500     $       25,500     29,500$      $       22,000     26,000$      $   19,500     $   21,000     24,500$      
      6124      $       47,500     $       55,000     63,000$      $       17,000     20,500$      $   25,000     $   26,500     31,500$      
      6132      $       34,000     $       39,000     45,000$      $       19,500     23,000$      $   22,000     $   23,500     28,000$      
      6152      $         9,000     $       10,000     11,500$      $       19,500     23,000$      $   25,000     $   26,500     31,500$      
      6153      $       29,000     $       33,500     38,500$      $       24,500     28,500$      $   19,500     $   21,000     24,500$      
      6154      $       34,000     $       39,000     45,000$      $       31,500     37,500$      $   19,500     $   21,000     24,500$      12,000$  
      6156      $       34,000     $       39,000     45,000$      $       31,500     37,500$      $   19,500     $   21,000     24,500$      
      6212      $       27,500     $       31,500     36,000$      $       29,000     34,500$      $   16,500     $   18,000     21,000$      
      6213      $       19,000     $       21,500     25,000$      $       29,000     34,500$      $    8,500      $    9,000     10,500$      
6214 $       56,500     $       65,000     74,500$      
      6216      $       22,500     $       25,500     29,500$      $       17,000     20,500$      $   16,500     $   18,000     21,000$      
      6217      $       29,000     $       33,500     38,500$      $       27,000     31,500$      $   11,000     $   12,000     14,000$      
      6222      $       27,500     $       31,500     36,000$      $       10,000     11,500$      $   11,000     $   12,000     14,000$      
      6223      $       20,500     $       23,500     27,000$      $       10,000     11,500$      
      6226      $       19,000     $       21,500     25,000$      $       10,000     11,500$      
      6227      $       19,000     $       21,500     25,000$      $       10,000     11,500$      
      6252      $       30,500     $       35,500     40,500$      $       22,000     26,000$      $   16,500     $   18,000     21,000$      
      6253      $       32,500     $       37,500     43,000$      $       31,500     37,500$      $   30,000     $   32,500     38,000$      
      6256      $         5,500     $         6,000     7,000$        $       17,000     20,500$      $   14,000     $   15,000     17,500$      
      6257      $       20,500     $       23,500     27,000$      $       29,000     34,500$      $   14,000     $   15,000     17,500$      
      6282      $       27,500     $       31,500     36,000$      $       22,000     26,000$      
6283 $       17,000     $       19,500     22,500$      
      6286      $       12,500     $       14,000     16,000$      $       22,000     26,000$      
      6287      $         5,500     $         6,000     7,000$        $       22,000     26,000$      $   11,000     $   12,000     14,000$      
      6312      $       36,000     $       41,000     47,500$      $       36,500     43,000$      $   14,000     $   15,000     17,500$      
      6313      $       30,500     $       35,500     40,500$      $       36,500     43,000$      
      6314      $       61,500     $       71,000     81,000$      $       36,500     43,000$      $   14,000     $   15,000     17,500$      
      6316      $       36,000     $       41,000     47,500$      $       36,500     43,000$      
      6317      $       37,500     $       43,000     49,500$      $       38,500     45,500$      $   14,000     $   15,000     17,500$      
      6322      $       32,500     $       37,500     43,000$      $       17,000     20,500$      $   14,000     $   15,000     17,500$      
      6323      $       41,000     $       47,000     54,000$      $       29,000     34,500$      $   14,000     $   15,000     17,500$      
      6324      $       47,500     $       55,000     63,000$      $       29,000     34,500$      $   14,000     $   15,000     17,500$      12,000$  
      6326      $       51,000     $       59,000     67,500$      $       17,000     20,500$      $   14,000     $   15,000     17,500$      15,000$  
      6332      $       44,000     $       51,000     58,500$      $       34,000     40,000$      $   14,000     $   15,000     17,500$      
      6333      $       41,000     $       47,000     54,000$      $       31,500     37,500$      
      6336      $       24,000     $       27,500     31,500$      $       31,500     37,500$      $   19,500     $   21,000     24,500$      
      6337      $       37,500     $       43,000     49,500$      $       24,500     28,500$      $   19,500     $   21,000     24,500$      
      6386      $       47,500     $       55,000     63,000$      $       24,500     28,500$      $      8,500      $    9,000     10,500$      
      6412      $       19,500          
6413 $       19,500          
6414 $    9,000     10,500$      
      6423      $       34,000          
      6432      $        17,000     $       19,500     22,500$      $       22,000     
6433 $    11,000     
           6434           26,000$      $    12,000     14,000$      
6461 $       22,000      
      6462      $       10,000          
6463 $       22,500     $       22,500     29,500$      $       10,000          
      6466      $       26,000     $       29,500     34,000$      $       19,500          
      6467      $       53,000     $       61,000     70,000$      $       27,000          
           6469           31,500$      $    9,000     10,500$      
      6482      $       27,500     $       31,500     36,000$      $       27,000     31,500$      
      6483      $       14,000     $       16,000     18,000$      $       27,000     31,500$      $    25,000     $   26,500     31,500$      
      6484      $       32,500     $       37,500     43,000$      $       27,000     31,500$      
      6492      $       17,000     $       19,500     22,500$      $       24,500     28,500$      $    11,000     $   12,000     14,000$      
      6493      $       36,000     $       41,000     47,500$      $       36,500     43,000$      
Zone A Zone B Zone C Zone D
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Table 33. FY08 SRB amounts. Adapted from Morgan (2007).  
 
  
PMOS < E3 E4 E5 > < E5 E6 > E5 E6 E7 >
6042 19,500$      22,500$      26,000$      14,000$      16,500$      15,500$      17,000$      19,500$      
6046 19,500$      22,500$      26,000$      23,000$      27,500$      10,000$      11,500$      13,000$      
6048 19,500$      22,500$      26,000$      18,500$      22,000$      10,000$      11,500$      13,000$      
6062 19,500$      22,500$      26,000$      23,000$      27,500$      15,500$      17,000$      19,500$      
6072 19,500$      22,500$      26,000$      23,000$      27,500$      20,500$      22,500$      26,000$      
6073 19,500$      22,500$      26,000$      18,500$      22,000$      15,500$      17,000$      19,500$      
6074 26,000$      30,000$      34,500$      18,500$      22,000$      15,500$      17,000$      19,500$      
6092 19,500$      22,500$      26,000$      18,500$      22,000$      15,500$      17,000$      19,500$      
6112 23,000$      26,500$      30,500$      14,000$      16,500$      15,500$      17,000$      19,500$      
6113 26,000$      30,000$      34,500$      23,000$      27,500$      20,500$      22,500$      26,000$      
6114 29,500$      34,000$      39,000$      18,500$      22,000$      20,500$      22,500$      26,000$      
6116 26,000$      30,000$      34,500$      23,000$      27,500$      20,500$      22,500$      26,000$      
6122 19,500$      22,500$      26,000$      23,000$      27,500$      20,500$      22,500$      26,000$      
6123 23,000$      26,500$      30,500$      23,000$      27,500$      20,500$      22,500$      26,000$      
6124 32,500$      37,500$      43,500$      23,000$      27,500$      20,500$      22,500$      26,000$      
6132 19,500$      22,500$      26,000$      23,000$      27,500$      20,500$      22,500$      26,000$      
6152 23,000$      26,500$      30,500$      28,000$      33,000$      25,500$      28,500$      32,500$      
6153 23,000$      26,500$      30,500$      28,000$      33,000$      20,500$      22,500$      26,000$      
6154 23,000$      30,000$      34,500$      23,000$      27,500$      20,500$      22,500$      26,000$      
6156 29,500$      34,000$      39,000$      23,000$      27,500$      20,500$      22,500$      26,000$      
6212 19,500$      22,500$      26,000$      28,000$      33,000$      20,500$      22,500$      26,000$      
6213 26,000$      30,000$      34,500$      28,000$      33,000$      20,500$      22,500$      26,000$      
6214 32,500$      37,500$      43,500$      28,000$      33,000$      20,500$      22,500$      26,000$      
6216 19,500$      22,500$      26,000$      18,500$      22,000$      10,000$      11,500$      13,000$      
6217 23,000$      26,500$      30,500$      28,000$      33,000$      10,000$      11,500$      13,000$      
6222 23,000$      26,500$      30,500$      10,000$      11,000$      10,000$      11,500$      13,000$      
6223 19,500$      22,500$      26,000$      10,000$      11,000$      10,000$      11,500$      13,000$      
6226 19,500$      22,500$      26,000$      10,000$      11,000$      10,000$      11,500$      13,000$      
6227 19,500$      22,500$      26,000$      10,000$      11,000$      10,000$      11,500$      13,000$      
6252 23,000$      26,500$      30,500$      23,000$      27,500$      15,500$      17,000$      19,500$      
6253 26,000$      30,000$      34,500$      32,500$      38,500$      30,000$      34,000$      39,000$      
6256 13,000$      15,000$      17,500$      18,500$      22,000$      15,500$      17,000$      19,500$      
6257 19,500$      22,500$      26,000$      28,000$      33,000$      15,500$      17,000$      19,500$      
6282 19,500$      22,500$      26,000$      18,500$      22,000$      15,500$      17,000$      19,500$      
6283 26,000$      30,000$      34,500$      32,500$      38,500$      30,000$      34,000$      39,000$      
6286 19,500$      22,500$      26,000$      18,500$      22,000$      15,500$      17,000$      19,500$      
6287 19,500$      22,500$      26,000$      18,500$      22,000$      15,500$      17,000$      19,500$      
6312 26,000$      30,000$      34,500$      32,500$      38,500$      15,500$      17,000$      19,500$      
6313 29,500$      34,000$      39,000$      28,000$      33,000$      10,000$      11,500$      13,000$      
6314 32,500$      37,500$      43,500$      28,000$      33,000$      15,500$      17,000$      19,500$      
6316 19,500$      22,500$      26,000$      23,000$      27,500$      15,500$      17,000$      19,500$      
6317 26,000$      30,000$      34,500$      23,000$      27,500$      15,500$      17,000$      19,500$      
6322 29,500$      34,000$      39,000$      18,500$      22,000$      15,500$      17,000$      19,500$      
6323 32,500$      37,500$      43,500$      23,000$      27,500$      15,500$      17,000$      19,500$      
6324 29,500$      34,000$      39,000$      18,500$      22,000$      10,000$      11,500$      13,000$      
6326 39,000$      45,000$      52,000$      18,500$      22,000$      15,500$      17,000$      19,500$      
6332 32,500$      37,500$      43,500$      28,000$      33,000$      10,000$      11,500$      13,000$      
6333 32,500$      37,500$      43,500$      37,000$      44,000$      30,000$      34,000$      39,000$      
6336 29,500$      34,000$      39,000$      18,500$      22,000$      15,500$      17,000$      19,500$      
6337 29,500$      34,000$      39,000$      18,500$      22,000$      15,500$      17,000$      19,500$      
6386 29,500$      34,000$      39,000$      23,000$      27,500$      10,000$      11,500$      13,000$      
6412 16,500$      19,000$      21,500$      14,000$      10,000$      
6413 16,500$      19,000$      21,500$      14,000$      10,000$      
6414 27,500$      11,500$      13,000$      
6423 16,500$      19,000$      21,500$      23,000$      10,000$      
6432 23,000$      26,500$      30,500$      23,000$      10,000$      
6433 13,000$      15,000$      17,500$      23,000$      10,000$      
6434 27,500$      11,500$      13,000$      
6461 23,000$      26,500$      30,500$      23,000$      10,000$      
6462 19,500$      22,500$      26,000$      10,000$      10,000$      
6463 26,000$      30,000$      34,500$      10,000$      10,000$      
6464 10,000$      10,000$      
6466 16,500$      19,000$      21,500$      10,000$      10,000$      
6467 32,500$      37,500$      43,500$      23,000$      10,000$      
6469 27,500$      11,500$      13,000$      
6482 16,500$      19,000$      21,500$      23,000$      27,500$      15,500$      17,000$      19,500$      
6483 19,500$      22,500$      26,000$      23,000$      27,500$      20,500$      22,500$      26,000$      
6484 19,500$      22,500$      26,000$      28,000$      33,000$      10,000$      11,500$      13,000$      
6492 16,500$      19,000$      21,500$      18,500$      22,000$      10,000$      11,500$      13,000$      
6493 26,000$      30,000$      34,500$      32,500$      38,500$      20,500$      22,500$      26,000$      
 
                                                  
Zone CZone BZone A
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APPENDIX B. RE-ENLISTMENT RATES BY FISCAL YEAR 
A. FISCAL YEAR 2008 
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B. FISCAL YEAR 2009 
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C. FISCAL YEAR 2010 
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D. FISCAL YEAR 2011 
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E. FISCAL YEAR 2012 
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F. FISCAL YEAR 2013 
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G. FISCAL YEAR 2014 
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H. FISCAL YEAR 2015 
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I. FISCAL YEAR 2016 
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J. FISCAL YEAR 2017 
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K. FISCAL YEAR 2018 
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APPENDIX C. MILITARY BASE PAY VS. CIVILIAN PAY 
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APPENDIX D. TOTAL MILITARY PAY VS. CIVILIAN PAY 
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APPENDIX E. PAY RATIOS 
A. TOTAL MILITARY COMPENSATION/ANNUAL CIVILIAN SALARY 
RATIOS 
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B. BONUS-TOTAL COMPENSATION/ANNUAL CIVILIAN PAY RATIOS 
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APPENDIX F. QUALITY OF MARINES 
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